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Thesis summary
This thesis examines how stimulus similarity structure and the statistical properties of 
the environment influence human and nonhuman animal categorisation. Two aspects 
of categorisation behaviour are explored: unsupervised (spontaneous) categorisation 
and stimulus cross-classification. In my General Introduction, I raise the issue of the 
respective roles of similarity and the classifier in determining categorisation 
behaviour. In Chapter 1, I review previous laboratory-based unsupervised 
categorisation research, which shows an overwhelming bias for unsupervised 
classification based on a single feature. Given the prominent role of overall similarity 
(family resemblance) in theories of human conceptual structure, I argue that this bias 
for unidimensional classification is likely an artefact. One factor in producing this 
artefact, I suggest, are the biases that exist within the similarity structure of laboratory 
stimuli. Consequently, Chapter 2 examines if it is possible to predict unidimensional 
versus multidimensional classification based solely on abstract similarity structure. 
Results show that abstract similarity structure commands a strong influence over 
participants’ unsupervised classification behaviour (although not always in the 
manner predicted), and a bias for multidimensional unsupervised classification is 
reported. In Chapter 3, I examine unsupervised categorisation more broadly, by 
investigating how stimulus similarity structure influences spontaneous classification 
in both humans and rats. In this way, evidence is sought for human-like spontaneous 
classification behaviour in rats. Results show that humans and rats show qualitatively 
different patterns of behaviour following incidental stimulus exposure that should 
encourage spontaneous classification. In Chapter 4 ,1 investigate whether rats exhibit 
another important aspect of human categorisation; namely, stimulus cross­
classification. Results show that the statistical properties of the environment can 
engender such cognitively flexible behaviour in rats. Overall, the results of this thesis 
document the important influence of stimulus similarity structure and the statistical 
properties of the environment on human and nonhuman animal behaviour.
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Chapter 0
General Introduction
0. Categorisation in humans and nonhuman animals
Faced with a complex environment, human beings are required to identify 
efficient strategies to help deal with the world. One important process in this regard is 
categorisation: the assignment of objects, agents, or events to a set of instances of 
‘the same kind’; for, as noted by Komatsu, “To remember and treat everything in 
one’s environment as unique would require tremendous cognitive capacity” (1992, p. 
501). Not only does categorisation provide cognitive economy, it also plays an 
important role in mediating stimulus generalisation: that is, while classifying two 
stimuli into the same category will increase generalisation between them, classifying 
two stimuli into different categories will decrease generalisation between them 
(Hamad, 1987). Moreover, categorisation allows a person to infer a great deal from 
only a minimal amount of information (Komatsu, 1992). For example, once a person 
is informed that a novel entity is a dog, he or she can infer (with confidence) a wide 
range of different properties about that entity (e.g., that it will bark, chase sticks, etc.). 
Not surprisingly, then, categorisation forms the foundation for much of human 
cognition, including higher-level cognitive processes such as reasoning, decision 
making, and problem-solving.
One notable feature of human categorisation is that it is effortless, irrespective 
of whether the stimuli are simple, geometric patterns, or complex, naturalistic objects. 
This effortlessness should be viewed as all the more remarkable considering the 
incredible flexibility of human categorisation: a single object may be classified at a 
number of different levels -  superordinate (e.g., mammal), basic (e.g., dog), and/ or 
subordinate (e.g., Labrador; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976; 
Tanaka & Taylor, 1991) -  and in a variety of different ways depending on the context 
for classification (e.g., Barsalou, 1982; Tversky & Gati, 1978). For example, while a 
Labrador may be classified together with a wolf when considering overall appearance, 
such a classification would seem very odd within the context of “Pets”.
Of course, it is not just humans who are faced with a complex environment; 
nonhuman animals face similar challenges. As a result of these challenges, many
1
different species have been found to engage in complex forms of discrimination 
learning and ‘categorisation’ by rote (see Hermstein, 1990). Indeed, it is likely that 
these ‘basic processes’ are integral to everyday functioning and survival, affording 
efficient generalisation between stimuli. However, while the prowess of 
discrimination learning in nonhuman animals is undoubted (e.g., Hermstein, 1979; 
Hermstein, Loveland, & Cable, 1976; Vaughan & Green, 1984), fundamental 
questions have been asked about whether this learning reflects, in any sense, 
meaningful, human-like categorisation (see Chater & Heyes, 1994). Probably the 
most divisive issue in discussions of the difference between human and nonhuman 
categorisation is with respect to concepts. Following the philosophical distinction 
between ‘intension’ and ‘extension’ of terms first introduced by Frege (1892/1970), 
‘concepts’ are the presumed mental representations that mediate the assignment to 
‘categories’ (classes of objects in the world that somehow ‘go together’); or in 
Murphy’s words, “Concepts are the glue that holds our mental world together” (2002, 
p. 1). In research in humans, the distinction between categories and concepts is often 
blurred. This blurring is justifiable to some extent because of the critical assumption 
that categories are the expression of human concepts; when studying human 
categorisation, we are in effect studying human conceptual structure (at least, that is 
the assumption). However, this ‘blurring’ does cause problems during discussions 
and assessments of categorisation in non-linguistic agents (Chater & Heyes, 1994).
Over the past three decades, a number of influential theories of human 
conceptual structure have been proposed (a more detailed discussion of these is 
presented in Chapter 1). First came what has now been termed the “classical view” of 
concepts, which is premised on the assumptions of necessity and sufficiency (e.g., 
Katz, 1972; Katz & Fodor, 1963). That is, categories are assumed to be based on 
concepts that represent information about the attribute(s) that are necessary and 
sufficient for membership (Komatsu, 1992); consequently, this view has also been 
termed the “definitional account” of concepts. Bom from the philosophical work of 
Wittgenstein (1953), however, the 1970s brought to the fore a wealth of evidence that 
ultimately led to the classical view’s downfall (see, e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; 
Rosch et al., 1976; also Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes, 1980). In its place, new 
similarity-based views of concepts were soon conceived: first of this kind was
prototype theory, which assumes that concepts should be considered in terms of a 
summary (abstracted) representation of category members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975;
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see also Hampton, 1995; Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972). In its strictest form, 
therefore, category membership of a novel exemplar is determined on the basis of its 
similarity to, for example, an ‘average’ dog, an ‘average’ cat, etc. A second 
similarity-based approach soon followed in the form of exemplar theory (e.g., Medin 
& Schaffer, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981). In exemplar theory, concepts are 
considered in terms of a set of stored instances, which may or may not be abstracted 
across during classification (Komatsu, 1992). This view of concepts has been 
particularly influential, spawning the development of a family of related mathematical 
models that have provided some of the most detailed modelling of human behaviour 
to date (e.g., the Context Model, Medin & Schaffer, 1978; the Generalized Context 
Model (GCM), Nosofsky, 1986; and its connectionist implementation in ALCOVE, 
Kruschke, 1992; as well as extensions to include reaction times, EBRW, Nosofsky & 
Palmeri, 1997; and EGCM, Lamberts, 1995, 2000). While fundamentally different in 
nature, the predictions that arise from prototype and exemplar theory are often 
indistinguishable. While interesting, this fact has created numerous problems for 
researchers that are engaged in work comparing the different theories of concepts.
Similarity-based views of our everyday concepts have, however, been attacked 
on a number of fronts (e.g., Goodman, 1972). These fundamental critiques led to the 
development of new theories that expounded the theory-like nature of concepts, 
becoming known as the theory theory or knowledge approach (e.g., Murphy, 2002; 
Murphy & Medin, 1985). According to theory theory, concepts are intimately 
intertwined with people’s “naive theories” about the world: that is, coherent concepts 
‘fit’ with people’s general knowledge (Murphy & Medin, 1985). While general 
knowledge is clearly an important determinant of the way humans behave in their 
environment, a fully explicated account of theory theory is still to be provided. For 
example, fundamental questions have not been fully answered: what, exactly,
constitutes a theory; how is a theory implemented; how are theories brought to bear in 
real-world concepts? While some promising suggestions to the answers of these 
questions have been made (e.g., Kaplan & Murphy, 1999, 2000; Murphy & 
Allopenna, 1994), it is still the case that the most fully articulated proposals to date of 
our natural language concepts are prototype accounts (e.g., Hampton, 2001, 2003). 
Moreover, with respect to attempts to model human categorisation, the computational 
formalisation of general knowledge effects has proved extremely difficult (see Fodor, 
1983; Lewandowsky, Roberts, & Yang, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Pickering & Chater,
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1995). Of course, the fact that incorporating effects of general knowledge into models 
of categorisation is extremely hard does not, in itself, form a platform from which to 
reject theory-based views of concepts (see, e.g., Heit, 1997, 2001; Heit & Bott, 2000).
By contrast, research in nonhuman animals has typically denied any sense that 
‘categorisation’ in animals is driven by concepts (Chater & Heyes, 1994; but, see 
Schrier & Brady, 1987, for example). Rather, categorisation-like behaviour is 
commonly explained in terms of associative principles of learning. This is hardly 
surprising; the study of concepts in humans is hard enough, given that they can only 
ever be inferred. Interestingly though, categorisation-like behaviour in nonhuman 
animals has been explained using theories that are similar in kind to those that have 
been proposed to explain human categorisation (though in no sense are these theories 
considered ‘theories of concepts’; see Pearce, 1997, for a more detailed overview). 
For example, similar to the classical view of concepts in humans, feature theory in 
nonhuman animals assumes categorisation based on a set of defining features (e.g., 
D’Amato & Van Sant, 1988; Lea, 1984). These defining feature sets, however, are 
thought to be learned constructs, arising directly from experience. A number of 
authors have proposed exemplar views of nonhuman categorisation, in which stimulus 
generalisation provides the mechanism for the successful categorisation of novel 
stimuli (e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1992; Pearce, 1988, 1989, 1991). While some 
authors have tried to claim nonhuman animal categorisation based on a concept (e.g., 
Schrier & Brady, 1987), simpler learning mechanisms often suffice (e.g., mediated 
generalisation). As Pearce states, “it remains an open question as to whether or not 
success by animals in solving any categorisation problems ever implies the possession 
of a concept” (1997, p. 124; for a similarly critical position, see also Chater & Heyes, 
1994). While Pearce’s negative conclusion seems justifiable in light of present 
evidence, it is also apparent that, despite decades of research, the full scope of 
nonhuman categorisation is still to be resolved. For example, recent work has 
documented stimulus grouping in nonhuman animals that is beyond the scope of 
traditional associative analysis (e.g., Honey & Watt, 1998, 1999). One important 
reason for Pearce’s negative conclusion, I would argue, is due to the overwhelming 
use of supervised experimental procedures in investigations of nonhuman 
categorisation. As has been shown for the study of human categorisation, devoting 
appropriate resources to the study of unsupervised categorisation is essential for the 
adequate assessment of a species’ categorisation ability.
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Throughout this thesis, a distinction will be made between supervised 
categorisation and unsupervised categorisation (see Chapter 1). Briefly, supervised 
categorisation refers to a situation in which a classifier is required to learn a 
previously determined classification through trial and error; therefore, feedback is 
often continually provided. Unsupervised categorisation refers to stimulus 
classification that proceeds in the absence of feedback, and as such, is assumed to be 
determined by the classifier’s ‘natural preferences’. While one may presume that the 
mechanisms of supervised categorisation drive all classification, this is unlikely to be 
the case (at least for humans; Pothos & Chater, 2002). First, in humans, there are 
strong cross-cultural commonalities in the way humans come to categorise the world 
(e.g., Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin, & Smith, 1997; Malt, 1995; see Chapter 1). 
Second, generalisation of new words is often successful following presentation of just 
a small number of rival category exemplars (e.g., Feldman, 1997). As noted by 
Pothos and Chater, “This suggests that supervised learning of linguistic categories 
may be guided by rich prior constraints on what categories are plausible; and 
unsupervised learning provides a potentially important source of such constraints” 
(2002, p. 307). To my mind, the importance of research focused on unsupervised 
categorisation cannot be overstated: simply, it currently allows the best insight into 
people’s ‘natural’ categorisation biases (or preferences), and our best chance of 
understanding the fundamental principles that underlie everyday categorisation. 
Research focused on unsupervised categorisation is particularly important to the 
debate on whether our natural categories are mainly a product of a structured 
environment (e.g., Anderson, 1991) or the mind of the human classifier (e.g., Murphy 
& Medin, 1985)1. That is, does the abstract similarity structure for a set of objects 
bias and guide their classification, or is ‘knowledge’ (a “naive theory”) about a set of 
objects most critical in determining categorisation? While certain inferences about 
natural categorisation can be made from the study of supervised categorisation, the 
fact that people learn one very specific classification faster than a second very specific 
classification does not necessarily mean that the first classification is more natural .
Until fairly recently, research focused on unsupervised categorisation in 
humans was rather rare; indeed, even today such work is still dwarfed by research
Of course, it is most likely that categories reflect a complex interplay between the 
environment and the classifier (see Malt, 1995).
I appreciate that this does not reflect the full scope o f supervised categorisation research.
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assessing supervised categorisation. Given the inherent difficulty of determining the 
basis for participant classification in free (unsupervised) categorisation experiments, 
this is not at all surprising. However, due to the points specified in the preceding 
paragraph, unsupervised categorisation research has become more abundant. 
Moreover, a number of influential models of human unsupervised categorisation have 
now been proposed within the psychological domain (e.g., Anderson, 1991; Love, 
Medin, & Gureckis, 2004; Pothos & Chater, 2002). While some good progress has 
been made in our understanding of unsupervised categorisation, one particular 
anomaly (one might even say perversity) has dominated in findings from laboratory- 
based unsupervised categorisation research; namely, participants’ overwhelming use 
of a unidimensional sorting strategy. That is, when presented with a set of stimuli in 
the laboratory, people prefer to base their classifications on just one of the N  stimulus 
dimensions available (e.g., size). The reason why this is odd is because this does not 
fit with cognitive scientists’ current understanding of natural categories, which 
conform to the principle of family resemblance (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; 
Wittgenstein, 1953). Is there any sense that this bias for unidimensional classification 
represents a ‘natural’ preference in human unsupervised categorisation, or is it simply 
an artefact of the standard experimental setup? Understanding why unidimensional 
classification is so prevalent within laboratory-based investigations of human 
unsupervised categorisation is a topic of particular importance, and this issue is the 
focus of Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.
With respect to the dominance of unidimensional classification in the 
laboratory, some interesting work by Love (2002) has recently highlighted the 
importance of the distinction between intentional and incidental unsupervised 
categorisation (see also, Wattenmaker, 1991). Love (2002) found that whereas 
intentional unsupervised categorisation was associated with more ‘rule-like’ 
(unidimensional) category learning, incidental unsupervised categorisation was 
associated with more similarity-based categorisation (i.e., a preference for family 
resemblance structures). This distinction is important because while the majority of 
laboratory-based unsupervised classification can be considered intentional, natural 
unsupervised classification will, for the most part, be incidental -  that is, stimulus 
classification will not be the primary objective during a specific interaction (Love, 
2002). If one is interested in better understanding the processes that determine natural 
categorisation, therefore, the focus of experimental, laboratory-based research needs
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to be on classification that occurs incidentally. Moreover, the development of 
procedures to assess incidental categorisation in humans will likely prove invaluable 
for investigations of unsupervised categorisation in non-linguistic beings. Chapter 3 
of this thesis picks up on these issues and examines incidental unsupervised 
categorisation.
To fully understand the roles of the environment and the classifier in 
determining the formation of categories, one should also look to experiments with 
nonhuman subjects. If “the mind has the structure it has because the world has the 
structure it has” (Anderson, 1991, p. 428), then one might imagine that nonhuman 
unsupervised categorisation would share a number of commonalities with human 
unsupervised categorisation (Brown & Boy sen, 2000): of course, this assumes that 
nonhuman animals do engage in unsupervised categorisation, and that one has 
allowed appropriately for issues of scaling, etc. However, as noted above, 
experimental investigations of nonhuman categorisation behaviour have typically 
employed supervised classification procedures . This is not surprising; obviously it is 
not possible to ask an animal to group a set of items in a way that feels natural and 
intuitive to them, as frequently occurs in studies of human unsupervised 
categorisation. It therefore remains an open question whether or not nonhuman 
animals engage in any meaningful form of unsupervised categorisation (of course, this 
presupposes that animals do categorise in some meaningful way under supervised 
conditions; see Honey & Watt, 1998, 1999). Interestingly, a small amount of work is 
at least suggestive of the possibility that nonhuman primates have the cognitive 
requisites to engage in spontaneous categorisation (e.g., Brown & Boysen, 2000; 
Murai, Tomonaga, Kamegai, Terazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2004; Spinozzi, Natale, 
Langer, & Brakke, 1999; see also, Spinozzi, 1996). Unfortunately though, this work 
is less than conclusive: while it documents that some nonhuman primate species do 
appear to spontaneously recognise the similarity and difference between a set of 
stimuli, this sensitivity does not, in itself, indicate human-like categorisation 
behaviour. That is, this work does not show that these animals come to treat a 
perceptually-based, spontaneous grouping of a set of stimuli in a manner that is truly 
categorical in nature (cf. Fagot, Wasserman, & Young, 2001).
Interestingly, these supervised classification procedures have documented a number of 
similarities between human and nonhuman animal categorical discrimination behaviour (see, 
e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1992; Wasserman, Kiedinger, & Bhatt, 1988).
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Although often not focused on the question of unsupervised categorisation per 
se, a considerable amount of work has assessed how prior, nonreinforced exposure to 
a set of stimuli influences the way in which nonhuman animals later perceive those 
stimuli (similar work has also been conducted in human participants; see Goldstone, 
1998, for a review). One robust finding from work of this nature in animals has been 
that nonreinforced preexposure to a set of stimuli results in a later reduction in 
stimulus similarity (a phenomenon that has been termed perceptual learning; see 
Gibson, 1963, 1969, and, Hall, 1991, for reviews). This result is, of course, the 
opposite of what one would expect if an animal had come to ‘classify together’ a set 
of stimuli (Hamad, 1987). At the same time, following certain other forms of 
stimulus preexposure in animals, the similarity between two stimuli has been found to 
increase, which is exactly what one would expect if an animal had come to ‘classify 
together’ those stimuli (see Hall, 1991, for a review). This kind of preexposure effect 
has been termed sensory-preconditioning or acquired equivalence (Hall, 1991). For 
the most part, however, sensory-preconditioning has not been considered a product of 
unsupervised categorisation. Instead, an explanation has been sought on the basis of 
more simple, associative mechanisms (e.g., Hall, 1991; but see, Bateson & Chantrey, 
1972; Chantrey, 1974).
Whether or not nonhuman animals engage in unsupervised categorisation is a 
fundamental question to assessments of animal cognition, and yet there is a paucity of 
research which has adequately addressed this. Not only is it important to establish if 
unsupervised categorisation is an evolutionary primitive, but if it is, then research of 
this kind gets to the heart of the debate on the role of the environment versus the 
classifier in unsupervised classification. Consequently, as well as focusing on 
incidental unsupervised categorisation in humans, Chapter 3 of this thesis also 
investigates the possibility of incidental unsupervised categorisation in rats.
That unsupervised categorisation (or learning) may take place with respect to 
the statistical properties of the environment finds a natural home within associative 
and connectionist analyses of learning. Interestingly, while some connectionist 
models limit the flexibility of nonhuman animal behaviour and deny the formation of 
‘internal representations’ (e.g., Pearce, 1994), this is not true of other, more complex 
connectionist architectures. Indeed, those connectionist networks that typically 
employ hidden units, such as Elman’s (1990) simple recurrent network (SRN), are, in 
a sense, capable of “building complex internal descriptions” (Gureckis & Love, in
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press, p. 6; see Elman, 1991; Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986; also, Mareschal 
& Quinn, 2001). Such architectures have now been used widely to model both 
supervised (e.g., Gluck & Bower, 1988; Kruschke, 1992) and unsupervised 
categorisation in humans (e.g., Japkowicz, Myers, & Gluck, 1995; Love et al., 2004; 
see also, Japkowicz, 2001). Moreover, they have been employed to account for 
categorisation behaviour in nonhuman animals that is beyond the scope of traditional 
associative theory (e.g., Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002; see also, Honey & Watt, 
1998, 1999). What these more complex connectionist architectures demonstrate, 
therefore, is that simple associative mechanisms can afford a surprising degree of 
cognitive flexibility (this is further reinforced by “hybrid” models of associative 
learning; e.g., Le Pelley, 2004). Naturally, this has a number of important 
implications with respect to nonhuman animal categorisation: that is, it should be 
considerably more flexible than once assumed by traditional learning theory (e.g., 
Pearce, 1994; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). If correct, then this would be of notable 
interest to discussions of the differences that might exist between nonhuman and 
human categorisation, and nonhuman categorisation per se (e.g., Chater & Heyes, 
1994). Taking up this theme, Chapter 4 explores one prediction made about the 
cognitive flexibility of nonhuman animals, based on a connectionist analysis outlined 
by Honey and Ward-Robinson (2002).
The fact that connectionist networks, based on the principles of associative 
theory, have shown promise in modelling both supervised and unsupervised 
categorisation is very exciting. Indeed, connectionist architectures are perhaps best 
placed to offer not only a single model of categorisation that unifies supervised and 
unsupervised classification in adult humans (see Love et al., 2004), but also a single 
model of categorisation that tracks the course of human development and unifies 
human and nonhuman classification. While still a long way off, the success of 
connectionist architectures to date appears to show some genuine promise in this 
regard (see, e.g., Mareschal & Quinn, 2001). However, to fulfil that promise, closer 
collaboration between researchers that study human and nonhuman categorisation will 
be necessary. One of the overarching aims of this thesis, therefore, is to draw 
liberally from both of these rich domains, assessing aspects of human and nonhuman 
animal categorisation behaviour.
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Chapter 1
Unsupervised (spontaneous) categorisation: A Review
1. The nature of human unsupervised categorisation
Why do we have the categories we have? That is, given the almost infinite 
number of different ways that humans could divide up the world, why have we come 
to form the category of objects that we now refer to as dogs, and not a category of 
objects that includes dogs, oak trees and computer speakers? As highlighted in 
Chapter 0, categorisation -  the grouping together of a set of entities that are regarded 
to be ‘alike’ in some way -  is both powerful and flexible; it affords an agent the 
ability to efficiently identify, reason and infer properties about objects in the world 
(including objects not seen before).
To answer the question of why we have the categories we have and not others, 
it is important to understand the mechanisms that guide categorisation. In a broad 
sense, should categorisation predominantly be regarded as a product of the human 
mind, in which resides language and general knowledge about the world (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985), or predominantly as a product of structure in the environment (in the 
form of perceived regularities and discontinuities; Rosch & Mervis, 1975)? 
“Predominantly” here reflects the fact that it is unlikely that these factors are mutually 
exclusive; rather, the role of the categoriser will likely interact with environmental 
structure (Malt, 1995). For example, despite two mushrooms being perceptually 
similar, ‘knowledge’ may impact upon one’s decision to eat both mushrooms for 
dinner: whereas one of these mushrooms is an edible straw mushroom (Amanita 
virgata), the other is actually a highly poisonous Death Cap mushroom (Amanita 
phalloides). Of course, unless one is a mycologist, it is unlikely that one would have 
the knowledge necessary to tell these two mushrooms apart. In human language, 
there is “division o f linguistic labor” (Putnam, 1996, p. 287). That is, it is not 
necessary for everyone to be able to make the distinction between the straw 
mushroom and the Death Cap mushroom, despite this distinction being important to 
everyone. However, the words ‘straw mushroom’ and ‘Death Cap mushroom’ would 
be meaningless unless someone was able to distinguish between these two types of 
mushroom (Putnam, 1996).
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The upshot of this is that words alone do not create meaning (Putnam, 1996): 
For example, if I were to start calling all dogs ‘blibs’, I would still ‘mean’ dog when I 
said blib: the entities that I now refer to as blibs have not changed in any respect from 
when I called them dogs. At the same time, my communication with others about 
these objects will, of course, be detrimentally affected, until that is they realise that I 
‘mean’ dog when I say blib. Critically, once this has been established, effective 
communication can then resume. One way in which effective communication may be 
re-established is if I, and the person that I am speaking to, share a similar concept of 
‘dogness’; that is, what it means to be a dog (or ‘blib’; e.g., they have fur, bark, etc.). 
As noted in Chapter 0, a concept is commonly regarded to be the minimal unit of 
information (in the head) that is required to determine a categorisation (i.e., the 
physical (external) grouping of stimuli). While early theories of concepts did assume 
a primary role for language -  such that knowing the definition of a word meant that 
you had mastered the concept of the object being defined (see Komatsu, 1992) -  this 
view was challenged on a number of fronts by the philosophical work of Wittgenstein 
(1953), and the empirical work of Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues (e.g., Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) on basic level categorisation. As will be detailed 
over the course of this review, Rosch’s work spawned the development of new 
theories of human concepts based on similarity. This change in focus was not only 
important with respect to human concepts and categorisation, but it also had 
implications for comparative assessments of human and nonhuman animal 
categorisation. This is because categorisation based on overall similarity, as opposed 
to rule-based cognitive processing (i.e., through definitions), is consistent with the use 
of associationistic processes, which all animals are thought to share (Lea & Wills,
2008). However, as will also be shown, similarity-based views of human conceptual 
structure have faced fundamental critiques of their own (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 
1985).
1.1 Theories of human conceptual structure
As highlighted in Chapter 0, a number of influential theories of human 
conceptual structure and category coherence (that is, what makes categories ‘good’) 
have been proposed over the past three decades (see Smith & Medin, 1981). Using 
the terminology of Komatsu (1992), these theories can be broadly broken down into 
similarity-based views (e.g., Hampton, 1979; Katz, 1972; Lakoff, 1987a, 1987b;
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Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1991; Reed, 1972; 
Wittgenstein, 1953) and knowledge-based views (Murphy & Medin, 1985, see also, 
Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987).
1.1.1 The Classical View
The classical view (formalised by Katz, 1972; see also, Katz & Fodor, 1963) 
assumes that concepts specify individually necessary and jointly sufficient constraints 
for categorisation: that is, concepts are regarded as definitional in nature. Critically, 
the classical view of concepts is intimately intertwined with natural language, such 
that having definitional information about a word assumes possession of the defined 
concept (Ogden & Richards, 1956; see also, Gleitman, Armstrong, & Gleitman, 1983; 
Komatsu, 1992; Medin & Smith, 1984). Importantly, this definitional information is 
considered distinct from encyclopaedic information (i.e., information about how 
category members relate to other aspects of the world; Komatsu, 1992). The 
assumption of necessity and joint sufficiency of attributes means that the classical 
view is extremely rigid, implying an account of conceptual structure in which 
category membership is clear-cut and discrete. That is, an object X either is or is not a 
member of category Y, and no category member can be more or less typical of a 
category than any other category member (Komatsu, 1992). Consequently, categories 
will always be maximally coherent, and should follow rule-like structures such as “if 
a stimulus X has a square head then classify as a member of Category A, else classify 
as a member of Category B”. The classical view does not, however, address why 
some categories are preferred over others (i.e., the “naturalness” of certain 
categorisations over others). Indeed, any arbitrary categorisation that fits within the 
definitional constraints of the classical view would be considered as ‘natural’ as any 
meaningful categorisation (Komatsu, 1992).
As noted in Chapter 0, the classical view has an obvious analogue in the 
animal learning literature; namely, feature theory (e.g., D’Amato & Van Sant, 1988; 
Lea, 1984). Here, categorisation is assumed to be guided by a set of learned features 
that define whether a stimulus is positive (i.e., has been associated with reward) or 
negative (i.e., has been associated with the absence of reward). Based on this theory, 
therefore, nonhuman animal categorisation is assumed to be determined by necessary 
and jointly sufficient features.
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1.1.1.1 The rejection of necessity and joint sufficiency in concepts
Bom from the philosophical work of Wittgenstein (1953), which advocated 
the principle of family resemblance in categorisation, researchers in the 1970s began 
to attack the assumptions made by the classical view (see Mervis & Rosch, 1981; 
Rosch, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981). Leading this attack was work undertaken by 
Rosch and her colleagues (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976) on basic 
level categorisation. In a series of experiments, Rosch et al. (1976; see Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981, for a review) observed that, when categorising a set of items, humans 
normally consider one level of abstraction to be more ‘natural’ than others. For 
example, when making category judgements about a set of dog stimuli, participants 
will normally be faster and more accurate to respond that a particular stimulus is a dog 
(the basic level of abstraction) compared to a Labrador (the subordinate level of 
abstraction) or a mammal (the superordinate level of abstraction). Some authors have 
argued that the basic level of categorisation reflects inherent structure within the 
environment, and experiments using structured, artificial taxonomies lend some 
support to this view (i.e., by ruling out other factors such as background knowledge, 
etc.; e.g., Lassaline, Wisniewski, & Medin, 1992; Murphy & Smith, 1982).
Research on basic level categorisation has obvious conceptual links with 
unsupervised categorisation in that it has sought to identify what it is that makes 
categories at the basic level ‘good’ categories (see, Corter & Gluck, 1992; Gosselin & 
Schyns, 2001; Jones, 1983). The findings of Rosch and her colleagues (see Mervis & 
Rosch, 1981), therefore, are important in the context of unsupervised categorisation in 
a number of respects: First, they have shown that ‘real world’ category structures are 
broad, rich constructions that are patently not based on definitional features. For 
example, when asked to list the features of members of a particular category, people 
produce a broad spectrum of answers, rather than all focusing on a core set of 
necessary features (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976). When studying 
category construction in the laboratory, therefore, one would presume that the 
formation of categories will similarly adhere to these ‘natural’ principles (i.e., that 
they will be based on family resemblances). Second, when based on perceptual 
similarity, at least, people’s category construction should reflect the perceived 
similarity-based regularities that exist between a given set of items, such that
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categories maximise within-category similarity and minimise between-category 
similarity (Pothos & Chater, 2002).
People do not always prefer the basic level, however: for example, studies 
have shown faster and more accurate verification at the subordinate level of 
abstraction for atypical category members (e.g., a penguin, Murphy & Brownell, 
1985) and among experts of a specific category (e.g., birdwatchers and dog experts, 
Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; see also, Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973; Dougherty, 
1978). Similarly, Murphy and Wisniewski (1989) found matched verification times 
for both basic and superordinate level categorisation when the items to be categorised 
were presented within a specific context (e.g., judging a picture of a chair to be a 
‘chair’ or ‘furniture’ when presented in a living room scene). Recently, faster and 
more accurate verification at the superordinate level of abstraction has also been 
shown among participants engaged in a speeded categorisation task (Rogers & 
Patterson, 2007). The fact that humans view one level of abstraction as ‘most 
natural’, regardless of what level that is, does not fit with the assumptions of the 
classical view. Further evidence amassed against the classical view has included 
results showing that category boundaries are not clear-cut and discrete, but rather 
fuzzy (e.g., McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978; Hampton, 1979, 1981), with some 
category members being more or less typical of a category than others (e.g., Lakoff, 
1972; Rosch, 1973, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Moreover, from an intuitive 
viewpoint, category formation based on necessary and jointly sufficient features 
appears unable to capture the breadth and depth of human category structures (e.g., 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Ultimately, these criticisms led to the rejection of the 
classical view (see Fodor, Garrett, Walker, & Parkes, 1980).
1.1.2 The rise of alternative theories of conceptual structure: similarity-based or
theory-based?
With the rejection of the classical view came the rise of probabilistic accounts 
of conceptual structure, invoking a central role for similarity. Most prominent within 
these probabilistic theories are the family resemblance (or prototype) view (see, e.g., 
Hampton, 1979; Reed, 1972; Wittgenstein, 1953) and the exemplar view (see, e.g., 
Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1984, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1991). These 
similarity-based views contrast with an alternative view of conceptual structure
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proposed by Murphy and Medin (1985, see also, Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987), 
termed theory theory.
1.1.3 The family resemblance (prototype) view of conceptual structure
The family resemblance view focuses on the relationship of the elemental 
overlap between a set of items. That is, within a category, items will share a high 
level of commonality (in terms of number of shared elements); between categories, 
items will share a lower level of commonality. Furthermore, those category members 
that share a great deal of overlap (or family resemblance) with other members of the 
category will be viewed as more prototypical of the category as a whole (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). Taken in its strictest form, one could propose that each category is 
represented by a single, ideal member, sometimes termed the category prototype. 
However, this position is not one that has been widely accepted within the literature 
(Murphy, 2002). Such a view would not allow for information about category 
variability, and as Murphy (2002) notes, it is difficult to conceive of a single 
prototype that could represent an “ideal bird”, for example. Instead, theorists have 
conceptualised the prototype view as the formation of a summary representation of a 
category as a whole (Hampton, 1979; Smith & Medin, 1981). With the introduction 
of feature weightings, these summary representations allow for considerable 
complexity, enabling representations to convey such information as the variability of 
a category and the typicality of a specific category member (Murphy, 2002). For 
example, the feature ‘barking’ may be weighted more highly than the feature ‘having 
four legs’ in one’s representation of a dog, since many animals have four legs, and so 
captures little of the uniqueness of what it means to be a dog.
Prototype accounts of categorisation have not found a natural home within the 
animal learning literature. This is not particularly surprising; abstraction across a 
category as a whole -  to allow for the formation of a summary representation -  
implies, in humans at least, the formation of a concept. As noted in Chapter 0, 
however, animal learning theorists have typically denied any sense of concept 
formation in nonhuman animals (see Chater & Heyes, 1994). In support of this, the 
classic ‘prototype effect’ found in humans has often not been found in nonhuman 
animals (e.g., Lea & Harrison, 1978). The ‘prototype effect’ describes the 
observation that stimuli that share a high degree of similarity with a category 
prototype are classified more readily than stimuli that are quite different from the
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category prototype (e.g., Posner & Keele, 1968). While some authors have now 
demonstrated such behaviour in nonhuman animals (e.g., in pigeons; Aydin & Pearce, 
1994), as Pearce (1997) points out, feature (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985) and 
exemplar theories (Shin & Nosofsky, 1992) appear to offer an account of the 
‘prototype effect’ without needing to appeal to the formation of prototypical 
(summary) representations.
1.1.3.1 The family resemblance view and its critics
Bom from the failures of the classical view, it is of little surprise that the 
family resemblance view is readily able to explain such phenomena as typicality 
effects; indeed, this view predicts these effects. However, a number of shortcomings 
of the family resemblance view have been highlighted over the last ten years. It is 
intriguing, for example, that humans often hold deep beliefs that necessary and 
sufficient conditions do form the basis for categories, even if they cannot express 
what these are (e.g., McNamara & Sternberg, 1983). Furthermore, some authors have 
questioned whether typicality effects in themselves provide adequate grounds for the 
rejection of the classical view and the acceptance of the family resemblance view 
(Armstrong, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1983; Gleitman et al., 1983). Other problems for 
the family resemblance view include a loss in power for explicating linguistic 
meaning, inductive reasoning, and the formation of complex concepts (e.g., ‘salmon 
fillet’ from the concepts ‘salmon’ and ‘fillet’; Komatsu, 1992). Lastly, with the 
naturalness and coherence of concepts relying on an interaction between the 
environment and the classifier’s perceptual system, it has been argued that this view 
can only account for perceptually based concepts; if true, this would clearly make it 
an inadequate view of adult concepts (Neisser, 1987).
1.1.4 The exemplar view of conceptual structure
Compared to the family resemblance view, where a concept is regarded as a 
stored abstraction of a category as a whole, the most widely suggested form of the 
exemplar view -  the instance approach -  takes, essentially, the opposite viewpoint. 
That is, a concept reflects sets of different, individually stored exemplar 
representations, with abstraction across a category only occurring during concept use 
(Komatsu, 1992). However, this is not to say that abstraction always, or even ever, 
occurs when using a concept. If no abstraction takes place, then this suggests the
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intriguing possibility that, “In some sense, there is no real concept (as normally 
conceived of), because there is no summary representation” (Murphy, 2002, p. 49). 
The exemplar approach has proved to be an extremely successful account of human 
categorisation, spawning some of the most detailed and successful modelling to date. 
One of the most influential models of this form is the Generalized Context Model 
(e.g., Nosofsky, 1986, 1988a, 1989; Nosofsky, Clark, & Shin, 1989; see also, 
Kruschke, 1992). Although this model has generally been applied to assessments of 
categorisation where feedback is provided, recently, it has also been applied to 
assessments of categorisation where feedback is not provided (Pothos & Bailey,
2009). Along with feature theory, a number of authors have applied the instance 
approach of exemplar theory to nonhuman animal categorisation to good success 
(e.g., Astley & Wasserman, 1992; Pearce, 1988, 1989, 1991). As noted in Chapter 0, 
stimulus generalisation provides the additional mechanism to explain humans’ and 
nonhuman animals’ ability to accurately classify novel stimuli.
1.1.4.1 The exemplar view and its critics
Komatsu (1992) has argued that the exemplar view does not provide a strong 
account of why some groupings are privileged over others (i.e., category coherence). 
He states that “With no prior specification of the nature or degree of similarity 
necessary for items to be instances of the same concept, there is no constraint at all on 
possible new instances: At the very extreme, every object is similar to every other 
object in some way” (Komatsu, 1992, p. 509). Here we see Komatsu echoing the 
thoughts of Goodman (1972), who argued that to say two things are similar (and so be 
classified together) without qualifying in what respects the two objects are similar, is 
a vacuous statement devoid of content. For example, my computer and my desk are 
similar in an infinite number of ways; they both weigh less than one ton, two tons, 
three tons etc. I therefore need to qualify the similarity relationship between the two 
objects by saying how they are similar: my computer and my desk are similar in 
respect to the fact that both items can be found in my office. However, once one has 
introduced the notion o f ‘respects’ into similarity judgments, Goodman (1972) argues, 
then it is these ‘respects’ that take on all the explanatory power, leaving no role for 
similarity per se. As such, one might argue that similarity is too unconstrained to 
afford the constrained nature of categorisation. Without extra specification, therefore, 
it seems the exemplar view of conceptual structure is deeply flawed.
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More recently, however, the arguments of Goodman (1972) have been 
challenged on two fronts: First, when presented with objects formed from multiple 
dimensions -  as would always be the case in the real world -  ‘respects’ can only do 
some of the work, as the central issue psychologically is how different dimensions are 
combined to form an overall similarity judgment (Goldstone, 1994; Hahn & Chater, 
1997; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). Second, when dealing with the notion of 
similarity within object categorisation, some authors have argued that the focus 
should centre on an agent’s mental representation of an object, and not on the 
objective properties of the object per se. By their very nature, it is argued, mental 
representations will be representative only of those dimensions that are important to 
successful classification, and so by extension, finite (Hahn & Chater, 1997). 
Consequently, those dimensions which are clearly arbitrary to effective classification 
(such as weighs less than 1 ton) will not be represented; and so, similarity is naturally 
constrained in object categorisation. If a person is presented with two objects that are 
highly dissimilar, therefore, then a person’s finite representations of these objects will 
likely contain no similarities whatsoever; as such, these objects would not be 
classified together.
Over the course of experience, it is also probable that the similarity relations 
between objects will naturally start to shift into some coherent pattern. That is, a 
category will cohere by virtue of the fact that instances within a category will share a 
greater degree of similarity to each other than instances from different categories. 
Consequently, as for the family resemblance view, one is left with a situation in which 
coherent categories will reflect some optimal ratio between maximising within-group 
similarity and minimising between-group similarity (Rosch, 1975). Certain 
classifications, such as those at the basic-level, will therefore be privileged because 
they best attain this ‘optimal’ ratio (see Rosch et al., 1976).
More problematic for an exemplar view of conceptual structure that invokes 
dimensional summation as its metric of similarity (see also, Tversky, 1977) is that 
such an account appears unable to reflect more sophisticated, relationally-based forms 
of similarity, and the subsequent categorisation this affords. Indeed, it is more than 
possible that a dimensional summation strategy is only intuitive for binary-valued 
stimulus structures. However, alternative metrics of similarity can help to overcome 
this problem (see, e.g., Hahn, Chater, & Richardson, 2003; Markman & Gentner,
1993). In the unsupervised categorization experiments presented in Chapters 2 and 3
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of this thesis, all category structures are specified along continuous valued dimensions 
(e.g., size).
1.1.5 Theory theory
Dissatisfied with the notion that similarity-based views of conceptual structure 
provide a principled account of conceptual coherence, Murphy and Medin (1985; see 
also, Keil, 1989) proposed an account of concepts based on theoretical knowledge. 
Instead of regarding similarity as the sole basis for conceptual coherence, they 
propose that it is people’s theories about the world that provide the ‘glue’ that holds 
concepts together. What, then, is a theory in respect to concepts? First, Murphy and 
Medin (1985) do not use theory to mean a scientific account of something. Instead, 
they use it to mean any of numerous mental “explanations” that generally take the 
form of causally connected sets of relations between concepts (Murphy & Medin, 
1985). That is, concepts cohere to the extent that knowledge is available which 
causally relates the instances of a category: The stronger the relations are that link 
together the instances within a category, the greater the category coherence of that 
category. For example, the concept “BIRD” can be considered very coherent because 
the theoretical knowledge ‘most birds fly’ and ‘wings afford flight’ supports the high 
feature correlation between birds and ‘having wings’. But how can theories explain 
concepts when concepts are made out of theories; clearly, this is circular? Murphy 
and Medin embrace this circularity, arguing for a bidirectional influence between 
concepts and knowledge: “Concepts and theories must live in harmony in the same 
mental space; they therefore constrain each other both in content and in 
representational format” (1985, p. 313).
It is important to note that Murphy and Medin regard the knowledge approach 
as supplying the constraints that are missing from similarity-based views of 
conceptual coherence, rather than seeing it as a purely contradictory account of such. 
Numerous variants of the knowledge approach to conceptual coherence now exist: 
these include, for example, psychological essentialism (e.g., Medin & Ortony, 1989), 
idealised cognitive models (Lakoff, 1987a, 1987b), and mental models (Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; see Komatsu, 1992). Due to its focus on ‘nai’ve theories’ about the world 
constraining categorisation, the theory theory (or the knowledge approach; Murphy, 
2002) places a strong emphasis on the role of the classifier in determining this 
process. As a consequence of this, it is apparent that human categorisation will most
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likely be qualitatively, rather than simply quantitatively, different from nonhuman 
categorisation. Whether or not nonhuman animals have any kinds of ‘na'ive theories’ 
about the world is a fascinating question in its own right; whatever the answer, 
however, it seems clear that these theories will not be comparable to those of humans.
1.1.5.1 Theory theory and its critics
While ‘nai've theories’ (‘knowledge’) about the world may play an important 
role in human categorisation, by guiding which categories appear coherent, the theory 
itself remains rather underspecified. As noted in Chapter 0, fundamental questions 
remain with respect to how theories are implemented and brought to bear in real- 
world concepts (Close, Hahn, Hodgetts, & Pothos, 2009). Moreover, the difficulties 
posed in incorporating general knowledge factors into models of human 
categorisation are well known; indeed, these difficulties may prove insurmountable 
(cf. Fodor, 1983; Lewandowsky et al., 2006; Murphy, 2002; Pickering & Chater, 
1995; but, see Heit, 1997, 2001; Heit & Bott, 2000). Given this state of affairs, it is 
still the case that the most fully articulated proposals of natural concepts are those 
based on similarity (e.g., Hampton, 2001, 2003; Nosofsky, 1986). It is no wonder, 
therefore, that probabilistic accounts of concepts (e.g., prototype and exemplar views) 
still engender wide support.
In summary, within a culture, and even between cultures, the category 
structures formed by humans are often similar (Malt, 1995). While some authors 
have argued that this observation reflects the impact of environmental factors 
constraining category construction (e.g., Billman, 1989; Malt & Smith, 1984; Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975; see also, Anderson, 1991; Smith & Heise, 1992), others have 
promoted a view of category coherence driven simultaneously by low- and higher- 
level cognitive processes (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985; Wattenmaker, Dewey, 
Murphy, & Medin, 1986). These viewpoints have been expressed over the past three 
decades in a number of influential theories of human conceptual structure, which have 
been outlined above. Despite notable advances in our understanding of human 
categorisation, however, there still exists no unified position on which theory of 
conceptual structure, if any, is correct. The fact is, categorisation is most likely a 
product of both the environment and the classifier (see Malt, 1995): but the question 
remains, which factor dominates? In the subsequent review, I look to assess what
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research focused on laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation tells us about the 
nature of human conceptual structure. Specifically, what insights does unsupervised 
categorisation research provide about the factors that guide and determine everyday 
category construction? Moreover, wherever pertinent, I will seek to draw parallels 
between findings from unsupervised categorisation research in humans and findings 
from research in nonhuman animals. Such comparative assessment is both interesting 
and important, as it allows for a more accurate assessment of the role of the classifier 
in determining categorisation behaviour.
1.2 Supervised versus unsupervised categorisation
To reiterate from Chapter 0, the study of human categorisation (and to a far 
lesser extent nonhuman categorisation), has been pursued in two distinct contexts. 
The first is where participants are asked to discover or impose a classification on a set 
of unlabelled objects. This is undertaken without any feedback on performance, and 
as such, has been termed unsupervised categorisation. The second is where feedback 
is typically continuously provided to participants; consequently, it has been termed 
supervised categorisation. Here, a participant’s task is to learn a predefined 
classification from a set of labelled instances as quickly as possible. This 
conventional distinction between unsupervised and supervised categorisation will be 
adhered to throughout this thesis.
1.3 Unsupervised categorisation: informing understanding of human conceptual
structure
While the majority of categorisation research to date has investigated 
supervised categorisation, more recently, the merits of unsupervised categorisation as 
a tool for assessing human conceptual structure have been realised. As noted in 
Chapter 0, the logic runs as follows: it seems reasonable to suppose that the
categories people prefer to construct when provided with no supervision will reflect 
those mechanisms that underlie people’s real world (natural) categorisations. 
Therefore, in comparison to tasks that are supervised in nature, unsupervised 
categorisation allows for an assessment of the principles governing human conceptual 
structure in an unconstrained manner; hence the reason it is the focus of this review. 
This is not to deny the utility of research that has employed supervised procedures. 
Indeed, some of the most detailed modelling of human behaviour to date has benefited
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directly from such work (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Lamberts, 1995, 2000; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1981; Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997).
1.3.1 Necessary and jointly sufficient features in unsupervised categorisation
In a seminal paper by Medin, Wattenmaker and Hampson (1987), participants 
were found to display an overwhelming preference for unidimensional classification 
when asked to sort a set of stimuli constructed from an apparently intuitive family 
resemblance structure. The stimuli used by Medin et al. (1987) included pictures and 
phrases, where each dimension represented either a certain attribute or phrase, 
respectively. Category A was formed from the prototype 1, 1, 1, 1, and Category B 
was formed from the prototype 0, 0, 0, 0, with the other items of a category differing 
from their respective category prototype by a single feature (see Figure 1). Similarly, 
using stimuli that consisted of two dots depicted on pieces of white card, which varied 
in interdot distance, orientation and overall position, Imai and Gamer (1965) showed 
that participants predominantly chose to base their classifications on only one of the 
three dimensions available, rather than on all three dimensions. These findings would 
suggest, therefore, that participants are predisposed to employ a categorisation 
strategy based on unidimensional rules; that is, based on the principle of necessity and 
joint sufficiency. For example, in Medin et al.’s (1987) Experiment 1, classification 
of cartoonlike animals into Category A might be defined by the necessary presence of 
four legs, whereas classification into Category B would be defined by the necessary 
presence of eight legs.
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Family resemblance sort
Category D1 D2 D3 D4
a 1 1 1 1
a 1 1 1 0
a 1 1 0 1
a 1 0 1 1
a 0 1 1 1
b 0 0 0 0
b 0 0 0 1
b 0 0 1 0
b 0 1 0 0
b 1 0 0 0
Figure 1. The abstract stimulus structure employed by Medin et al. (1987) in their 
Experiments 1, 2b, 2c, 2d, 3, and 6. The first column indicates the assumed optimal 
classification of the items, when considering all four dimensions of variation together 
(this reflects the family resemblance classification). D1 -  D4 represent individual 
stimulus dimensions; for example, head shape, number of legs, body markings, and 
tail length. These dimensions can take a value of 0 or 1, where a value of 0 on D1 
reflects an angular head and a value of 1 on D1 reflects a round head, for example. In 
boldface are shown the assumed prototypes of each category (in four dimensions).
More recently, Regehr and Brooks (1995) assessed the impact of a number of 
task manipulations on participants’ preference for unidimensional classification. 
These manipulations included the following: increasing the family resemblance
structure of a stimulus set through the addition of more dimensions (see also Medin et 
al., 1987); making the stimuli appear more integral by decreasing the separability of 
their dimensions of variation; and, providing a simple rule that defined the two 
category, family resemblance structure. In line with findings by Medin et al. (1987), 
Regehr and Brooks (1995) found that none of these manipulations had any impact on 
reducing participants’ preference for unidimensional classification. Building on this 
work, Milton and Wills (2004) have further shown a bias for unidimensional 
classification among participants engaged in a sequential ‘matching-to-standards’ 
procedure (in contrast to other findings by Regehr & Brooks, 1995). The sequential 
matching-to-standards procedure takes the following form: following an initial pre­
sort phase -  where participants are simply asked to group together identical pairs of 
stimuli -  two prototypes are placed side by side on a table. Participants are told that
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these two prototypes are characteristic of Category A and Category B, and they 
remained visible on the table throughout the experiment. Half of the stimuli given in 
the pre-sort phase are then presented to participants, and they are asked to place each 
stimulus into the category of their choosing (Category A or Category B). Participants 
group the stimuli in a sequential fashion, and they are told to place each stimulus card 
face down directly below the group they feel it most resembles (see Milton & Wills, 
2004; Milton, Longmore, & Wills, 2008). By employing this sequential matching-to- 
standards procedure, Milton et al. (2008) have also documented evidence that under 
conditions of high time-pressure and concurrent cognitive load, participants’ 
preference for unidimensional categorisation is increased relative to conditions of low 
time-pressure and no cognitive load. This finding is surprising given previous results 
by Ward (1983, discussed later; see also Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984; Ward, Foley, 
& Cole, 1986), but is in line with accounts of categorisation based on stochastic 
sampling (e.g., Lamberts, 2002) and dimensional summation (Milton & Wills, 2004).
More evidence for a unidimensional classification preference among 
participants comes from work by Ashby, Queller, and Berretty (1999; see also, Fried 
& Holyoak, 1984; Homa & Cultice, 1984). They found that, in the absence of any 
feedback, participants were unable to learn an experimenter defined category structure 
when the boundary separating the contrasting categories was orthogonal. Indeed, 
when analysing their participants’ behaviour, Ashby et al. (1999) concluded that their 
failure to learn the orthogonal category structure resulted from them trying to impose 
unidimensional or conjunctive rules, rather than employing a classification strategy 
based on an integration of both dimensions of variation. When feedback was 
provided, participants were able learn the xategory structure specified along the 
diagonal. In contrast, when the categories were separated by a unidimensional 
boundary, the experimenter defined category structure was readily learned both when 
feedback was available, and when it was not (a depiction of the category structures 
employed by Ashby et al., 1999, is presented in Figure 3; see Chapter 2). Ashby et 
al.’s (1999) stimuli were lines that varied in both length and orientation, and learning 
was assessed by monitoring participants’ increased levels of categorisation accuracy 
over 800 trials.
The above findings show that unidimensional classification in laboratory- 
based unsupervised categorisation tasks is both highly pervasive and robust. Indeed, 
Ashby et al. even go so far as to say that “in the absence of feedback, people are
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constrained to use unidimensional rules” (1999, p. 1). Ahn and Medin (1992) have 
similarly concluded that unidimensional classification is a ubiquitous feature of 
unsupervised category formation, invoking such in their two-stage model of category 
construction. From the standpoint of many categorisation researchers, however, the 
results presented above are quite odd. Simply, they do not fit with current 
understanding of the nature of everyday (natural) categories in humans, which are 
patently not definitional in kind. That is, with respect to everyday categorisation at 
least, unidimensional classification must be considered suboptimal to classification 
based on a principle of family resemblance. The reason for this is that, in a complex 
environment, classification based on such a restricted, definitional principle would 
simply be too inflexible. In contrast, classification based on family resemblances 
would afford great flexibility. For example, if one took the presence of a wing as a 
definitional attribute for “birdness”, then one would have to wrongly classify a bat as 
a bird. Similarly, if one took the presence of a blow hole as a definitional attribute for 
“whaleness”, then one would have to wrongly classify a dolphin as a whale. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, the idea that everyday concepts are based on necessary 
and jointly sufficient features has been widely rejected (see, e.g., Fodor et al., 1980).
The above work raises the question though, is such rule-like behaviour 
reflective of some ‘natural’ preference for rule-based cognitive processing in humans? 
Interestingly, Lea and Wills (2008) have recently challenged the view that 
unidimensional classification is a reliable sign of rule-based cognition. Their 
argument rests partly on the fact that single dimensions sometimes come to control 
the behaviour of nonhuman animals when these animals are presented with 
multidimensional stimuli. For example, in experiments that have employed artificial 
polymorphous concepts -  that is, where category membership reflects the principle of 
family resemblance -  analysis in birds has shown that different dimensions control 
behaviour to a different extent (i.e., one dimension was preferred; Lea & Harrison, 
1978; Lea, Wills, & Ryan, 2006). This has also been found in the study of ‘natural’ 
concepts in nonhuman animals (e.g., discriminating between male and female faces; 
Troje, Huber, Loidolt, Aust, & Fieder, 1999). Moreover, Lea and Wills (2008) point 
out that pigeons learn discriminations faster when they are based on a single stimulus 
dimension, rather than when they are based on multiple stimulus dimensions. If one 
assumes, therefore, that unidimensional classification is rule-based, then one would 
have to conclude that pigeons, at least, sometimes elaborate rules (Lea & Wills,
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2008). This, however, fits poorly with the majority of animal learning research. Of 
course, it is possible that unidimensional classification in humans is reflective of rule 
use, whereas in nonhuman animals it is reflective of, perhaps, limited attentional 
capacity, meaning that animals cannot process all the available stimulus dimensions at 
any one time (Lea & Wills, 2008; see also, Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971). With 
respect to humans, however, one further possibility is that participants’ bias for 
unidimensional classification in laboratory-based studies of human unsupervised 
categorisation is simply some artefact of the experiments themselves. This possibility 
is discussed further in the next section.
1.3.2 Reconciling the theoretical rejection of necessity and joint sufficiency and
participants’ preference for unidimensional unsupervised categorisation
To recapitulate, while on the one hand we have the theoretical rejection of the 
assumption of necessity and joint sufficiency in concepts (see Fodor et al., 1980), on 
the other hand there exists a large body of research documenting a strong bias for a 
4classical-type’ classification strategy within laboratory-based unsupervised 
categorisation. In accounting for these contradictory results, an important starting 
point is the simple fact that, in the majority of unsupervised categorisation 
experiments, and indeed in the majority of categorisation studies per se, we are not 
dealing with naturalistic categories. Instead, participants are focused upon a limited 
number of highly structured, artificial stimuli, created most often from binary data 
sets (Malt, 1995). This fact becomes important when one considers the following 
point: with respect to category coherence, the classical view provides a strong
account. That is, once a person has defined a basis for classification (e.g., all stimuli 
with four legs are members of category A and all stimuli with eight legs are members 
of category B), stimuli can be rapidly classified with confidence. This has a 
secondary benefit of enabling a high degree of cognitive economy within the account 
(even if this is at the expense of informativeness; Komatsu, 1992). Therefore, when 
engaged in a traditional laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation task -  where 
participant motivation is generally low (Murphy, 2002) -  participants will likely 
favour a classification strategy based on the principles of economy and coherence, 
rather than informativeness. It has also been suggested that other prevalent task 
constraints imposed in the literature, such as specifying the number of categories to be 
used (more often than not, two), may further encourage unidimensional classification.
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This is because by restricting stimulus classification, the experiment will appear a lot 
more like a problem-solving task than a categorisation task. Consequently, 
participants will likely favour a readily verbalisable strategy when engaging in 
stimulus classification (Murphy, 2002). Moreover, as noted in Chapter 0, whereas 
laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation will often be intentional, everyday 
unsupervised categorisation will, for the most part, be incidental. As Love (2002) 
showed, this distinction produces meaningful differences in the nature of participants’ 
unsupervised classification behaviour, with intentional categorisation encouraging 
more unidimensional classification. Further work by Love et al. (2004; to be 
discussed later in this chapter) has also shown that the abstract stimulus structure of 
Figure 1, introduced by Medin at al. (1987), should itself encourage unidimensional 
classification. This is particularly problematic because many researchers 
investigating unsupervised categorisation have employed this stimulus structure.
The upshot of all this is that participants’ bias for unidimensional 
unsupervised categorisation, which has been documented in so many laboratory 
studies, is likely an artefact of the factors specified above. Of particular interest in
this thesis is the likely influence of stimulus structure in biasing participants’
classification behaviour (see Love et al., 2004). Specifically, if one stimulus structure 
is able to bias people towards unidimensional classification, then it makes sense that a 
different stimulus structure should be able to bias people towards multidimensional 
classification. This intriguing possibility is the subject of empirical investigation in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Furthermore, if the majority of natural unsupervised
categorisation takes places incidentally (Love, 2002), then clearly unsupervised
categorisation inJhe laboratory also needs to be assessed in an incidental manner. In 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, therefore, a new procedure is introduced to assess incidental 
unsupervised categorisation in the laboratory. By employing this procedure, I 
specifically sought to assess the factors that influence whether stimuli are incidentally 
classified together, or classified apart. It is important to note, however, that while 
much of the unsupervised categorization literature has documented a preference for 
unidimensional classification in humans, this is not to say that multidimensional 
unsupervised classification is never found.
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1.3.3 Family resemblance in unsupervised categorisation
When discussing naturalness, the family resemblance view looks to the 
interplay between our perceptual system and the environment. That is, human 
category construction (and category coherence) is considered to reflect the natural 
discontinuities that exist in the environment, as perceived by the classifier (Komatsu, 
1992). Unsupervised categorisation should, therefore, reflect a partitioning of a 
stimulus set in the manner most privileged by the human perceptual system (see 
Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). That is, unsupervised categorisation should 
maximise within-category similarity and minimise between-category similarity. 
Moreover, providing participants with the prototypical members of each category 
within a stimulus set should encourage classification based on overall similarity (or 
family resemblance).
As documented above, however, the majority of laboratory-based 
unsupervised categorisation research has shown a bias among people to engage in 
unidimensional classification. Furthermore, even when the prototypical members of 
the two experimenter-defined categories are presented, participants still seem to 
favour classification based on unidimensional rules (e.g., Medin et al., 1987). This, 
then, appears to argue against unsupervised category formation based on the principle 
of family resemblance. However, as noted in Section 1.3.2, the bias for 
unidimensional unsupervised classification in the laboratory is likely an artefact of the 
experiments themselves. So, do people ever spontaneously notice the family 
resemblance structure of an artificially created stimulus set? The answer is yes: using 
binary dimensioned stimuli, Billman and Knutson (1996) showed that participants 
were able to notice family resemblance structure when given a set of highly structured 
items (i.e., when many of the items’ attributes covaried with each other). Given this 
finding, do people ever spontaneously categorise a set of items in concordance with a 
family resemblance principle? Again the answer is yes: Regehr and Brooks (1995), 
for example, found that while participants who engaged in a simultaneous 
categorisation task showed a preference for unidimensional classification, those that 
engaged in a sequential categorisation task produced more family resemblance sorting 
(cf. Milton & Wills, 2004).
Handel and Imai (1972), and, Kemler and Smith (1979) have further shown 
increased family resemblance sorting when participants are presented with integral as
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opposed to separable stimuli (cf. Milton & Wills, 2004). However, Kemler and Smith 
(1979) concluded that, in general, participants preferred single dimension sorts. 
Contrary to the findings of Milton et al. (2008), reported earlier, a number of studies 
have shown that family resemblance categorisation is promoted under conditions of 
increased time pressure. For example, using a minimal unsupervised categorisation 
paradigm, Ward (1983) found that those participants classed as ‘slow responders’ 
(whose median response latency was more than the group median) showed 
significantly fewer family resemblance sorts than those participants classed as ‘fast 
responders’ (whose median response latency was less than the group median). 
Similarly, Smith and Kemler Nelson (1984) found that those participants who 
engaged in a speeded unsupervised classification task produced significantly more 
family resemblance sorts than those participants that engaged in non-speeded 
classification. In comparing these findings to those of Milton et al. (2008), Milton et 
al. suggest a levels-of-time-pressure explanation. That is, the amount of time pressure 
imposed on classification shares a nonmonotonic relationship with the classification 
strategy imposed. Milton et al. (2008) demonstrate this by showing an increase in 
family resemblance sorting at stimulus presentation times of 256 ms and 640 ms, 
relative to presentation times of 64 ms and 384 ms. Finally, Smith and Kemler 
Nelson (1984) found that employing a concurrent cognitive load -  here, having 
participants count backwards in 17s from a specified starting point -  during 
classification also significantly increased family resemblance sorting to a level above 
that of unidimensional sorting (cf. Milton et al., 2008).
What is striking about these results, however, is that almost all of the 
unsupervised categorisation studies that have reported an increase in family 
resemblance sorting have only done so by introducing some additional manipulation. 
As highlighted by the findings of Ward (1983) and Smith and Kemler Nelson (1984), 
one of the most effective manipulations in this regard is speeded categorisation. 
Interestingly, the identification and categorisation of familiar everyday objects has 
been shown to occur very rapidly, at somewhere between 50-100 ms (see Grill- 
Spector & Kanwisher, 2005; Thorpe & Imbert, 1989). Does speeded categorisation in 
the laboratory most accurately reflect people’s unsupervised classification behaviour 
in the real world, therefore? Well, perhaps; but, the identification and classification of 
novel objects will necessarily take longer. Moreover, at around 100 ms, Milton et al. 
(2008, Experiment 4) found that their participants clearly preferred unidimensional
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classification; indeed, family resemblance sorting was at one of its lowest levels. 
Also, despite showing increased levels of classification based on family resemblance, 
in general, participants in speeded categorisation studies have still shown an overall 
preference for unidimensional classification (but, see Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984, 
Experiment 6, Concurrent task, Initial phase). What is apparent, therefore, is that the 
issue of unidimensional versus family resemblance unsupervised categorisation is not 
one that can be understood simply in terms of the speed of classification.
In conjunction with the reasons documented in Section 1.3.2, the lack of 
family resemblance sorting found in studies of unsupervised categorisation may 
further be attributed to two other factors: First, with the allowance of nondefinitional 
information within people’s representations, it is arguable that the family resemblance 
view does not provide as strong an account of category coherence as the classical 
view. Consequently, for simple ‘categorisation problems’ presented in the laboratory, 
classification on the basis of family resemblance may be considered less cognitively 
efficient and economic (Komatsu, 1992). Second, when humans engage in real world 
categorisation, they will likely do so with the benefit of a great deal of associated 
background knowledge. As we will see in Section 1.3.5, the introduction of prior 
knowledge into unsupervised categorisation tasks can produce a marked increase in 
classification based on family resemblance. The question remains, however, if 
presented with a set of stimuli for which family resemblance classification is 
predicted to be ‘most intuitive’ on the basis of their abstract similarity structure, will 
people’s categorisations reflect this prediction in the absence of any prior knowledge? 
As noted earlier, this question is the subject of investigation in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis.
1.3.4 Instances in unsupervised categorisation
To recapitulate, according to the instance approach of the exemplar view of 
conceptual structure, category membership is a function of the similarity of an 
encountered item to one or more of the instance representations that form a category 
(see, e.g., Nosofsky, 1986). The more similar an item is to a previously encountered 
instance, the more likely it is that that item will be categorised accordingly. 
Consequently, the more typical an item is of a particular category, the more likely it is 
that it will share a high degree of similarity with one or many of the stored instances 
forming that category, and so the more readily categorisation of that item will
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proceed. While some authors have argued that the instance approach offers no 
systematic explanation of category coherence (e.g., Komatsu, 1992), as has already 
been detailed, these arguments have been successfully countered on a number of 
fronts (e.g., Goldstone, 1994; Hahn & Chater, 1997; see Section 1.1.4.1). In light of 
this, as for the family resemblance view, coherent categories within the instance 
approach should reflect some optimal ratio between maximising within-group 
similarity and minimising between-group similarity (Rosch, 1975). As such, people’s 
unsupervised categorisations should similarly reflect the principle of family 
resemblance (overall similarity).
As has already been shown, despite a number of studies documenting family 
resemblance sorting in laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation tasks, this has 
often only been achieved following the introduction of some other, critical 
manipulation (e.g., imposing a time constraint). This observation suggests, therefore, 
that classification based on a principle of family resemblance is not what participants 
regard as ‘most intuitive’ (at least with respect to the experimental tasks employed). 
Moreover, while these additional task manipulations have been found to increase the 
prevalence of family resemblance sorting, as noted above, unidimensional 
classification is often still preferred overall. Is there any specific evidence for 
unsupervised categorisation based on an instance-based principle? Using simple 
butterfly-like stimuli, Milton and Wills (2004) recently reported that participants who 
were presented with a spatially separable form of their stimuli (i.e., the antennae, 
wings, etc., were presented separately, but next to each other) showed significantly 
increased family resemblance sorting compared to those participants who were 
presented with a spatially integrated form of their stimuli. This surprising result was 
confirmed using different, lamp-like stimuli (see Milton & Wills, 2004). Milton and 
Wills (2004) provide an explanation for their findings by proposing that people use an 
analytic, dimensional summation strategy in categorization.
Milton and Wills (2004) argue that, when categorising by family resemblance, 
participants engage in a process whereby they individually focus on each dimension 
of variation, and then categorise a stimulus on the basis of whether it has more 
characteristic features of, for example, Category A members or Category B members. 
Critically, therefore, this analytic dimensional summation process appears to argue 
against the idea that novel stimuli are compared to some stored, averaged abstraction 
of a category as a whole (as is suggested by the prototype view of conceptual
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structure). Moreover, the dimensional summation hypothesis encourages the view 
that unidimensional and family resemblance classification strategies are based on 
similar cognitive processes (Milton & Wills, 2004). Indeed, this idea receives some 
support from demonstrations that, when appropriately weighted, exemplar models can 
readily account for both unidimensional and family resemblance categorisation (see 
Nosofsky & Johansen, 2000). Based on this view, then, classification based on family 
resemblance is simply a more sophisticated version of dimensional summation than is 
unidimensional classification. Consequently, dimensional summation in 
categorisation provides a ready explanation for participants’ preference for 
unidimensional classification in the laboratory: that is, it is cognitively less effortful 
than family resemblance sorting.
However, the dimensional summation hypothesis appears odd for a couple of 
reasons. First, a number of studies have reported the opposite result to Milton and 
Wills (2004), finding that spatially integrated stimuli are more likely to encourage 
family resemblance sorting (e.g., Gamer, 1974). Second, if dimensional summation is 
the mechanism for categorisation, then why does natural categorisation reflect a 
principle of family resemblance (e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Rosch et al., 1976)? 
That is, we do not normally view stimuli in the environment broken up into their 
constituent parts. Based on the dimensional summation hypothesis, therefore, 
humans’ everyday concepts and categories should be biased towards unidimensional 
classification. One could argue, of course, that given the amount of experience that 
humans have with everyday stimuli, this allows the supposed more effortful family 
resemblance classification strategy to proceed successfully. However, this seems 
somewhat odd in light of findings by Smith and Kemler (1977), who showed that 
children are more likely to engage in family resemblance sorting than are adults. If 
family resemblance classification is a more complex analytic process, surely Smith 
and Kemler (1977) should have found the reverse result. Moreover, support for the 
view that overall-similarity-based classification is a more associationistic process 
stems from numerous studies showing that nonhuman animals readily engage in 
classification based on family resemblance (Lea & Wills, 2008). For example, 
experiments that have used ‘natural concepts’, such as HUMAN, TREE, or FISH, 
have shown that pigeons can readily learn to discriminate between different complex 
scenes based on the presence or absence of these ‘concepts’ (e.g., Cerella, 1979; 
Hermstein & Loveland, 1964; Hermstein, Loveland, & Cable, 1976; Siegel & Honig,
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1970; Wasserman et al., 1988). Furthermore, nonhuman animals can also generalise 
their initial discrimination learning to novel pictorial scenes. The reason why such 
discrimination learning is considered to be based on overall similarity is because these 
‘natural concepts’ are considered to be polymorphous; that is, deciding category 
membership is assumed not to be possible on the basis of a singly necessary or 
sufficient feature (Hermstein, 1985; Jitsumori, 1993).
However, given the complexity of these ‘natural concept’ scenes, it is rather 
difficult to know exactly how nonhuman animals are solving these kinds of 
discriminations (see D’Amato & Van Sant, 1988; Troje et al., 1999; but, see 
Jitsumori, 1993, 1994). While these studies do appear to show that nonhuman 
animals can, in principle, discriminate on the basis of overall similarity, this does not 
mean that this form of discrimination learning is necessarily most natural to them (see 
Lea & Wills, 2008). Importantly, these studies also do not definitively document 
categorisation (in any meaningful sense) in nonhuman animals (see Chater & Heyes,
1994). Before one can ask whether nonhuman animals have a natural preference for 
categorisation based on a principle of family resemblance, therefore, one first needs to 
address the question of whether nonhuman animals engage in unsupervised 
(spontaneous) categorisation at all. Consequently, although the issue of 
unidimensional versus multidimensional categorisation in nonhuman animals is not 
directly investigated in this thesis, a new method for investigating unsupervised 
(spontaneous) categorisation in nonhuman animals is introduced in Chapter 3.
In summary, the above studies document an overall bias for unidimensional 
classification in laboratory assessments of human unsupervised categorization. 
Indeed, even when increased levels of family resemblance sorting have been shown, 
often unidimensional classification is still preferred overall. One obvious difference 
between laboratory-based and real world categorisation, however, is that everyday 
categorisation takes place with respect to a person’s understanding about the world, 
and the objects that exist within it. Consequently, perhaps it is this theoretical 
knowledge that predominantly encourages classification based on family resemblance 
(see Murphy & Medin, 1985).
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1.3.5 The influence of theoretical knowledge on unsupervised categorisation
If theoretical knowledge does indeed form the basis for category coherence, 
then one would naturally expect this to be reflected in people’s categorisation 
behaviour. What would this mean with respect to laboratory-based unsupervised 
categorisation? If, as is widely accepted within cognitive psychology, real world 
category structures are rich and multidimensional, then a clear prediction would be 
that incorporating theoretical knowledge into an artificial unsupervised categorisation 
task should encourage participants to engage in classification based on family 
resemblance. A number of authors have demonstrated how prior knowledge about a 
set of stimuli influences participants’ unsupervised classification behaviour. For 
example, Lassaline and Murphy (1996) found that participants who had previously 
been asked inductive questions about verbal and pictorial stimuli engaged in 
significantly more family resemblance sorting in a subsequent unsupervised 
categorisation task than participants who had simply been asked ‘frequency questions’ 
about the stimuli, or who simply completed the sorting task. An induction question 
took the form, “If X  has the property 7, what kind of Z does it have?” (X  may refer to 
an animal, Y  to tail length (long or short), and Z to tooth shape (flat or sharp)). In 
contrast, a frequency question focused only on single dimensions, such as, “How 
many animals have a short tail?” (Lassaline & Murphy, 1996). Similarly, Spalding 
and Murphy (1996) showed that people are able to spontaneously utilise their 
background knowledge when afforded to do so in laboratory-based unsupervised 
categorisation tasks. For example, participants who were able to thematically relate 
the features of a set of stimuli produced significantly more classifications based on 
family resemblance than participants who were unable to thematically relate the 
features of a set of stimuli. Furthermore, Kaplan and Murphy (1999) found that even 
if only a single feature per item is associated with prior knowledge, then this will still 
help participants notice the family resemblance structure for a set of stimuli.
Ahn (1990, 1991) has also shown the importance of background knowledge in 
influencing participants’ production of family resemblance sorts. In her experiments, 
participants were either presented with the prototypical members of each category to 
use as templates for category construction (the prototype condition), presented with 
information that identified certain features (e.g., a flower being brightly coloured) 
with some particular property (e.g., being particularly attractive to birds rather than
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bees; the theory condition), or were given no additional information (the control 
condition). In a subsequent unsupervised categorisation task, she found that while 
those participants who had received no additional information showed an 
overwhelming bias for unidimensional classification, those participants in the other 
two conditions tended to use a family resemblance principle as the basis for their 
unsupervised categorisations. Notably, however, those participants in the theory 
condition were more likely to engage in family resemblance-based unsupervised 
classification than participants in the prototype condition.
The experiments described in this section demonstrate how the introduction of 
prior knowledge into unsupervised categorisation tasks increases the prevalence of 
family resemblance sorting. However, in line with other findings, where family 
resemblance sorting has been increased by prior knowledge, participants often still 
show an overall preference for unidimensional unsupervised categorisation. While 
these findings provide some support for the view that prior knowledge plays an 
important role in guiding human categorisation (Murphy & Medin, 1985), it is also 
apparent that prior knowledge does not uniquely determine family resemblance-based 
classification (at least in the laboratory). Critically, prior knowledge appears to play 
an important role in highlighting (enhancing) the correlated nature of stimulus 
attributes, but this can only guide unsupervised classification so far. It appears, 
therefore, that what is most critical in determining humans’ overall bias for 
unidimensional or multidimensional unsupervised classification is the nature of the 
underlying stimulus structure (i.e., the similarity-based relations that exist between a 
set of stimuli). That is, if the similarity structure of a set of stimuli is biased towards 
unidimensional categorisation (i.e., unidimensional classification is ‘more intuitive’), 
then participants’ classifications will likely reflect this bias (see Figure 1; Love et al., 
2004). To reiterate, Chapter 2 of this thesis sought to directly test the influence of 
stimulus similarity structure on the issue of unidimensional versus multidimensional 
unsupervised classification.
1.3.5 Overview of unsupervised categorisation research: what does it tell us about
human conceptual structure?
The laboratory-based investigation of human unsupervised categorisation has 
revealed some surprising results. Despite the theoretical rejection of the classical 
view of conceptual structure (that is, category formation based on necessary and
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jointly sufficient features), many unsupervised categorisation studies have 
documented a robust and overwhelming bias for a classical-type, unidimensional 
classification strategy among people. Put simply, this laboratory-based preference 
does not fit with current understanding about the nature of our everyday category 
structures, which are patently based on a principle of family resemblance (Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). This is not to say that unsupervised classification 
based on a family resemblance principle is never found in the laboratory. 
Manipulations of stimulus format, procedure, etc., have all influenced the issue of 
unidimensional versus family resemblance sorting. The fact that some additional task 
manipulation has been required to increase family resemblance sorting, however, 
suggests that this kind of unsupervised classification is not participants’ preferred 
strategy for categorisation. Moreover, where family resemblance sorting has been 
increased, more often than not an overall preference for unidimensional unsupervised 
categorisation has remained.
What, then, does this research tell us about the nature of human conceptual 
structure? First, the evidence suggests that the human cognitive system does not 
spontaneously recognise and utilise the family resemblance structure of a set of items 
(but, see Billman & Knutson, 1996). Rather, when possible, it appears much simpler 
to group a set of items on the basis of some necessary feature along a single 
dimension of variation. So, is the use of necessary and sufficient features in human 
categorisation natural? Well, perhaps for categorisation tasks undertaken in unnatural 
situations using artificially created category structures. However, what is also clear is 
that, when provided with only a minimal amount of prior knowledge that causally 
relates features within a stimulus set, participants produce more naturalistic, family 
resemblance sorts (e.g., Kaplan & Murphy, 1999, 2000; Lassaline & Murphy, 1996; 
Spalding & Murphy, 1996). Do ‘naive theories’, acquired from prior knowledge, 
underlie category coherence, therefore? The most likely answer to this question is 
that prior knowledge commands an important influence over human categorisation, 
but it is unlikely to be the sole, or even the main, determinant of stimulus 
classification. Similarity, ever ready to impress itself, is clearly a critical component 
in guiding and determining human (and nonhuman animal) categorisation. 
Furthermore, many of the arguments that cast doubt over the suitably of similarity as 
providing a basis for human categorisation have now been addressed (see Goldstone, 
1994; Hahn & Chater, 1997; Medin, et al., 1993). These authors have convincingly
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argued that similarity is not too unconstrained to afford the constrained nature of 
categorisation. While prior knowledge may be central in highlighting the 
interconnected nature of stimulus attributes, this does not mean that it is the ‘glue’ 
that holds categories together (Murphy, 2002).
As documented in Section 1.3.2, a number of factors have likely played an 
important role in producing the overwhelming bias for unidimensional unsupervised 
classification in the laboratory (e.g., constrained categorisation, etc.). To my mind, 
one of the most important of these factors is the fact that the stimulus structure of 
Figure 1 has been repeatedly employed in studies of human unsupervised 
categorisation. This is important because, although Medin et al. (1987) assumed that 
this stimulus structure would naturally promote family resemblance sorting, 
modelling work has predicted that this structure should actually be considered ‘most 
intuitive’ in terms of classification based along a single dimension of variation (see 
Ahn & Medin, 1992; Love et al., 2004). Given this fact, it is therefore imperative to 
determine the influence of stimulus similarity structure on the issue of unidimensional 
versus multidimensional unsupervised classification. That is, an assessment of 
unsupervised categorisation needs to be made where classification is entirely 
unconstrained, and where modelling work has established the similarity-based biases 
that exist within the stimulus structure(s) being used. Specifically, based solely on 
abstract similarity structure, one needs to contrast a situation where a preference for 
unidimensional unsupervised classification is predicted with a situation where a 
preference for family resemblance-based unsupervised classification is predicted. 
Only if unidimensional categorisation persists in both these conditions can one start to 
draw firm conclusions about the ‘naturalness’ of this classification behaviour. These 
fundamental issues are the subject of experimental investigation in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. To achieve this goal, detailed modelling work of human unsupervised 
categorisation is required. Fortunately, as noted in Chapter 0, there now exist a 
number of influential models of unsupervised categorisation within the psychological 
domain, and it is to these that I now turn my attention.
1.4 Modelling Advances in Unsupervised Categorisation
Despite evidence supporting the principles of necessity and joint sufficiency as 
a basis for human unsupervised categorisation, modelling work on this topic has 
traditionally taken similarity as its starting point (e.g., Fisher, 1996; but see, Ahn &
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Medin, 1992). The modelling effort for unsupervised categorisation has largely been 
overshadowed by that on supervised categorisation; the latter producing some of the 
most influential modelling approaches within cognitive psychology, such as exemplar 
(Kruschke, 1992; Nosofsky, 1986, 1989) and prototype theory (Hampton, 2003). 
However, a plethora of models of unsupervised categorisation now exist from work 
done within psychology, statistics, and machine learning. All these three areas of 
research share the same problem of how to divide up large amounts of information in 
the ‘best’ way possible; of course, work in machine learning and psychology has a 
specific emphasis on mirroring, or modelling, what humans do naturally. An 
influential early account of unsupervised learning was proposed by Fried and Holyoak 
(1984). For Fried and Holyoak’s account to be successful, however, knowledge of the 
number of categories sought by the category learner must be known a priori (see also, 
£-means clustering, Banfield & Bassill, 1977; Kohonan neural network architecture, 
e.g., Schyns, 1991), and the category density functions that the approach relies on 
must have a specific form (Pothos & Chater, 2002). Given the clear limitations of this 
approach (e.g., in the real world people do not generally know how many categories 
they should construct), it is not surprising that numerous models now exist that 
require no knowledge of the number of categories sought -  although most still rely on 
the data conforming to a specific form, albeit in a much more flexible manner (e.g., 
AutoClass, Cheeseman & Stutz, 1995; CODE, Compton & Logan, 1993, 1999; 
COBWEB, Fisher, 1987, 1996; Fisher & Langley, 1990; see also, Corter & Gluck, 
1992). An early model of unsupervised categorisation stemming directly from 
psychological research is Ahn and Medin’s (1992) two-stage model of category 
construction. This model was developed in response to the robust finding of a strong 
bias among participants for unidimensional unsupervised classification (e.g., Medin et 
al., 1987). Briefly, classification is initially sought on the basis of a single dimension 
(Ahn & Medin, 1992, viewed unidimensional classification as a ubiquitous feature of 
human unsupervised categorisation). If a suitable classification cannot be identified 
on the basis of any single dimension, then a grouping based on a principle of family 
resemblance is subsequently identified. With regard to the number of categories 
sought by the two-stage model of category construction, the model predicts that this 
will mirror the number of values (reflecting individual features) along the dimension 
that is regarded as most salient (Ahn & Medin, 1992).
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With these models in mind, I now focus on three models of unsupervised 
categorisation that have established themselves within the cognitive psychology 
literature. These three models are the Rational model (Anderson, 1991), the 
simplicity model (Pothos & Chater, 2002), and SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004). While 
it is an interesting task in and of itself to review these models to better understand 
how they implement unsupervised categorisation, these three models will also be 
considered in the experimental work of Chapter 2 of this thesis. In particular, the 
simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation was employed to generate the 
predictions for the experimental work presented in Chapter 2. Therefore, a somewhat 
more detailed description of the simplicity model is presented below.
1.4.1 The Rational Model
Anderson’s (1991) Rational Model is a Bayesian model of human 
categorisation, viewing human categorisation as a product of its necessary adaptation 
to the environment (Anderson, 1991). While the role of similarity is not central in the 
Rational Model, categorisation predictions often reflect the overall similarity structure 
of the stimulus domain. Indeed, as Anderson states, “The probability of an item 
coming from a category is a function of its feature similarity” (1991, p. 415). In the 
context of categorisation, there are two key considerations that the Rational Model has 
to address: First, what property of categorisation is the human cognitive system trying 
to optimise; second, what is the structure of the environment in which the human 
cognitive system has evolved, and as such, is adapted to? This strong emphasis on the 
environment is reflective of the view of Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch & Mervis, 
1975; Rosch et al., 1976), and given the probabilistic nature of the environment, 
Anderson suggests that humans “start out with some weak assumptions about the 
environment and with experience make these increasingly strong” (1991, p. 409).
The Rational Model is an iterative (or incremental) model of learning and 
categorisation. From a starting position where no categories are specified, at each 
step, it decides how a novel instance should be categorised. In this way, it slowly 
builds a classification for a set of stimuli. A key constraint on the Rational Model’s 
incremental strategy of category formation, however, is that it does not consider all 
possible category structures for a given data set (this being due to the high 
computational demands that such a procedure would require). Instead, the model 
hypothesises some specific category structure of the objects seen, and then the
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algorithm commits to this. When a new item is presented, this hypothesised category 
structure may have to be altered from its previous state, and so the model commits to 
a hypothesis about the category structure of the objects after every object seen (see 
Anderson, 1991, for a more in-depth discussion of this constraint). Critical to 
Anderson’s (1991) theorising is the premise that humans need to have well-formed 
category structures at their disposal at all times; these naturally being updated after 
every new object is presented. The incremental nature of the Rational Model means 
that the model gives rise to order effects.
When a new object is presented, the Rational Model calculates for each 
category k the probability P(k | F) that the new object belongs to category k given that 
the new object has features F. P(k | F) is calculated from two terms, P(k) and P(F | k). 
The first of these terms is a prior probability; that is, before the feature structure of an 
object has been assessed, the prior probability of that object coming from category k. 
The second term is a conditional probability; that is, the probability of having features 
F  given that it comes from category k. So, a new instance with feature structure F  is 
classified to the category k for which the product P(k)P(F \ k) is greatest (or, it may be 
assigned to a new category). For example, if you see a new object that looks like a 
‘cat’, assign it to the category of cats, since the feature structure of the object is most 
probable given this category membership.
Surveying the literature, Anderson (1991) showed that the Rational Model 
provided an accurate description of a number of important experimental findings. For 
example, in a test of categorisation to a face prototype, the predictions of category 
membership of 25 test stimuli made by the Rational Model correlated extremely well 
(.90) with participant categorisations from the original study by Reed (1972). 
Similarly, the Rational Model was shown to be sensitive to the frequency of 
presentation of certain exemplars, as were participants in Nosofsky (1988b). It also 
accurately predicted when linearly nonseparable categories (that is, when it is not 
possible to draw a straight hyperplane in the category space that separates a set 
number of categories) would be easier to learn than linearly separable categories (that 
is, when it is possible to draw a straight hyperplane that separates a set number of 
categories; see Medin & Schwanenflugel, 1981). Anderson (1991) further showed 
that, in the absence of any feedback, the Rational Model was able to identify category 
structure within the materials used by Homa and Cultice (1984). Furthermore, the
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Rational Model has been successfully applied to basic level categorisation, simulating 
results by Murphy and Smith (1982; see, Anderson, 1990).
In summary, the Rational Model of human categorisation has been shown to 
be an effective model of supervised categorisation that also extends into the 
identification of category structure when no feedback is available. Anderson makes a 
number of conclusions about his Rational Model, two of which are particularly 
interesting in the current context: First, he proposes that '‘a good case has been made 
for the proposition that categorisation behaviour can be predicted from the structure of 
the environment at least as well as it can from the structure of the mind” (1991, p. 
427). Second, after acknowledging that the Rational Model has little to say with 
specific regard to what the structure of the mind is, he suggests “that the mind has the 
structure it has because the world has the structure it has” (1991, p.428).
1.4.2 The simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation
The second model to be discussed, the simplicity model of unsupervised 
categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002), provides a computational formalism for 
Rosch and Mends’s (1975) proposal that ‘good’ categories are ones that maximise 
within-category similarity and minimise between-category similarity. Consequently, 
the simplicity model predicts what has become regarded as people’s preferred level of 
categorisation; that is, the basic level of categorisation (as opposed to superordinate or 
subordinate level categorisation; Rosch et al., 1976). A number of clustering 
algorithms have been proposed with the goal of trying to extract the ‘natural’ or ‘best’ 
way of partitioning a set of items (that is, through forming ‘good’ or ‘intuitive’ 
categories; see Krzanowski & Marriott, 1995). This contrasts with hierarchical 
clustering models where one typically ends up with a single cluster, unless a ‘cut-off 
criterion is specified. The critical issue with regards to these clustering algorithms is 
what determines ‘bestness’. In all clustering methods, partitioning of a set of items is 
deemed to reflect regularity in the similarity structure of those items (Pothos & 
Chater, 2001); but, how does one measure how good a specific classification is? For 
example, one may identify two plausible ways of partitioning an item set based on 
their similarity structure, but which classification (partitioning) is to be preferred? As 
an answer to this problem, Pothos and Chater (2002) propose the notion of simplicity 
in the form of the minimum description length principle (MDL; Rissanen, 1978). The 
MDL principle reflects the idea that shorter descriptions of a given data set (specified
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in terms of a codelength in some (universal) programming language) are better. That 
is, the shorter the codelength needed to describe the data, and therefore the data itself, 
the better that description (or ‘theory’) is (Pothos & Chater, 2001; see also, Quinlan & 
Rivest, 1989). To specify a codelength for the similarity structure of a set of items, 
Pothos and Chater (2001, 2002) take their reference from information theory (this will 
be discussed further shortly).
For the purpose of the simplicity model, ‘descriptions’ can be mapped directly 
onto classifications, and as such, a codelength can be associated with a specific 
classification. Following from Rissanen (1978), Pothos and Chater propose that 
“According to the simplicity model...groupings associated with a short codelength 
(high compression) will be favoured” (2002, p. 310). Initially, therefore, the 
simplicity model computes, in bits, the codelength required to describe the total 
similarity information in a set of items without any categories (i.e., the raw similarity 
information). Certain clustering patterns will reduce the codelength required to 
describe the similarity information of the item set more than others; these clustering 
patterns will therefore be preferred, given that they will achieve an overall greater 
compression of the raw description of all the similarity information. Specifically, in 
line with the proposal of Rosch and Mervis (1975), the simplicity model looks to 
achieve a clustering pattern whereby the similarity of items within a cluster (a 
collection of items in a set) is greater than the similarity of items between clusters 
(Pothos & Chater, 2001, 2002).
To avoid becoming embroiled in the debate over the nature of similarity (see, 
e.g., Goodman, 1972; Hahn & Chater, 1997; Medin et al., 1993; Tversky, 1977), the 
simplicity model looks to capture the broadest view of similarity information possible. 
That is, given four items A, B, C, and Z), for example, the simplicity model asks, is 
similarity (A, B) less or greater than similarity (C, D), without any regard to how 
similarity is defined. Judgements of pairwise inequalities reflect a binary decision: 
for example, similarity (A, B) is either greater than similarity (C, D), or it is less than 
similarity (C, D; Pothos & Chater, 2001). Pothos and Chater (2001) note that ties (or 
equalities) can also be accounted for within these judgements; however, they propose 
that ties are extremely unlikely with real-valued domains, and so they are ignored for 
simplicity. Of course, while this may be true for real-valued domains, ties will likely 
occur with the kinds of materials that most unsupervised categorisation studies 
employ; namely, stimuli constructed from binary-valued feature dimensions. In
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practice, therefore, the simplicity formalism is slightly adjusted to take into account 
equalities. One further assumption made in the simplicity model is that similarities 
obey the metric axioms of symmetry and minimality. That is, similarity (A, B) = 
similarity (B, A), and similarity (A, A) = maximum similarity. These metric axioms 
are assumed to be obeyed when meaningless, schematic stimuli are employed (the 
introduction of general knowledge factors into classification judgements will, 
however, likely lead to violations of these metric axioms; see Tversky, 1977).
So, as stated above, the simplicity model initially computes (in bits) the 
codelength required to describe the total similarity information in a set of items 
without any categories (i.e., the raw similarity information). For example, for 10 
objects, there are 10x(10-l)/2 = 45 unique similarities (‘unique’ here represents the 
fact that if similarity (A, B) is included, then similarity (B, A) will not be included, and 
that similarity (A, A), etc., will also not be included). Consequently, there are 45x(45- 
l)/2 = 990 unique pairs of similarities (‘unique’ here represents the fact that if the 
relation similarity (A, B) > similarity (A, C) is included, then the relation similarity (A, 
C) < similarity (A, B) will not be included, and that relations like similarity (A, B) > 
similarity (A, B) will not be included). Overall, therefore, for 10 objects there are 990 
pairs of similarity relations (inequalities), meaning that a codelength of 990 bits is 
required to describe the corresponding similarity information.
In the simplicity model, Pothos and Chater (2002) defined categories as 
imposing constraints on the similarity relations between pairs of stimuli. To 
recapitulate, the definition Pothos and Chater (2002) used was that all similarities 
within categories are assumed to be greater than all similarities between categories 
(Rosch, 1975). So, if one assumes, for example, that the 10 objects specified above 
can be clustered into two perfect categories, with five objects in each category (i.e., no 
constraints are violated), then there are 5x(5-l)/2 = 10 within-category similarities. In 
total, therefore, there are 20 within-category similarities when considering both 
categories together. Moreover, there are 5 x 5 between-category similarities. 
Consequently, given these two perfect categories, there are a total of 20 x 25 = 500 
constraints. By imposing categories, then, the codelength required to describe the 
similarity structure of the objects is now, approximately, 990-500 = 490 bits. 
“Approximately” here reflects two points: First, the simplicity model also needs to 
take into account the codelength required to select the ‘best’ classification from all 
possible classifications of r items; that is, the complexity of specifying the category
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membership of a set of items (see Pothos & Chater, 2001, 2002). This is done using
, NV (ft ~ vY
Stirling’s number, 2 j H )  ( w - v ) ! v !  * describes the number of ways r items can
be divided into n categories. Second, when a particular classification is imposed, in 
general, some of the constraints will be wrong. These wrong constraints need to be 
corrected, therefore, so as to reconstruct the data (Pothos & Chater, 2002). Pothos 
and Chater (2002) detail that if there are u constraints, of which e are erroneous, then
the total code for correcting erroneous constraints is log2 («+1) + log2 („ Ce) bits, 
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given that there are = e\^u _ ey  ways to choose e items from a set of u.
In summary, the simplicity model provides a metric for assessing ‘category 
intuitiveness’, by determining how much simpler the description of a stimulus 
structure is with categories, compared to without categories. Overall, the ‘goodness’ 
of a classification will be better the more constraints and fewer errors there are; this 
will be reflected in a corresponding reduction in description length. In general, 
simplicity model predictions are typically specified as the ratio of codelength (with 
categories) / codelength (without categories), expressed as a percentage. Therefore, 
the lower this percentage, the greater the ‘simplification’ of the code achieved by 
imposing a classification and the more psychologically intuitive (obvious) the 
classification is predicted to be. For brevity, this percentage is referred to as 
‘codelength’. Classification codelengths typically vary between 50% and 100% (as 
said, lower values indicate a more psychologically intuitive classification). The 
computation of the different codelength terms specified above is effectively an 
application of the formal simplicity framework of Minimum Description Length 
(Rissanen, 1989). The simplicity model is run in a straightforward way: its input is 
the coordinates of a set of stimuli when represented in an assumed psychological 
space, out of which the model generates information about pairs of similarities 
(typically using the Euclidean metric). The model employs a search algorithm to 
identify the best possible classification for the set of items. The algorithm is akin to 
agglomerative clustering ones, which initially assume that all items belong to separate 
categories, and then gradually combine items to try to improve this classification. 
Unlike many prominent models of categorisation (whether they model supervised or 
unsupervised categorisation), the simplicity model is parameter free (Pothos & 
Chater, 2002).
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Over a series of four experiments, Pothos and Chater (2002) presented 
experimental support for their simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation. These 
experiments included having participants simply draw lines around a set of data points 
in a manner that they felt represented the most natural and intuitive partitioning for 
those data points; grouping together sets of star stimuli, which were constructed from 
the coordinates of a specified stimulus structure; and, providing pairwise similarity 
ratings for 11 black and white polka dot square stimuli. In conclusion, the simplicity 
model provides an important and interesting metric for computing the ‘intuitiveness’ 
of a classification. Moreover, one is able to determine an ‘optimal’ classification for a 
set of stimuli without the need for any free parameters. The development of the 
simplicity model adds to the growing literature in which the simplicity principle has 
been applied to explain a number of cognitive processes (see Chater, 1999; also, e.g., 
Hahn et al., 2003).
1.4.3 SUSTAIN
Like the Rational Model (Anderson, 1991) and the simplicity model (Pothos & 
Chater, 2002), the Supervised and Unsupervised STratified Adaptive Incremental 
Network (SUSTAIN; Love et al., 2004) assumes that the world has some natural 
structure that the human perceptual and conceptual systems exploit (e.g., Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). At the heart of SUSTAIN’s categorisation behaviour, however, is the 
flexible search for structure. Indeed, Love et al. (2004) note that the most intuitive 
structure for a set of items based solely on perceptual similarity may not always be as 
useful as the structure derived from an alternative analysis. The promotion of 
flexibility in search by Love et al. is highlighted by the following passage: “Thus, the 
categorisation system must be able to both assimilate structure and discover or even 
create that structure” (2004, p. 309). This broad notion of categorisation fits nicely 
with Malt’s (1995) conclusion that a structured environment in itself is insufficient to 
determine categorisation, although it clearly plays a key role in categorisation (see 
also, Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Wisniewski & Medin, 1994).
SUSTAIN is particularly interesting as it tries to capture the full continuum of 
human categorisation behaviour, from unsupervised categorisation to supervised 
categorisation, in a single model. In contrast to some models (e.g., backpropagation 
models), SUSTAIN has an adaptive architecture to learning (Love et al., 2004). That 
is, it initially searches for simple solutions to a particular categorisation problem and
45
only expands the complexity of such solutions when the problem requires. Like the 
Rational Model, SUSTAIN is an incremental model of category learning, and as such, 
is susceptible to ordering effects (Love et al., 2004; see, e.g., Bruner, Goodnow, & 
Austin, 1956). With specific regard to SUSTAIN’s modelling of unsupervised 
categorisation, once again similarity has a central role to play in initially determining 
structure within a given stimulus set, in line with both the Rational Model and the 
simplicity model. The intuition is that similar items will tend to cluster together, 
favouring groupings that maximise within-category similarity and minimise between- 
category similarity (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Moreover, SUSTAIN’s unsupervised 
categorisation component is also driven by the fact that it reacts to ‘surprising’ events. 
That is, if a novel item is encountered that does not fit well into any existing clusters 
(i.e., the similarity between an item and the cluster the item is most similar to is below 
a certain threshold, Love et al., 2004) then a new cluster will likely be created.
SUSTAIN is composed of the following basic components: a set of input 
units; a set of clusters that compete to respond to an input stimulus; a set of output 
units that mirror the input layer and serve as the corresponding inputs to a decision 
procedure; the decision procedure that generates a response (see Love et al., 2004). 
Stimuli are represented in terms of vector frames, “where the dimensionality of the 
vector is equal to the dimensionality of the stimuli” (Love et al., 2004, p. 313). Along 
with the perceptual dimensions (e.g., colour), these vector frames also include the 
category label as a stimulus dimension. Similarity is a function of the distance 
between vector frames within a multidimensional representational space; the smaller 
the distance between two vector frames, the more similar those items are taken to be. 
In the model simulations of Love et al. (2004), they only focused on stimuli whose 
dimensions are nominal, rather than continuous. While Love et al. (2004) note that 
SUSTAIN can represent continuous-valued stimulus dimensions, the details on how 
this is done are somewhat sketchy. However, to represent multiple-valued, nominal 
stimulus dimensions, at least, SUSTAIN simply recruits multiple input units (Love et 
al., 2004). With respect to unsupervised categorisation, an important free parameter 
in SUSTAIN is its cluster recruitment mechanism; that is, the mechanism that 
specifies the threshold of dissimilarity required between a novel item and an already 
formed cluster for the novel item to create a new cluster, rather than become part of an 
existing cluster. This parameter is important as it indirectly determines the number of 
categories created. However, despite representing a free parameter (having a range
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between 0 and 1), for simplification of analysis, this parameter was arbitrarily fixed at 
.5 for all simulations run by Love et al. (2004).
With respect to previous unsupervised categorisation research, Love et al. 
(2004) showed that SUSTAIN accurately predicts the contradictory findings of 
Billman and Knutson (1996) and Medin et al. (1987). To recapitulate, Billman and 
Knutson (1996) found that participants who received a set of highly structured 
stimuli, in which there were many features intercorrelations, performed better in a 
later classification task than participants who received a set of poorly structured 
stimuli, in which the stimulus features were nonintercorrelated. Specifically, 
participants in the intercorrelated structure condition became aware of the family 
resemblance structure of the stimuli. In contrast, when engaged in unsupervised 
classification, Medin et al. (1987) found that their participants preferred 
unidimensional classification, even when the stimuli’s feature dimensions were 
intercorrelated. On the basis of Billman and Knutson’s (1996) results, this should 
have led to classification based on a principle family resemblance. SUSTAIN 
successfully reconciles these seemingly contradictory patterns of results in two ways: 
First, by focusing on the statistical regularities that existed within the category 
structures used by the authors (note, for example, that in contrast to the materials used 
by Medin et al., 1987, perfect correlations existed between the stimulus dimensions 
used in Billman & Knutson’s, 1996, study). Second, by the fact that SUSTAIN is 
biased to focus on a small subset of stimulus dimensions when considered acceptable 
(Love et al., 2004).
In conclusion, the interplay between the unsupervised and supervised 
categorisation components of SUSTAIN makes it an extremely flexible model, and 
one that is more powerful than either a pure model of unsupervised or supervised 
categorisation. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 2, the existence of 
SUSTAIN’s recruitment mechanism as a free parameter can result in ambiguity in its 
predictions over a number of important issues within unsupervised categorisation 
research.
1.4.4 Overview of modelling of unsupervised categorisation
A number of commonalities exist between the three models reviewed above: 
first, they share the assumption that humans perceive an environment that has a 
structured nature; second, they assume that humans are sensitive to these perceived
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structural regularities; third, they all invoke a central role for similarity in 
unsupervised categorisation. Essentially, the three models look to principles that 
seem at odds with many of the findings from investigations of laboratory-based 
unsupervised categorisation. All the models suppose that humans will construct 
categories in a manner that is consistent with the most easily identifiable structure 
within a given stimulus set. Most notably, in contrast to past experimenters’ 
intuitions, Love et al. (2004) have shown that SUSTAIN predicts that unidimensional 
classification of the binary stimuli employed by Medin et al. (1987; see Figure 1) 
should be preferred, on the basis of their abstract similarity structure. Given the 
prevalence of this stimulus structure (see Figure 1) within the unsupervised 
categorisation literature, SUSTAIN’s prediction clearly casts doubt over the reliability 
of any conclusion that participants are ‘naturally’ biased towards unidimensional 
classification. Rather, this prediction supports the view that the prevalence of 
unidimensional unsupervised classification in the laboratory is most likely an artefact 
of the similarity structure of the stimuli employed.
1.5 Summary and conclusions
Research on human unsupervised categorisation has documented an 
overwhelming bias for unidimensional classification, which appears to reflect a 
‘classical-type’ view of categorisation. The classical view of human conceptual 
structure has, however, been widely discredited (see Fodor et al., 1980). In its place, 
theories of conceptual structure have been developed that emphasise the role of 
similarity in human categorisation (i.e., prototype and exemplar views). These latter 
theories have led to the development of influential models of human categorisation 
(e.g., Hampton, 2003; Nosofsky, 1986, 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Nosofsky et al., 1989, 
see also Kruschke, 1992), which have proved extremely successful in modelling a 
range of classification data. With regard to the modelling of unsupervised 
categorisation, a number of influential models have been outlined in this chapter, 
which again emphasise the role of similarity in classification. Essentially, these 
models assume that while similar stimuli should be ‘spontaneously’ classified into the 
same category, dissimilar stimuli should be ‘spontaneously’ classified into different 
categories. With respect to the Rational model, the simplicity model, and SUSTAIN, 
unsupervised categorisation is guided by the assumption that humans are sensitive to 
perceived regularities in the environment. However, SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004)
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also incorporates a role for the human classifier, with stimulus classification being 
influenced by the goals of the classifier at the time of categorisation.
As noted in Chapter 0, and highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
respective roles of a structured environment and the human classifier in determining 
‘spontaneous’ category construction is a particularly interesting topic of discussion. If 
one were to conclude, for example, that the theory theory provided an accurate 
representation of human categorisation, then this would have critical implications for 
comparative assessments of categorisation (i.e., comparing human categorisation 
behaviour to that of nonhuman animal categorisation behaviour). That is, the higher- 
level cognitive account of the theory theory view means that it must deny the 
possibility of nonhuman categorisation based on the same underlying principles as 
human categorisation. Consequently, human and nonhuman animal categorisation 
will necessarily be qualitatively different (see Chater & Heyes, 1994). To reiterate, 
this account of human conceptual structure clearly suggests a view of categorisation 
in which the role of the classifier dominates. However, if human classification is 
predominantly influenced by the statistical properties of the environment (in terms of 
perceived structural regularities), then this at least allows the possibility that 
nonhuman animal categorisation is qualitatively similar to that of human 
categorisation.
With these issues in mind, this thesis seeks to better understand how stimulus 
similarity structure, and the statistical properties of the environment, guide and 
influence categorisation behaviour in humans and rats. Specifically, in the next 
chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) I investigate the influence of abstract stimulus 
structure on the issue of unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised 
classification in humans. As I have argued in this chapter, one likely factor in 
producing the overwhelming bias for unidimensional unsupervised classification in 
the laboratory are the inherent, similarity-based biases that have existed in the stimuli 
that have been regularly employed. Therefore, I sought to predict when participants 
should be biased towards unidimensional classification, and when they should be 
biased towards classification based on a principle of family resemblance, on the basis 
of the abstract similarity structure of a set of objects. To do this, I employ the 
simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002). In Chapter 
3 of this thesis, I sought to broaden my investigations of unsupervised categorisation:
I examine how stimulus similarity structure influences incidental unsupervised
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classification in both humans and rats, by either enhancing or limiting the processes of 
perceptual learning, sensory-preconditioning, and ‘surprise’. By investigating 
incidental unsupervised classification in this way, I sought evidence of human-like 
categorization behaviour in rats, which some authors would deny (see, e.g., Chater & 
Heyes, 1994). Finally, Chapter 4 of this thesis investigates whether rats exhibit 
another important aspect of human categorisation, which some authors have denied 
(see Chater & Heyes, 1994). That is, Chapter 4 assesses whether rats are capable of 
engaging in stimulus cross-classification, based on the learned statistical properties of 
the environment.
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Chapter 2
Unidimensional versus two-dimensional classification in human
unsupervised categorisation
“...there may be no general answer to the question of which partitioning of some 
abstract structure of a set of examples is more natural.”
(Medin et al., 1987, p. 33)
2. Introduction
When asked to group a set of stimuli in the absence of any feedback, 
participants readily engage with this task, generating a stimulus classification that, 
one assumes, is meaningful and intuitive to them. It is apparent, however, that the 
kind of unsupervised classification behaviour exhibited by participants in the 
laboratory is at odds with theoretical considerations of the nature of our everyday 
categories and concepts (see Chapter 1). On the one hand, there exists a general bias 
among participants to engage in unidimensional unsupervised categorisation in the 
laboratory (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; Medin et al., 1987; Regehr & Brooks, 1995), 
reflecting a reliance on a classical-type approach to categorisation. On the other hand, 
one sees the theoretical rejection of categorisation based on definitional qualities (i.e., 
the classical view), due to the fact that our everyday category structures clearly reflect 
a principle of family resemblance (see Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). It 
is important to ask, therefore, why people choose to sometimes ignore some of the 
dimensions of variation that exist within a stimulus set, and why they often take this 
to an extreme in laboratory-based studies of unsupervised categorisation.
While unidimensional unsupervised classification dominates in the laboratory, 
as was shown in Chapter 1, a number of task manipulations have been found to 
increase family resemblance sorting (e.g., speeded classification; Smith & Kemler 
Nelson, 1984; cf. Milton & Wills, 2008). Probably the most effective of these 
manipulations has been incorporating prior knowledge into laboratory-based 
unsupervised categorisation tasks (e.g., Lassaline & Murphy, 1996; Spalding & 
Murphy, 1996). The reason for this appears to be that ‘knowledge’ encourages the 
interconnection of stimulus features, which enables participants to more readily 
discover the experimenter-defined family resemblance category structure. While
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prior knowledge is clearly an important factor in influencing everyday categorisation, 
models of unsupervised categorisation have typically ignored such factors, defining 
category coherence purely in terms of similarity (e.g., Pothos & Chater, 2002). 
Despite ignoring the influence of general knowledge, these models have proved 
successful in capturing a range of unsupervised categorisation data (see, e.g., Love et 
al., 2004). Moreover, Love et al. (2004; see also, Ahn & Medin, 1992) have shown 
that, based on the abstract similarity structure of Medin et al.’s (1987) binary stimulus 
structure (see Figure 1, Chapter 1), unidimensional classification of the respective 
stimuli should be considered ‘optimal’. While consistent with Medin et al.’s (1987) 
experimental findings, this prediction is inconsistent with these author’s intuitions 
about this stimulus structure, which they believed would promote classification based 
on a principle of family resemblance. The fact that this belief has propagated, and 
that this binary stimulus structure has been so widely employed, has simply 
compounded the sense that participants are doing something odd, and that they are 
‘naturally’ biased towards unidimensional unsupervised classification. Based on the 
work of Love et al. (2004), therefore, it is possible that much of the bias for 
unidimensional unsupervised classification in the laboratory may simply reflect the 
abstract similarity structure of the stimuli being employed. A number of other factors 
have also likely contributed to the persistence of unidimensional unsupervised 
classification in the laboratory (see Section 1.3.2, Chapter 1): these include the
specification of the number of categories that should be used for classification, and 
the almost universal use of binary dimensioned stimuli. This latter point is important 
because, as Rosch states, “once the S [subject] has learned the rule(s) defining the 
positive subset, any one stimulus which fits the rule is as good an exemplar of the 
concept as any other” (1973, p. 329). This does not reflect the nature of real world 
categories where some stimuli are more typical members of a category than others, 
and which are often based on stimuli composed of continuous physical variation 
(Rosch, 1973).
The aim of the present chapter is to investigate the influence of abstract 
similarity structure on human unsupervised categorisation, in the hope of explaining 
some of the conflicting results and intuitions presented above, and in Chapter 1. The 
experimental work presented here is based on the assumption that humans should 
prefer categories that maximise within-category similarity and minimise between- 
category similarity, as has been found in the basic level categorisation literature (e.g.,
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Gosselin & Schyns, 2001; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Furthermore, the focus of the 
present chapter is on unrestricted unsupervised categorisation, using stimuli composed 
of continuous physical variation, rather than discrete (binary) variation (although the 
proposed approach can also, in principle, be applied to stimuli composed of binary 
dimensions). To be able to appropriately assess the importance of abstract similarity 
structure in biasing people towards either unidimensional or multidimensional 
unsupervised classification, it is obviously necessary to be able to establish a means 
through which one can identify category structure, and assess the intuitiveness of this 
category structure.
2.1 Assessing category intuitiveness
Given a set of stimuli constructed from n dimensions, participants may choose 
to categorise these stimuli based on just one of the n dimensions of variation present, 
up to a classification based on all n dimensions. To make things simple, when 
considering a set of stimuli constructed from two dimensions of physical variation 
(xy)9 stimulus classification may proceed in one of three ways: by taking into account 
dimension x  only, dimension y  only, or both dimensions together4. Each of these 
possible dimensionalities will therefore be associated with a different grouping of the 
stimuli, which I will denote as Group(x), Group(y) and Group(x,.y), respectively. 
Critically, these different stimulus groupings will likely differ in their perceived 
‘naturalness’ or ‘intuitiveness’. Consider the stimulus structure depicted in Figure 2, 
for example: when the stimulus points are collapsed along just dimension x
(Group(x)), an obvious (‘intuitive’) two cluster category structure is formed. In 
contrast, when the stimulus points are collapsed along just dimension y  (Group(y)), 
one simply sees homogenous variation along this dimension, and no obvious category 
structure. When taking into account both dimensions together (Group(x,y)), a 
category structure similar to that identified along dimension x is apparent, although a 
lot more variation is introduced by having to consider dimension y  as well. 
Consequently, if asked to classify the stimuli depicted in Figure 2, Group(x) should be 
preferred by participants.
For the sake o f simplicity, in all the category structures employed in this chapter, dimension x 
and dimension y  are considered to have equal weighting. It is possible, of course, that two 
dimensions of variation will not be equally weighted.
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Figure 2. Example stimulus structure where classification along just dimension x 
should be perceived to be ‘most intuitive’. Here and elsewhere the dimensions x and 
y  are assumed to correspond to dimensions of physical variation. In this structure, 
when the stimuli are represented along just dimension x, there is a well-defined two 
cluster category structure. In contrast, when represented along just dimension y , or 
when taking into account both dimension x and dimension y  together, any category 
structure is a lot less obvious.
To recapitulate, for stimuli constructed from two dimensions of variation, 
participants may choose to classify the stimuli by just considering dimension x 
(Group(x)), just considering dimension y  (Group(y)), or by considering both 
dimensions x and y  together (Group(xj>))- One can ask, therefore, which of these 
three dimensionalities produces the ‘most intuitive’ classification (that is, the 
classification perceived to be ‘best’ and most obvious)? In making this decision, I 
first assume that the cognitive system assesses the intuitiveness of Group(x) versus 
Group(y) versus Group(x,y) concurrently (Pomerantz & Kubovy, 1986), and second, 
that the cognitive system will prefer the dimensionality that produces the most 
intuitive classification. That is, if the intuitiveness of Group (x) (or Group(y)) is 
greater than that of Group(x;iy), then the cognitive system will prefer a unidimensional 
classification. In contrast, if Group(x,y) is considered more intuitive, then participants 
will prefer a two-dimensional categorisation. It is further assumed that these biases
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will be evident in participants’ classification behaviour, and that if the well- 
formedness of a category structure is not enhanced by the use of additional 
dimensions, then these dimensions will be ignored in favour of fewer dimensions. So, 
how can one measure the intuitiveness of Group(x), Group(y), and Group(x.jO?
In Chapter 1, I discussed three influential models of human unsupervised 
categorisation which are able to identify the ‘best’ category structure (classification) 
for a set of stimuli. However, not all of these models are able to provide a 
comparative assessment of the relative goodness of the three possible classification 
strategies presented above (i.e., Group(x) versus Group(y) versus Group(xj;)). For 
example, while the Rational model (Anderson, 1991) may very likely produce 
different classifications depending on whether stimuli are represented along just 
dimension x, or through a combination of dimension x and dimension y  together, it is 
not possible to compare the relative goodness of these two classifications. Moreover, 
the number of categories produced by the Rational model is effectively determined by 
the model’s coupling parameter (that is, the threshold at which new clusters should be 
formed). As highlighted in Chapter 1, by specifying the number of categories sought, 
participants may be biased towards employing one classification strategy (e.g., 
unidimensional classification) over another (Murphy, 2002). Overall, therefore, while 
alternative Bayesian approaches may be able to capture the issue of unidimensional 
versus two-dimensional classification (see Cheng, Shettleworth, Huttenlocher, & 
Rieser, 2007), it is not clear that the Rational model can.
Regarding SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004), its attentional parameters do allow it 
to predict a unidimensional versus multidimensional classification preference. 
Specifically, on the basis of Love et al.’s (2004) simulations, unidimensional 
unsupervised classification appears to be favoured by SUSTAIN when stimuli are 
made up of dimensions that do not intercorrelate with each other, or correlate only 
partially with each other. Order effects in stimulus presentation are critical in 
determining which dimension is focused upon, and attentional weights are adjusted to 
favour that clustering (i.e., to make clusters more well-separated). In contrast, two- 
dimensional classification will be favoured by SUSTAIN when the two dimensions 
are highly correlated with each other. These predictions of SUSTAIN are supported 
by the work of Billman and Knutson (1996), who demonstrated the importance of 
dimensional intercorrelation in unsupervised learning. While SUSTAIN can predict a 
preference for unidimensional versus multidimensional classification, it provides no
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quantification (or value) for the intuitiveness of a particular category structure. This 
quantification is required for the present proposal, where it is necessary to compare 
Group(x) and Group(x,y). Moreover, the presence of SUSTAIN’s cluster recruitment 
mechanism -  that is, the mechanism that specifies the threshold level of dissimilarity 
required between a novel stimulus and an already formed cluster for that novel 
stimulus to be accommodated in a new cluster, rather than become part of an existing 
cluster -  indirectly determines the number of categories formed. Similar to the issues 
surrounding the coupling parameter in the Rational model (Anderson, 1991), 
therefore, this parameter somewhat confuses the issue of unidimensional versus two- 
dimensional classification (see Murphy, 2002).
In summary, neither the Rational model nor SUSTAIN appear adequate to 
assess the influence of abstract similarity structure on participants’ preference for 
unidimensional versus multidimensional classification. In contrast, the simplicity 
model of unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002) is ideally suited for 
this task. To recapitulate, the simplicity model is a computational implementation of 
Rosch and Mervis’s (1975) suggestion that basic level categories maximise within- 
category similarity and minimise between-category similarity. As outlined in Chapter 
1, the simplicity model assesses the gain in ‘simplicity’ that can be achieved by 
imposing a specific clustering on a set of stimulus points. The basic premise is that 
the classification that is deemed the simplest (i.e., ‘most intuitive’) should be 
preferred by the participant. Importantly, the simplicity model provides a value for 
the intuitiveness of a particular classification in terms of an associated codelength; 
shorter (lower value) codelengths are associated with a more intuitive categorisation. 
Of particular merit is the fact that the simplicity model is parameter free, and, when 
computing category intuitiveness, does not require any specification of the number of 
categories sought. To investigate the influence of abstract stimulus structure on 
unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised classification, therefore, the 
simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002) was 
employed. Consequently, the experiments reported in this chapter also provide an 
obvious test of the validity of the simplicity model, although this was not the primary 
goal of these experiments.
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2.2 Assessing unidimensional versus two dimensional classification with the 
simplicity model
To recapitulate, when considering a set of stimuli constructed from two 
dimensions of physical variation (x,y), classification may proceed by considering just 
dimension x, just dimension y, or both dimensions together (i.e., Group(x), Group(y), 
or Group^^y), respectively). In determining which of these dimensionalities produces 
the most intuitive classification for a stimulus set, the simplicity model can be 
employed to provide an associated codelength value (and clustering pattern) for 
Group(x), Group(y), and Group(jc,y). Codelength values are given in terms of a 
percentage, which represents the number of bits (length of description) required to 
describe the stimulus sets’ similarity information with categories, relative to how 
many bits are required to describe the same, raw similarity information without 
categories. The lower a codelength’s value, the more intuitive/ natural the 
classification is considered to be, and the more obvious it should appear to naive 
observers (at least, that is the assumption). Consequently, if Codelength(Group(x)) or 
Codelength(Group(y)) is less than Codelength(Group(x,y)), then one would predict 
that participants should display a preference for unidimensional unsupervised 
classification (henceforth, Codelength(Group(x)) is denoted as Codelength(x), etc.). 
Similarly, if Codelength(x,y) is less than Codelength(x) and Codelength(y), then one 
would predict that participants should display a preference for two-dimensional 
unsupervised classification.5
The above paragraph, therefore, specifies one way in which it is possible to 
assess how abstract similarity structure biases participants’ preference for either 
unidimensional or multidimensional unsupervised classification. It is interesting to 
note that participants’ bias for unidimensional or multidimensional classification has 
sometimes been considered random (e.g., Medin et al., 1987). However, as 
highlighted in Chapter 1, a number of factors such as procedural details, stimulus 
format, and the introduction of prior knowledge (e.g., Lassaline & Murphy, 1996; 
Milton & Wills, 2004; Milton et al., 2008; Spalding & Murphy, 1996) have all 
influenced the amount of unidimensional and family resemblance sorting by 
participants. The experimental work detailed in this chapter, in which classification
5 Any model that can provide a quantifiable measure of category intuitiveness without
information about the number of categories sought would have been equally appropriate to use 
here.
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biases are specified independently of the factors just mentioned, therefore 
complements the modelling work of Love et al. (2004). To reiterate, based solely on 
the stimuli’s abstract similarity structure, SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004) predicted that 
unidimensional classification should be considered ‘most intuitive’ for the binary 
stimulus structure of Medin et al. (1987); a prediction that was empirically confirmed. 
In assessing the validity of the simplicity approach to the problem of unidimensional 
versus multidimensional classification, therefore, it is interesting to compare this 
prediction from SUSTAIN with the respective prediction from the simplicity model.
2.3 Examination of some previous findings
In investigations of human unsupervised categorisation, the majority of studies 
have employed stimulus structures composed from binary dimensions. The most 
influential stimulus structure of this kind is that originally employed by Medin et al. 
(1987), depicted in Figure 1 (see Chapter 1). Briefly, Figure 1 shows a four 
dimensional binary stimulus structure, which species 10 items. When represented 
along all four binary dimensions, two categories of stimuli are assumed: Category A, 
which is composed of a category prototype (specified as 1,1,1,1) and four other items 
that have three features in common with this prototype (e.g., 0,1,1,1), and Category B, 
which is again composed of a category prototype (specified as 0,0,0,0) and four other 
items that have three features in common with this prototype (e.g., 1,0,0,0). To 
reiterate, while Medin et al. (1987; see also Regehr & Brooks, 1995) assumed that this 
stimulus structure would yield classification based on a principle of family 
resemblance, across a wide variety of procedures and stimulus formats, they 
documented a clear bias among participants for classification based on a single 
dimension (e.g., head shape).
To assess the binary stimulus structure of Medin et al. (1987) with the 
simplicity model, I assumed that the 1, 0 values reflected coordinates in a 
multidimensional psychological space. Feature mismatches, which are the main 
source of similarity information when using binary dimensioned stimuli, can be 
considered to correspond to the City block distance between vectors; for example, 
between 0110 and 0100. Accordingly, this method of similarity computation is 
legitimate for this stimulus structure, and so the City block metric was employed to 
compute similarities between the different values. When represented along all four 
dimensions of variation, the predicted optimal classification for the 10 items was that
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assumed by Medin et al. (1987); that is, the two category structure depicted in Figure 
1 (see Chapter 1). The codelength associated with this classification (i.e., 
Codelength(4d)) was computed to be 94.84% (see Section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1 for an 
overview of the simplicity model’s computational implementation), meaning that this 
category structure should not be considered particularly obvious and intuitive by 
participants. By contrast, when specified along just one of the four dimensions of 
variation, Codelength(ld) was computed to be 51.57%. This codelength indicates that 
participants should perceive this category structure to be very obvious and intuitive. 
Consequently, participants should strongly favour classification that takes into 
account just one of the four stimulus dimensions over classification that takes into 
account all four stimulus dimensions. As for SUSTAIN (see Love et al., 2004), 
therefore, when presented with the binary stimulus structure of Medin et al. (1987), 
the simplicity model readily predicts a preference for unidimensional classification. 
Moreover, this prediction is based solely on the abstract stimulus structure of the 10 
items specified (see Figure 1).
In trying to reduce participants’ preference for unidimensional categorisation, 
Medin et al. (1987; Experiment 4) employed an alternative stimulus set, whereby 
items were created on the basis of four trinary-valued dimensions (that is, each 
dimension now had three levels, 0, 1, and 2, representing, for example, a short, 
medium, and long length of tail). Again, participants were asked to classify the 
stimuli into two categories. The authors claimed that there existed no straightforward 
way to divide the items into two groups based on any single stimulus dimension. As 
for the binary-valued dimensions, in modelling this stimulus set the assumption was 
made that each trinary dimension corresponds to coordinates in a psychological space, 
and the City block metric was again employed to compute similarities. This approach 
induces an ordering in feature values, such that feature 2 is assumed to be ‘greater’ 
than feature 1. As the same ordering of feature values is induced in all analyses 
(unidimensional versus four-dimensional), however, this ordering in feature values 
should not affect the comparison between Codelength(ld) and Codelength(4d). 
Ignoring the requirement to classify into two categories (which cannot be modelled 
within the simplicity approach), Codelength(ld) was computed to be 61.02%, and 
Codelength(4d) was 56.70%. Therefore, the simplicity model predicts a slight 
preference for four-dimensional classification in this case. Medin et al. (1987) found 
that, when presented with this trinary-valued structure, participants were prevented
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from producing any unidimensional classifications, but equally, they did not produce 
any classifications based on all four dimensions. While their findings differ slightly 
from the predictions of the simplicity model, it is important to consider the impact 
that constraining classification into two categories may have had. To recapitulate, it 
has been argued that this constraint on classification may encourage unidimensional 
sorting (Murphy, 2002). Consequently, it seems reasonable to suppose that the upshot 
of this situation -  in which a slight preference for four-dimensional classification is 
predicted in a situation that should encourage unidimensional classification -  will 
simply be a reduction in the number of unidimensional classifications observed. I 
would argue, therefore, that the predictions of the simplicity model, which were made 
on the basis of the abstract stimulus structure employed, are broadly consistent with 
the findings of Medin et al.’s (1987).
A few unsupervised categorisation studies have also employed stimuli 
constructed from continuous-valued dimensions, as I will be using in the experiments 
presented shortly (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999). The simplicity model can similarly be 
used to assess unidimensional versus multidimensional categorisation in this situation 
by computing the similarities between points using a Euclidean distance metric. 
Using a simplified, 20 point version of one of Ashby et al.’s (1999) data sets, 
containing 10 points along each ‘strip’ (see Figure 3a), Codelength(x) and 
Codelength(x,jy) were computed. In this case, Codelength(x) was found to be 50.07% 
and Codelength(x5>y) was 80.83%. The simplicity approach, therefore, predicts a clear 
preference for unidimensional classification along just dimension x. This makes 
intuitive sense; when all the stimuli are collapsed along dimension x, two extremely 
well-separated clusters are obvious. In contrast, in the x,y plane, many between- 
cluster similarities are actually greater than the within-cluster similarities. In line with 
simplicity’s predictions, Ashby et al. (1999) found that participants rapidly came to 
respond optimally to the two category classification specified along just dimension x 
in the absence of feedback.
Ashby et al. (1999) also employed a stimulus set in which a two-cluster 
classification was specified along the diagonal in the x,y plane (see Figure 3b). For 
this data set, no preference was found either for a two-dimensional or unidimensional 
classification. Indeed, participants were unable to learn the two-dimensional 
classification of this structure without feedback. To explain this finding, I created a 
second data set in which 10 points were specified along each of the two diagonal
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‘strips’ (see Figure 3b). In this case, Codelength(x.y) was computed to be 81.70%, 
which is almost identical to Codelength(x^) for Figure 3a. This was an expected 
result: the simplicity model does not take into account the absolute position of points 
in psychological space, rather it compares pairs of distances by computing whether 
distance (A, B) is greater than distance (A, C). As such, codelength values are 
rotationally invariant. In contrast, Codelength(x) was computed to be 81.61% (instead 
of 50.07% for the unrotated Figure 3a), and Codelength(y) was 79.53%. Therefore, 
the simplicity model predicts that, in this case, Group(x), Group(y) and Group^j^) are 
all, approximately, equally intuitive (although none of the groupings will be 
particularly obvious), meaning that no one classification should be preferred. This 
prediction is consistent with the results of Ashby et al. (1999).
As highlighted by the previous example, while rotation does not change the 
associated two-dimensional codelength values, the unidimensional versus two- 
dimensional bias can be radically altered. This alteration is caused by the change in 
Id projections associated with rotation of the data points. That is, while there is a 
well-separated unidimensional projection in Figure 3a, this is not the case in Figure 
3b. Critically, rotating a data set does not imply that the coordinate axes have to be 
rotated as well. Rather, the alignment of the coordinate axes is determined by 
independent, perceptual considerations (a coordinate axis in psychological space can 
be defined as the direction along which only one aspect of a stimulus’ appearance is 
altered). Consequently, rotation can radically alter the simplicity model’s prediction 
for a unidimensional versus two-dimensional classification bias.
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Figure 3. Two simplified versions of the data sets employed by Ashby et al. (1999). 
For stimulus structure ‘a’, participants were found to prefer classification along just 
dimension x (the preferred classification is highlighted by the perforated line) rather 
than classification by taking into account both dimension x  and dimension y  together. 
For stimulus structure ‘b’, no dimensionality was preferred for classification, and 
none of Ashby et al.’s (1999) participants responded ‘optimally’.
In summary, the predictions derived from the simplicity model are broadly 
consistent with the findings of Medin et al. (1987; see also Regehr & Brooks, 1995) 
and Ashby et al. (1999), demonstrating support for the simplicity approach. 
Critically, these predictions were based solely on the abstract similarity structures of 
the stimulus sets employed by these authors. With respect to the findings of Medin et 
al. (1987), the predictions of the simplicity model support those of SUSTAIN (Love 
et al., 2004), suggesting some level of compatibility between the two models. Before 
an experimental investigation of the influence of abstract similarity structure on 
unidimensional versus multidimensional classification can begin, however, two 
fundamental methodological issues need to be addressed: First, it is important to 
ensure that the experimental procedure does not bias participants to favour one 
classification strategy over another (by promoting unidimensional classification, for 
example). Second, it is clearly necessary to be able to unambiguously infer whether 
participants are basing their classifications on only one dimension of variation, or on 
more than one dimension of variation. In Section 2.4, these methodological issues are 
discussed further, and a procedure is proposed that allows for the assessment of 
unconstrained unsupervised categorisation.
2.4 Methodological Concerns
A common methodology used in investigations of unsupervised categorisation 
is to ask participants to classify a set of stimuli into two categories. This has been 
useful as, in conjunction with the use of binary dimensioned stimuli, it has allowed 
experimenters to readily assess the basis on which a participants’ classification was 
derived (i.e., on the basis of a single dimension, or multiple dimensions). However, 
some authors have argued that constraining classification in this manner may 
inadvertently encourage participants to interpret the experiment as a problem-solving 
task, rather than a simple categorisation task (Murphy, 2002). Indeed, Murphy (2002) 
points out that standardised tests in the US often require searching for a critical 
property to distinguish between instances. Consequently, it is possible that the action 
of constraining laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation may, in itself, encourage 
unidimensional classification. Additionally, for a given stimulus set, it is possible that 
while an intuitive classification into, for example, three categories exists when 
considering two dimensions of variation, the only intuitive classification that exists 
into two categories is if participants consider only a single dimension of variation (of 
course, this could go both ways). So, asking participants to sort a set of stimuli into a 
particular number of categories may bias their classifications. To adequately examine 
the influence of abstract similarity structure on the issue of unidimensional versus 
two-dimensional classification, therefore, an unconstrained categorisation procedure 
would be preferable. However, there is good reason why previous experimenters 
have chosen to constrain participants’ categorisations.
In unconstrained unsupervised categorisation, there will be considerable 
response variability: for as few as 10 stimuli, there are about 100,000 possible 
categorisations (Medin & Ross, 1997). Accordingly, classification performance has 
to be measured in terms of a person’s preference towards one classification, relative to 
another (e.g., Group(x) versus Group(x,y)). This can be achieved by using a metric of 
classification similarity, such as the Rand Index (Rand, 1971). The Rand Index is a 
statistic that can be implemented in categorisation research to compare two 
classifications. Specifically, it is the number of pairs of stimuli that are both in the 
same cluster, or both in different clusters, in two classifications, divided by all pairs. 
It varies from 0 (totally different classifications) to 1 (identical classifications). For 
example, consider a participant who produces a classification X. Does this
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classification reflect a unidimensional or a two-dimensional bias? By comparing 
Rand(X,Group(x)) with Rand(X,GroupfrjO)* one can assess this: if, for example, the 
second Rand is larger, then one can conclude that the participant’s classification is 
more similar to Group(x,y), indicating that the participant had a bias for two- 
dimensional classification.
A final issue of concern is the format of the stimuli. In categorisation 
research, materials are often created in a way that each stimulus can be perceived as 
an individual object. Sometimes these objects have a naturalistic appearance (e.g., 
cartoon-like characters, as in Medin et al., 1987), or they correspond to a meaningless 
geometric shapes (e.g., lines differing in orientation and length, as in Ashby et al., 
1999). Regehr and Brooks’ (1995) stimuli, for example, were each formed from a 
separable two-dimensional arrangement of features, such that a stimulus could be 
composed of a bottle, a cup, a trumpet, and a cake, enclosed within a rectangle. While 
Milton and Wills (2004; see also, Handel & Imai, 1972) have observed that stimulus 
format does influence unidimensional versus multidimensional classification, they 
found it difficult to formulate general principles.
The simplicity approach can only explain biases arising from the abstract 
stimulus structure of a set of stimuli, not stimulus format or other procedural details. 
Therefore, the two-dimensional stimuli chosen here were constructed such that they 
could be perceived as individual objects, as is most commonly the case in 
categorisation research. However, I also aimed for dimensions of physical variation 
that would be neither particularly separable nor integral, since this could potentially 
influence participants’ classification preference (Milton & Wills, 2004). Crucially, 
with the Rand Index analysis, it is not necessary to ensure that the stimulus 
dimensions do not introduce a bias either for unidimensional or multidimensional 
classification. Suppose, for example, that the stimulus format encourages a bias for 
multidimensional classification. Irrespective of this bias, the Rand Index should still 
reveal more of a bias for unidimensional classification in the case where the simplicity 
model predicts a preference for classification along just dimension x (i.e., Group(x)), 
for example, compared to the case where the simplicity model predicts a preference 
for classification in two dimensions (i.e., Group(x,_y)).
In conclusion, using the simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation 
(Pothos & Chater, 2002) and the Rand Index (Rand, 1971), one is able to investigate
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the influence of abstract similarity structure on people’s preference for 
unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised classification, in an entirely 
unconstrained manner. Specifically, one can generate one stimulus structure for 
which the simplicity model predicts a unidimensional classification bias, and a second 
stimulus structure for which the simplicity model predicts a two-dimensional 
classification bias. For both stimulus structures, each dimensionality will be 
associated with a predicted classification (i.e., Group(x), Group(y), and Group(xiy)). 
The Rand Index can be used to calculate the similarity of participants’ physical 
classifications of the stimuli to Group(x), Group(y \ and Group(x,y). The experiments 
reported below, therefore, investigate if it is possible to predict unidimensional versus 
multidimensional classification based on the abstract similarity structure of a set of 
stimuli.
2.5 Experiment 1
2.5.1 Method
2.5.1.1 Participants
Fifty Cardiff University students took part for course credit. Twenty-five 
participants were allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and 25 to a condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted. A further 24 Cardiff University students 
participated in a similarity ratings task for course credit.
2.5.1.2 Materials
Stimuli were circles enclosed in squares, with the circles ‘blended in’ with the 
squares (using CorelDraw), so as to make them look more like individual objects (see 
Figure 4). The similarity structure for the two conditions was specified on abstract 1 
-1 0  scales; as such, these scales had to be applied to the physical dimensions of circle 
size and square size. This was done by assuming a Weber’s fraction of 7.5% for both 
the circles (smallest size: 24.8 mm) and the squares (smallest size: 52.1 mm; Morgan, 
2005). Each stimulus was printed individually on a piece of paper as large as the 
stimulus, which was subsequently laminated.
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Figure 4. A few examples of the stimuli employed in Experiments 1 to 4. The 
stimulus presented on the left shows the greatest size in the square dimension, and the 
stimulus presented on the right shows the greatest size in the circle dimension.
Figures 5 and 6 show the stimulus structures that were used for Experiment 1. 
Specifically, Figure 5 shows a stimulus structure for which the simplicity model 
predicts a preference for unidimensional classification, since Codelength(x) and 
Codelength(y) are less than Codelength(x,>>)- In two dimensions, there are four, 
relatively poorly distinguished clusters, whereas along either just x or y, there are two, 
reasonably well-separated clusters (Group(x) and Group(y) are predicted to be equally 
intuitive). Figure 6, by contrast, shows a stimulus structure for which the simplicity 
model predicts a two-dimensional classification preference, since Codelength(x,_y) is 
less than both Codelength(x) and Codelength(y). In two-dimensions, there are two, 
reasonably well-separated clusters, whereas along either just x or y, there is simply a 
uniform distribution of stimuli, with no obvious category structure. Importantly, the 
stimulus sets were created so that the codelengths for the predicted ‘optimal’ 
classification(s) in each condition were approximately the same, and likewise for the 
predicted ‘suboptimal’ classification(s).
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Figure 5. A stimulus structure where the simplicity model predicts a unidimensional 
classification preference (the unidimensional classifications are shown): the left-hand 
structure depicts the most intuitive classification along just dimension x, in which the 
predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is (1,2,3,4,5,9,10) (6,7,8,11,12), and the right-hand 
structure depicts the most intuitive classification along just dimension y, in which the 
predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is (1,5,6,7,8,9,10) (2,3,4,11,12). Both these 
classifications are associated with a codelength of 58.05%. When represented along 
both dimension x and y  together, the predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is (1,5,9,10) 
(2,3,4) (6,7,8) (11,12), with an associated codelength of 76.15%.
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Figure 6. A stimulus structure where the simplicity model predicts a two-dimensional 
classification preference (the two-dimensional classification is shown): when
represented along both dimension jc and y  together, the predicted ‘optimal’ clustering 
is (1,2,3,4) (5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12), with an associated codelength of 57.40%. Along any 
single dimension (i.e., either just dimension x or just dimension y), the predicted 
‘optimal’ clustering is (1,2,3,4) (5,6,7,8) (9,10,11,12), both with an associated 
codelength of 81.08%.
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Before investigating participants’ classification of the stimuli, it is clearly 
important to establish that participants perceive the stimuli as I intended them to be 
perceived. To confirm this, similarity ratings were separately collected from 12 
participants for each of the two stimulus sets. Participants were instructed that their 
task was to rate the similarity between a number of different items. The 12 stimuli in 
either of the two data sets were then sequentially displayed on a computer screen in a 
random order. Stimuli were displayed for 1000 ms each, and each item was preceded 
by a centrally located fixation point, displayed for 250 ms. Subsequently, participants 
were instructed that they would have to rate the similarity between the stimuli on a 
scale ranging from 1 (very dissimilar) to 9 (very similar). Each trial consisted of a 
central fixation point (250 ms), followed by the first stimulus (1000 ms), followed by 
another fixation point (250 ms) and the second stimulus (1000 ms), then the similarity 
scale, which was visible until a response was made. Participants rated the similarity 
of all possible stimulus pairs once, excluding pairs of identical stimuli, for a total of 
132 similarity comparisons. Trials were randomly ordered. Multidimensional 
Scaling (MDS) was used to derive a spatial representation in two-dimensions for the 
stimuli, on the basis of participants’ similarity ratings. For the data set for which a 
unidimensional classification bias was predicted, the best solution was associated with 
a stress of 0.068 (lower values indicate better solution); for the data set for which a 
two-dimensional classification bias was predicted, the best solution was associated 
with a stress of 0.097. This MDS procedure was necessary so that a spatial 
representation of participants’ perceptions of the two stimulus structures could be 
derived for comparison with the experimenter assumed structures. This comparison 
was made using the Orthosim procedure introduced by Barrett, Petrides, Eysenck and 
Eysenck (1998).
The Orthosim procedure (Barrett et al., 1998) allows the computation of 
various similarity indices between two sets of coordinates for the same set of items. 
By using this procedure, I was able to compare the similarity of the MDS derived 
representation of the stimuli with the experimenter assumed coordinates (on the basis 
of which the predictions for unidimensional versus multidimensional classification 
were computed). A similarity index was used which adopts a ‘procrustes’ approach 
(Barrett et al., 1998), according to which the coordinate configurations to be 
compared are first normalised and rotated/ reflected to remove any of the arbitrariness 
in MDS solutions (with respect to location, scale, and orientation). The Orthosim
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documentation recommends the ‘double-scaled Euclidean distance’ coefficient, for 
which 0 corresponds to complete dissimilarity, and 1 to identity. The similarity 
coefficient between the coordinates for the stimulus set where a unidimensional 
classification bias was predicted and the corresponding MDS solution was 0.79, and 
for the stimulus set where a two-dimensional classification bias was predicted and the 
corresponding MDS solution, the similarity coefficient was 0.76. In evaluating the 
results of the Orthosim procedure, it is important to note that a similarity scale is a 
rather insensitive measure of similarity perception. Moreover, participants’ 
responding during the ratings task likely became much less careful as the task 
progressed. Consequently, the similarity ratings procedure can lead to rather noisy 
data. An alternative procedure for assessing similarity, such as confusability ratings, 
was not used, as the stimuli employed here are readily discriminable relative to each 
other. Overall, the similarity between the MDS solutions and the corresponding 
experimenter assumed coordinates is considered adequate.
2.5.1.3 Procedure
Participants were presented with one of the two stimulus sets and received the 
following written instructions:
“We would like you to simply group the 12 items in a way that feels both 
natural and intuitive to you. There is no limit to how many groups you can 
have, but, you should not use more groups than you think is necessary. You 
may compare the items in any way that you feel will help you, and you are free 
to change your mind and re-group the items until you are happy. ”
Stimuli were presented in a randomly ordered stack, and participants spread the 
stimuli out on a table to determine their preferred classification by arranging the 
stimuli into piles.
2.5.2 Results
Of primary interest is participants’ preference to engage either in 
unidimensional or multidimensional classification. Consequently, for each condition, 
I was interested in assessing the similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x), 
Group(y), and Group(x,.y). As discussed earlier, any analysis that involves frequency
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of occurrence of different classifications is prohibited due to the large classification 
variability that will exist (see Medin & Ross, 1997; for completeness, Figure 28 of 
Appendix 1 shows the frequency with which participants produced classifications 
based on a specific number of clusters). Therefore, the Rand Index was employed.
As outlined earlier, the Rand Index allows one to infer whether a participant 
showed a bias for unidimensional classification or multidimensional classification. 
That is, if a participant preferred unidimensional classification, then the Rand Index 
(Rand similarity) when comparing that participant’s classification to Group(x) (or 
Group(y)) will be greater than when comparing that participant’s classification to 
Group(x,y), and vice versa. Therefore, for all participants in both conditions, I 
separately computed the Rand similarity between a participant’s classification and the 
respective predictions for Group(x), Group(y), and Group(xj>)- While it is possible 
that participants may, for example, prefer Group(x) over Group(y) if the squares 
dimension is more salient than the circles one, such differences are not of interest 
here. Rather, the result of interest concerns whether Group (x) or Group(y) is preferred 
over and above Group(x,y). Consequently, if Rand similarity is greater to Group(x) or 
Group(y) than it is to Group(x,y), then based on this, it is possible to infer a 
unidimensional classification preference. If Rand similarity is greater to Group(x,y) 
than it is to Group(x) and Group(y), then it is possible to infer a two-dimensional 
classification preference.
The dependent variable was the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x), Group(y), and Group(x,_y), computed using the Rand Index. These 
computed similarities are denoted as Rand(x), Rand(y), and Rand(x?>y), respectively, 
and are shown in Figure 7. A Greenhouse-Geisser corrected Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA), with condition (predicted unidimensional preference or predicted two- 
dimensional preference) as a between-participants factor and Rand similarity (Rand(x) 
or Rand(y) or Rand(x,_y)) as a within-participants factor, revealed a significant effect 
of condition, F(l, 48) = 9.33, p  < .005, no effect of Rand similarity, F < 1, and a 
significant interaction between these factors, F(1.52, 73.07) = 69.17, p  < .001. Tests 
of simple main effects revealed that there was a significant effect of condition at 
Rand(x), Rand(y), and Rand(x,y) (smallest F(1, 144) = 24.29, p  < .001). Simple main 
effects further revealed that there was a significant effect of Rand similarity in the 
condition where a preference for unidimensional classification was predicted (F(1.28,
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30.69) = 15.07, p  < .001), and in the condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted (F( 1, 24) = 197.88,/? < .001).
As can be seen from Figure 7, however, in the condition where a preference 
for unidimensional classification was predicted, the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Groupfo^) was significantly greater than to both Group(x) and 
Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests6, /(24) = 6.36,/? 
< .001, and, /(19) = 5.70, p  < .001, respectively). In the condition where a preference 
for two-dimensional classification was predicted, the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Group(x,.y) was significantly less than to both Group(x) and 
Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests, both /s(24) = - 
14.07,/?<.001).
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Figure 7. The results of the Rand Index analyses for Experiment 1. Rand(x) means 
the Rand similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x), etc. ‘Unidimensional 
Preference’ refers to the condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification. ‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. Error bars denote the standard error.
The Bonferroni method o f  correction has been shown to be extremely robust to violations o f  
sphericity, particularly in terms o f  controlling Type I error rates (see Field, 2009).
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2.5.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of abstract similarity structure on 
unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised categorisation. Using the 
simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002), two 
stimulus sets were created. For one set of stimuli, a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and for the second set of stimuli, a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted; these predictions were based solely on the 
abstract similarity structure of the stimuli. The results of Experiment 1 appear to 
document a preference for unidimensional unsupervised classification, and also the 
first empirical demonstration of a preference for multidimensional unsupervised 
classification, on the basis of abstract stimulus structure. However, the pattern of 
results found is opposite to the predictions of the simplicity model. That is, in the 
condition where simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, 
participants’ classifications were more similar to the predicted (‘suboptimal’) two- 
dimensional classification. In the condition where simplicity predicted a preference 
for two-dimensional classification, participants’ classifications were more similar to 
the predicted (‘suboptimal’) unidimensional classifications. Two questions arise from 
the present findings: First, why are the results in the opposite direction to the
predictions of the simplicity model? Second, do these results reflect participants’ 
genuine biases in classification?
It is important to note that multidimensional scaling and the Orthosim 
procedure established that there was a good fit between the MDS-derived 
representation for the stimuli and the experimenter-assumed coordinates. One 
obvious possibility why the predictions of the simplicity model were not supported, 
therefore, is that, simply, the model is wrong. However, two further possibilities may 
also account for participants’ classification behaviour being opposite to the 
predictions of the simplicity model. The first possibility surrounds the idea that, as a 
result of processing the stimuli, participants may have engaged in some restructuring 
of similarity space. For example, they may have come to gradually represent the 
stimuli based on a single, composite, emergent dimension along the diagonal.
The second possibility is that the nature of the stimulus structures employed in 
Experiment 1 may have encouraged what I will term category subclustering. That is, 
for the stimulus sets depicted in Figures 5 and 6, the classifications predicted to be
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‘suboptimal’ (i.e., less intuitive) in each condition held a subordinate relationship with 
the classifications predicted to be ‘optimal’ (i.e., more intuitive) in each condition. In 
each condition, therefore, contained within the ‘optimal’ (more intuitive) 
classification structure was meaningful substructure. Consequently, for the stimulus 
structure depicted in Figure 6, for example, the Rand Index analysis of participants’ 
classification data could have revealed a preference for unidimensional classification 
in either of two ways: First, participants may have indeed considered unidimensional 
classification to be ‘more intuitive’, and so preferred this kind of classification. 
Second, participants may have considered the two cluster classification in two- 
dimensions as ‘more intuitive’ initially, but then sought subclusters in the meaningful 
substructure along either just dimension x or just dimension y, resulting in an 
elaboration of the second cluster into two clusters (i.e., (5,6,7,8) and (9,10,11,12)). 
Indeed, Gosselin and Schyns (2001) have reported that people will often seek to 
generate classification hierarchies, rather than a single level of classification. Due to 
the fact that the predicted ‘optimal’ classification in each condition and the predicted 
‘suboptimal’ classification in each condition shared a superordinate-subordinate 
relationship, therefore, the Rand Index analysis is unable to determine whether there 
is a true bias either for unidimensional or two-dimensional classification.
In an attempt to investigate whether the interesting results of Experiment 1 
represent true classification biases, an emergent dimension, or category subclustering, 
Experiments 2, 3 and 4 were undertaken. While Experiment 2 sought to reduce the 
likelihood of classification based on an emergent dimension, Experiments 3 and 4 
sought to reduce the likelihood of any category subclustering.
2.6 Experiment 2
2.6.1 Introduction
Categorisation is obviously dependent on those dimensions that are 
considered, and when dealing with simple geometric shapes (as employed in 
Experiment 1), this dependency becomes more acute. While MDS and Orthosim 
reported an adequate fit between the experimenter-assumed coordinates and the MDS- 
derived representations for the stimulus structures, as highlighted in the previous 
section, it is possible that participants’ classifications in Experiment 1 may have been 
influenced by an unanticipated emergent dimension. In an attempt to counter this
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possibility, Experiment 2 sought to focus participants’ attention on the stimuli’s 
‘relevant’ dimensions of variation (i.e., the size of the inner circle and the size of the 
square). By increasing the saliency of the ‘relevant’ dimensions, this should reduce 
the likelihood of classification being determined by some unanticipated emergent 
dimension. Consequently, if participants in Experiment 2 show the same pattern of 
classification behaviour as participants in Experiment 1, then one can be more 
confident that the results of Experiment 1 were reflective of classification determined 
by the ‘relevant’ dimensions of variation, and not some unanticipated emergent 
dimension. Moreover, to get a better sense about which dimension(s) of variation 
participants were basing their classifications on, at the end of classification, 
participants were asked to describe how and why they grouped the stimuli in the way 
that they did.
2.6.2 Method
2.6.2.1 Participants, materials and procedure
Forty Cardiff University students took part for a payment of £2. Twenty 
participants were allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and 20 to a condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted. The same materials and procedure used in 
Experiment 1 were employed with the following exception: the instructions presented 
to participants before the classification task now highlighted the ‘relevant’ dimensions 
of variation. Specifically, the instructions read as follows:
“We would like you to simply group the 12 items in a way that feels both 
natural and intuitive to you. There is no limit to how many groups you can 
have, but, you should not use more groups than you think is necessary. You 
may compare the items in any way that you feel will help you, and you are free 
to change your mind and re-group the items until you are happy.
Following grouping, you will be asked to describe how and why you grouped 
the stimuli in the way that you did. For example, you may have based your 
grouping just on the overall size o f the stimulus squares, or just on the size o f 
the inner circles. Alternatively, you may have based your grouping on a
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combination o f both the overall size o f the stimulus squares and the size o f the
inner circles. ”
2.6.3 Results
As for Experiment 1, the dependent variable was the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Group(x), Group(y), and Group^^y), as computed using the Rand 
Index. These computed similarities are denoted as Rand(x), Rand(y), and Rand(x,y), 
respectively, and are shown in Figure 8 (Figure 29 of Appendix 1 shows the 
frequencies with which participants produced classifications based on a specific 
number of clusters). Greenhouse-Geisser corrected ANOVA, with condition 
(predicted unidimensional preference or predicted two-dimensional preference) as a 
between-participants factors and Rand similarity (Rand(x) or Rand(y) or Rand(xj;)) as 
a within-participants factor, revealed a significant effect of condition, F (l, 38) = 
22.61, p  < .001, no effect of Rand similarity, F(1.35, 51.13) = 2.92, p  > .05, and a 
significant interaction between these factors, F(1.35, 51.13) = 34.20, p  < .001. Tests 
of simple main effects revealed that there was a significant effect of condition at 
Rand(x), Rand(y), and Rand(x,y) (smallest F(l, 114) = 8.29, p  < .005). Simple main 
effects further revealed that there was a significant effect of Rand similarity in the 
condition where a preference for unidimensional classification was predicted (F(1.16, 
22) = 6.87, p  < .015), and in the condition where a preference for two-dimensional 
classification was predicted (F(l, 19) = 146.14,p  < .001).
The results of Experiment 2 are in line with the findings of Experiment 1: that 
is, in the condition where a preference for unidimensional classification was 
predicted, the similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x,y) was significantly 
greater than to both Group(x) and Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted 
paired samples t-tests, t{\9) = 2.73, p < .015, and, r(19) = 4.77,p  < .001, respectively). 
In the condition where a preference for two-dimensional classification was predicted, 
the similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x4y) was significantly less than 
to both Group(x) and Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples 
t-tests, both fe(19) = -12.09,/? < .001).
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Figure 8. The results of the Rand Index analyses for Experiment 2. Rand(x) means 
the Rand similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x), etc. ‘Unidimensional 
Preference’ refers to the condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification. ‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. Error bars denote the standard error.
2.6.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 replicates the findings of Experiment 1: in the condition where 
simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, participants’ 
classifications were most similar to the predicted (‘suboptimal’) two-dimensional 
classification. In the condition where simplicity predicted a preference for two- 
dimensional classification, participants’ classifications were most similar to the 
predicted (‘suboptimal’) unidimensional classifications. Based on the reasoning 
outlined earlier, I take this replication to provide evidence in support of the view that 
participants’ classifications were unlikely to be (primarily) based on some 
unanticipated emergent dimension, rather than the experimenter-assumed dimensions. 
In support of this, an assessment of participants’ descriptions about how they decided 
to classify the stimuli was broadly consistent with the view that participants were
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focusing on the experimenter-assumed dimensions of variation. Overall, 15 
participants reported basing their classification on the overall size of the square, 9 
participants reported basing their classification on the size of the inner circle, 11 
participants reported basing their classification on some combination of the overall 
size of the square and the size of the inner circle, and 5 participants gave an 
alternative response. These ‘alternative responses’ included basing their classification 
on the thickness of the lines that filled the space between the inner circle and the outer 
square, whether or not stimuli had a dark edge around the inner circle, or some 
combination of these properties and the experimenter-assumed dimensions. While 
generally positive, for some participants it is apparent that other, unanticipated 
dimensions of variation may have come to influence their classification of the stimuli; 
and indeed, such emergent dimensions may have influenced a number of participants’ 
classifications in Experiment 1. For the vast majority of participants, however, this 
does not seem to be the case. Instead, they reported basing their classifications on the 
experimenter-assumed dimensions. As a caveat, this qualitative analysis of 
participants’ classification behaviour must be treated with caution, as it is quite 
possible that the manner in which participants thought they had classified the stimuli 
did not actually reflect the true manner in which they did classify the stimuli (hence 
why the Rand Index was employed in the first place).
Given the results of Experiment 2, Experiments 3 and 4 sought to reduce the 
possibility that participants would engage in category subclustering when presented 
with the stimuli depicted in either Figure 5 or Figure 6. To recapitulate, due to the 
superordinate-subordinate relationship that exists between the predicted ‘optimal’ 
classification(s) and the predicted ‘suboptimal’ classification(s) in each stimulus 
structure, it is possible that while participants may have initially engaged in 
classification in the manner predicted by the simplicity model, subsequently they may 
have sought subclusters in the meaningful substructure. A number of factors may 
have contributed to this possible category subclustering behaviour. First, there is the 
small number of stimuli to be classified in each condition. Experimenter observations 
found that classification of the stimuli was rather quick (e.g., between one and two 
minutes). Given that many psychological experiments that undergraduate participants 
participate in are rather lengthy (e.g., between 1 5 - 3 0  minutes), the shortness of the 
classification task may have encouraged them to seek subclusters in an effort to 
demonstrate that they had fully engaged in the classification task. In an attempt to
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reduce the likelihood of this, participants in Experiment 3 were asked to classify 
double the number of stimuli than participants in Experiments 1 and 2. A second 
factor that may have contributed to possible category subclustering is the unlimited 
amount of time that participants had in which to complete their classifications. Again, 
this may have encouraged participants to seek category subclusters to demonstrate 
that they had fully engaged in the classification task. Principally, category 
subclustering will necessarily take longer to engage in than classification based on 
one’s initial preference. Consequently, in Experiment 4 I introduced a strict time 
constraint on classification in attempt to reduce any possibility of category 
subclustering.
2.7 Experiment 3
2.7.1 Introduction
Experiment 3 assessed whether doubling the number of stimuli to be classified 
would encourage participants to classify the stimuli of Figures 5 or 6 in a manner that 
is consistent with the predictions of the simplicity model, by reducing any tendency to 
engage in category subclustering. Why would this manipulation reduce category 
subclustering? As noted earlier, the small number of stimuli used in Experiments 1 
and 2 meant that participants completed their classification of the stimuli rather 
quickly. Consequently, participants may have tried to do more with their 
classifications than they would have done ‘naturally’ (i.e., engaged in subclustering), 
so as to engender the sense that they had performed adequately in the task. By 
doubling the number of stimuli to be classified, therefore, this should make the task 
more effortful and also increase the amount of time that it takes for participants to 
complete their classifications. As a result of this, participants should feel less 
pressure to do more with their classifications than they would have done ‘naturally’. 
Moreover, by increasing the number of stimulus comparisons that must be made, it is 
possible that this may enhance the perceived structural regularities contained within 
each stimulus set. In doing so, this may help to promote a sense that one stimulus 
classification -  that is, the classification predicted to be ‘more intuitive’ by the 
simplicity model -  is ‘optimal’ relative to the other classification possibilities. Of 
course, it is also possible that this may enhance any category subclustering.
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2.7.2 Method
2.7.2.1 Participants
Forty Cardiff University students took part for a small payment of £2. Twenty 
participants were allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and 20 to a condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted.
2.7.2.2 Materials and procedure
The same instructions and materials employed in Experiment 1 were used in 
Experiment 3. However, for every data point (see Figures 5 and 6), two identical 
stimuli were generated, creating a total of 24 stimuli to be classified in each condition. 
While the predicted clustering patterns for each stimulus set do not change from those 
detailed in Experiment 1 (for example, simplicity still predicts classification into two 
clusters for Group(x) and Group(y) in Figure 5), due to the increased number of 
pairwise similarity comparisons, Codelength(x), Codelength(y), and Codelength(xj;) 
in each condition are altered slightly. Critically, however, doubling the number of 
stimuli to be classified does not affect the overall unidimensional versus 
multidimensional classification predictions. In the case where a preference for 
unidimensional classification is predicted, Codelength(x) and Codelength(y) are now 
56.15%, and Codelength(x5>y) is now 75.1%. In the case where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification is predicted, Codelength(x) and Codelength(y) are now 
78.6%, and Codelength(x,y) is now 54.7%.
2.7.3 Results
The results of interest are presented in Figure 9 (see Figure 30 of Appendix 1 
for the frequency with which participants produced classifications based on a specific 
number of clusters). Again, the dependent variable was the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Group(x), Group(y), and Group(x,_y), as computed using the Rand 
Index (denoted as Rand(x), Rand(y), and Rand(xj;), respectively). Inspection of 
Figure 9 reveals that the pattern of results for Experiment 3 is very similar to that of 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. That is, in the case where the simplicity model 
predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, participants’ classifications 
are most similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ two-dimensional classification. In the
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case where simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional classification, 
participants’ classifications are most similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
unidimensional classifications.
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected ANOVA, with condition (predicted 
unidimensional preference or predicted two-dimensional preference) as a between- 
participants factors and Rand similarity (Rand(x) or Rand(y) or Rand(x *y)) as a within- 
participants factor, revealed a significant effect of condition, F(l, 38) = 8.86,/? < .006, 
an effect of Rand similarity, F(1.47, 55.66) = 4.59, p  < .015, and a significant 
interaction between these factors, F(1.47, 55.66) = 55.93, p  < .001. Tests of simple 
main effects revealed that there was a significant effect of condition at Rand(x), 
Rand(y), and Rand(xj>) (smallest F{ 1, 114) = 15.18, p  < .001). Simple main effects 
further revealed that there was a significant effect of Rand similarity in the condition 
where a preference for unidimensional classification was predicted (F(1.34, 25.44) = 
15.43, p  < .001), and in the condition where a preference for two-dimensional 
classification was predicted (F(l, 19) = 260.37,/? < .001).
Consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, in the condition where a 
preference for unidimensional classification was predicted, the similarity of 
participants’ classifications to Group(x,_y) was significantly greater than to both 
Group(x) and Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests, 
t{ 19) = 2.76, p  < .015, and, /(19) = 8.29, p  < .001, respectively), hi the condition 
where a preference for two-dimensional classification was predicted, the similarity of 
participants’ classifications to Group(x,jy) was significant less than to both Group(x) 
and Group(y) (as assessed with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests, both /s( 19) 
= -16.14,/? <
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Figure 9. The results of the Rand Index analyses for Experiment 3. Rand(x) means 
the Rand similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(jc), etc. ‘Unidimensional 
Preference’ refers to the condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification. ‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. Error bars denote the standard error.
2.7.4 Discussion
The pattern of results in Experiment 3 was identical to that found in 
Experiments 1 and 2. That is, in the condition where simplicity predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification, participants’ classifications were most similar to the 
predicted (‘suboptimal’) two-dimensional classification. In the condition where 
simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional classification, participants’ 
classifications were most similar to the predicted (‘suboptimal’) uni dimensional 
classification.
Overall, therefore, doubling the number of stimuli to be classified in each 
condition did little to encourage classification that was consistent with the predictions 
of the simplicity model. However, it is noteworthy that in the condition where 
simplicity predicted a unidimensional classification preference, two participants
Rand(x) Rand(y) Rand(x,y)
81
produced a classification that matched exactly Group(x); no participant produced such 
a classification in Experiment 1. So, participants’ classifications were still
inconsistent with the predictions of the simplicity model when a procedural 
manipulation was employed that should have reduced the possibility of category 
subclustering. Does the classification behaviour found in Experiments 1 - 3  represent 
a true preference, therefore? To investigate this further, a more powerful
manipulation was introduced that should considerably hinder participants’ ability to 
engage in category subclustering. This manipulation was based on the intuitive 
assumption that category subclustering will necessarily take longer to engage in than 
classification based on a person’s initial preference. Specifically, Experiment 4 
introduced a strict time constraint within the unsupervised categorisation task.
2.8 Experiment 4
2.8.1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter 1, speeded categorisation has been found to both increase 
(Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984) and decrease (Milton, et al., 2008) family 
resemblance sorting. Interestingly, the category structure employed by Milton et al. 
(2008) was that of Medin et al.’s (1987), for which the simplicity model predicted a 
preference for unidimensional classification. It seems plausible to suppose, therefore, 
that when under pressure to categorise a set of stimuli in a short period of time, 
participants will resort to classification that represents the ‘most intuitive’ 
classification based on the abstract similarity structure of the stimuli (this certainly 
makes intuitive sense). With respect to the results of Experiments 1 to 3, therefore, 
introducing a tight time-constraint on participants’ classifications should greatly 
encourage them to classify the stimuli on the basis of their initial preference (because 
they will have little time to engage in category subclustering). Consequently, the 
similarity of participants’ classifications to the predicted classifications of the 
simplicity model (as computed by the Rand Index) should reflect a more accurate 
assessment of participants’ true classification biases. That is, by forcing participants 
to classify the stimuli of Experiment 1 rapidly, it was assumed that this would only 
allow classification at the ‘more intuitive’ level (i.e., at the assumed ‘basic level’ of 
classification). In Experiment 4, therefore, I would argue that the Rand Index can be 
used to infer participants’ classification preferences, even when the predicted
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‘optimal’ classification shares a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the 
predicted ‘suboptimal’ classification.
2.8.2 Method
2.8.2.1 Participants and materials
Thirty Cardiff University students took part for a small payment of £2. Fifteen 
participants were allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and 15 to a condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted.
2.8.2.2 Materials
While the same materials of Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 4, the 
instructions differed from those of Experiment 1. In the present experiment I wanted 
classification to be as rapid as possible. Based on the findings of an informal pilot 
study (N= 5), I concluded that a classification time of 10 seconds represented a good 
trade off between classification that was very rapid, but still achievable. 
Consequently, participants read the following instructions:
“We would like you to simply group the 12 items in a way that feels both 
natural and intuitive to you. There is no limit to how many groups you can 
have, but, you should not use more groups than you think is necessary. You 
may compare the items in any way that you feel will help you, and you are free 
to change your mind and re-group the items until you are happy.
You will, however, only have 10 seconds to complete your grouping o f the 
stimuli. ”
2.8.23 Procedure
After reading the instructions, the experimenter reiterated to the participant 
that they would have just 10 seconds in which to classify the 12 stimuli. Participants 
were further told that the experimenter would tell them when to start, and that they 
would count down the final five seconds of the task (i.e., 5,4, 3, 2, 1, STOP).
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2.8.3 Results
The results from Experiment 4 are presented in Figure 10 (see Figure 31 of 
Appendix 1 for the frequency with which participants produced classifications based 
on a specific number of clusters). Importantly, all participants successfully completed 
the classification task within the allotted time (although this was a struggle for many). 
The present manipulation influenced participants’ classification behaviour in a 
number of interesting ways: First, in the case where simplicity predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification, the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x) and Group(x.j>) was now equivalent (Rand(x) = 0.70, and, Rand(xj;) = 0.72). 
This result sits in notable contrast to the findings of Experiments 1 - 3 .  Second, 
relative to the results of Experiments 1 -  3, in the case where simplicity predicted a 
preference for two-dimensional classification, there was a marked reduction in the 
difference between the similarity of participants’ classification to Group(x)/ Group(y) 
and Group(x*y); however, the results still showed that, overall, participants’ 
classifications were still more similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ unidimensional 
classification.
An ANOVA, with condition (predicted unidimensional preference or predicted 
two-dimensional preference) as a between-participants factors and Rand similarity 
(Rand(x) or Rand(y) or Rand(x^y)) as a within-participants factor, revealed no effect of 
condition, F(l, 28) = 2.81, p  > .05, a significant effect of Rand similarity, F(2, 56) = 
4.38,/? < .02, and a significant interaction between these factors, F(2, 56) = 14.47,p  < 
.001. Tests of simple main effects revealed that there was a significant effect of 
condition at Rand(y) (F(l, 84) = 19.12, p  < .001), but not at Rand(x) or Rand(x,y) 
(F(l, 84) = 1.12, p  > .05, and, F(l, 84) = 2.77, p  > .05, respectively). Simple main 
effects further revealed that there was a significant effect of Rand similarity in the 
condition where a preference for unidimensional classification was predicted (F(2, 56) 
= 12.91, p  < .001), and in the condition where a preference for two-dimensional 
classification was predicted (F(2, 56) = 5.46,/? < .007).
Focusing on the condition where simplicity predicted a unidimensional 
classification preference, follow-up tests revealed that while the similarity of 
participants’ classifications to Group(x,y) was significantly greater than to Group(y) 
(as assessed with a Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-test, t(\4) = 4.91,/? < .001), 
such a difference was not found when comparing the similarity of participants’
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classifications to Group (x,y) and Group(x) (assessed in the same way, t( 14) = .48, p > 
.05). The latter result sits in contrast to the findings of Experiments 1 - 3 ,  where the 
similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(xj^) was also greater than to 
Group(x). The fact that participants’ classifications were now equally similar to 
Group(x,y) and Group(x) in this condition is, therefore, rather interesting. Indeed, one 
may argue that it lends some validity to the argument that part of the reason why 
people’s classification preferences do not match those predicted by the simplicity 
model in Experiments 1 -  3 is because of a tendency to engage in category 
subclustering. However, it must be noted that in the condition where simplicity 
predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, the present manipulation still 
did not produce a result that was consistent with the predictions of the simplicity 
model. Moreover, in the condition where simplicity predicted a preference for two- 
dimensional classification, the similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x,y) 
was still significantly less than to both Group(x) and Group(y) (as assessed with 
Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests (/(l4) = -3.43, p  < .005, and /(14) = -3.43, 
p < .005, respectively). While this latter result agrees with the findings of 
Experiments 1 -  3, it is interesting to note that the estimated effect sizes for these 
differences in Experiment 4 (rs = -0.68) is significantly reduced compared to the same 
estimated effect sizes in Experiment 1 (rs = -0.94, Z = 2.53, p  < .015; Rosenthal, 
1991).
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Figure 10. The results of the Rand Index analyses for Experiment 4. Rand(x) means 
the Rand similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x), etc. ‘Unidimensional 
Preference’ refers to the condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification. ‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. Error bars denote the standard error.
2.8.4 Discussion
Broadly, the pattern of results of Experiment 4 is consistent with the pattern of 
results of Experiments 1 -  3 (i.e., in the sense that they are not consistent with the 
predictions of the simplicity model). However, in the condition where a preference 
for unidimensional classification was predicted, the similarity o f participants’ 
classifications to Group(x) was found to be equivalent to that of Group(x,y). As 
mentioned above, this finding sits in contrast to the results of Experiments 1 - 3 .  In 
the condition where a preference for two-dimensional classification was predicted, 
participants’ classifications were still more similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
(unidimensional) classifications. While the former results (i.e., in the predicted 
unidimensional classification condition) may lend some validity to the argument that
Rand(x) Rand(y) Rand(x,y)
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participants in Experiments 1 - 3  engaged in category subclustering, overall, this 
claim cannot be wholly substantiated.
I argued at the beginning of Experiment 4 that, by introducing a time 
constraint on classification, this should reveal participants’ true classification 
preferences, as the task would not allow participants to engage in any category 
subclustering. Based on this argument, it seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, 
that in the condition where simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification, participants preferred to engage in unidimensional classification. Of 
course, in the condition where simplicity predicted a unidimensional classification 
preference, no classification preference was shown by participants. Overall, 
therefore, I would argue that participants’ classification preferences, documented in 
the present experiment, do not support the predictions of the simplicity model. 
Naturally, this calls into question the validity of the model, and suggests that it is not 
correctly capturing people’s classification biases/ preferences. It is important to note 
that some of the differences observed between Experiments 1 - 3  and Experiment 4 
are likely the result of the classification data simply being much noisier in Experiment 
4, due to the time constraint imposed. However, there is no reason to believe that this 
noise should have acted directly against the predictions of the simplicity model.
Irrespective of what the results mean for the validity of the simplicity model, 
the results of Experiment 4 do document a further interesting influence of time 
pressure on human unsupervised classification (see, e.g., Milton et al., 2008). Indeed, 
taken as a whole, the pattern of results of Experiment 4 are particularly interesting 
because they show that speeded categorisation does not, necessarily, influence 
people’s classifications in a uniform manner (i.e., by simply increasing 
unidimensional classification, for example; Milton et al., 2008). Rather, speeded 
categorisation seems to influence people’s classification strategies in an apparently 
more complex manner than has been previously assumed (with respect to the present 
stimulus structures, at least; cf. Milton et al., 2008; Ward, 1983). That is, relative to 
the findings of Experiment 1, in the case where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, speeded classification increased the similarity of 
participants’ classifications to Group(x) (Rand(x) = 0.64, Experiment 1; Rand(x) = 
0.70, Experiment 4), and decreased the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x,^) (Rand(xj/) = 0.80, Experiment 1; Rand(x,x) = 0.72, Experiment 4). In 
contrast, in the case where a preference for two-dimensional classification was
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predicted, speeded classification slightly increased the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Group(x,y) relative to Experiment 1 (Rand(xj>) = 0.63, Experiment 
1; Rand(x1y) = 0.65, Experiment 4), and it decreased the similarity of participants’ 
classifications to Group(jc)/ Group(y) relative to Experiment 1 (Rand(x)/ Rand(y) = 
0.84, Experiment 1; Rand(x)/ Rand(y) = 0.75, Experiment 4). In general, however, it 
does appear as though unidimensional classification is somewhat more robust than 
classification based on a family resemblance principle (cf. Milton et al., 2008).
In conclusion, the speeded classification task of Experiment 4 did not 
encourage participants to show classification behaviour that was consistent with the 
predictions of the simplicity model. This is problematic for the simplicity model, as 
given the short period of time in which participants had to classify the stimuli, it 
seems reasonable to assume that participants’ classification strategies were reflective 
of a true preference. That is, the speeded classification task of Experiment 4 makes 
the possibility of category subclustering much less likely, although, of course, still 
possible. While an even stronger task manipulation (for example, combining speeded 
classification with a task that places a high demand on working memory) may lead to 
a reversal in the pattern of results of Experiments 1 - 4 ,  the simplicity model is 
supposed to capture human classification in the absence of such manipulations. The 
fact is, although category subclustering is compatible with the simplicity model, the 
model clearly predicts that such classification is ‘suboptimal’ given the category 
structures of Figures 5 and 6. Whether the results of Experiments 1 - 4  indicate 
participants’ true biases or not, these experiments have shown that participants’ final 
classifications have been consistently more similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
classifications than to the predicted ‘optimal’ classifications. To put the results of 
Experiments 1 - 4  into context, it is clearly important to establish whether the 
simplicity model adequately captures participants’ classification preferences when 
stimulus structures are employed in which the predicted ‘optimal’ classifications do 
not share a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
classifications. Consequently, this was the focus of the experimental investigation in 
Experiment 5.
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2.9 Experiment 57
2.9.1 Introduction
Experiment 5 sought to assess participants’ unsupervised categorisation 
behaviour using stimuli derived from stimulus structures in which the predicted 
‘optimal’ and ‘suboptimaP classifications do not share a superordinate-subordinate 
relationship. Consequently, two new stimulus structures were generated (see Figures 
12 and 13). As for Experiment 1, for one of these stimulus structures, the simplicity 
model predicted a unidimensional classification preference; for the other stimulus 
structure, the simplicity model predicted a two-dimensional classification preference. 
Critically, in the case where a unidimensional classification preference was predicted, 
care was taken to ensure that Group(x.y) was not subordinate to Group(x)/ Group(y), 
and in the case where a two-dimensional classification preference was predicted, care 
was taken to ensure that Group(x)/ Group(y) were not subordinate to Group(x,y). 
Essentially, for both stimulus structures, the category structure that corresponds to 
classification along a single dimension of variation was made as different as possible 
to the category structure that corresponds to classification when taking into account 
both dimensions of variation together. If category subclustering produced the conflict 
between the predictions of the simplicity model and the experimentally observed 
classification behaviour of participants in Experiments 1 - 4 ,  then Experiment 5 
should elicit classification behaviour that is consistent with the predictions of the 
model.
2.9.2 Method
2.9.2.1 Participants
Forty Cardiff University students took part for course credit. Twenty 
participants were allocated to a condition where a preference for unidimensional 
classification was predicted, and 20 to a condition where a preference for two- 
dimensional classification was predicted. As for Experiment 1, an additional 24 
Cardiff University students provided similarity ratings for a small payment of £2.
This work was published in Pothos and Close (2008).
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2.9.2.2 Materials and procedure
As for Experiments 1 -  4, stimuli were circles enclosed in squares, with the 
circles ‘blended in’ with the squares (using CorelDraw), so as to make them look 
more like individual objects (see Figure 11). The similarity structure for the two 
conditions was again specified on abstract 1 - 1 0  scales, and these were mapped to the 
physical dimensions of circle size and square size by assuming a Weber’s fraction of 
7.5% for both the circles (smallest size: 25 mm) and the squares (smallest size: 50 
mm; Morgan, 2005). Each stimulus was printed individually on a piece of paper as 
large as the stimulus, which was subsequently laminated.
Figure 11. A few examples of the stimuli employed in Experiment 5. The stimulus 
presented on the left shows the greatest size in the square dimension, and the stimulus 
presented on the right shows the greatest size in the circle dimension.
As noted, the objective in the present experiment was to create stimulus 
structures such that Group(x)/ Group(y) were not superordinate or subordinate relative 
to Group(x,_y). Figures 12 and 13 show two such structures: Figure 12 shows a 
stimulus structure for which the simplicity model predicts a preference for 
unidimensional classification (i.e., Codelength(x) and Codelength(y) are less than 
Codelength(xj/)). Figure 13 shows a stimulus structure for which the simplicity 
model predicts a preference for two-dimensional classification (i.e., Codelength(xvy) is 
less than Codelength(x) and Codelength(y)). Again, it is important to note that the 
codelength for the predicted ‘optimal’ classifications in each condition are 
approximately the same, as are the codelengths for the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
classifications (of course, in one condition the ‘optimal’ classification reflects
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unidimensional classification, and in the other condition the ‘optimal’ classification 
reflects two-dimensional classification).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dimension x
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Dimension x
Figure 12. A stimulus structure where the simplicity model predicts a unidimensional 
classification preference (the unidimensional classifications are shown). Where there 
are two numbers next to a data point, this means that two identical items were 
included in the stimulus set. The left-hand structure depicts the most intuitive 
classification along just dimension x, in which the predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is
(1.2.3.4.11.12) (5,6,7,8,15,16) (9,10,13,14,17,18,19,20), and the right-hand structure 
depicts the most intuitive classification along just dimension^, in which the predicted 
‘optimal’ clustering is (1,2,3,4,9,10) (5,6,7,8,13,14) (11,12,15,16,17,18,19,20). Both 
these classifications are associated with a codelength of 57.6%. When represented 
along both dimension x  and y  together, the predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is
(1.2.3.4.9.10.11.12) (5,6,7,8,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20), with an associated codelength 
of 73.4%.
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Figure 13. A stimulus structure where the simplicity model predicts a two- 
dimensional classification preference (the two-dimensional classification is shown). 
Where there are two numbers next to a data point, this means that two identical items 
were included in the stimulus set. When represented along both dimension jc and y  
together, the predicted ‘optimal’ clustering is (1,2,11,17,19) 
(3,4,5,6,9,10,13,14,15,16) (7,8,12,18,20), with an associated codelength of 59.4%. 
The predicted ‘optimal’ clustering along just dimension x  is (1,2,3,4,9,11,13,14,17,19)
(5.6.7.8.10.12.15.16.18.20) and along just dim ension^ is (1,2,3,5,10,11,15,16,17,19)
(4.6.7.8.9.12.13.14.18.20), both with an associated codelength of 73.5%.
Given these new stimulus structures, it is again important to establish that 
participants perceived the stimuli as I intended. Therefore, in exactly the same way as 
for Experiment 1, stimulus similarity ratings were collected from 12 participants for 
each of the stimulus structures (see Section 2.5.1.2 for procedural details). The 
number of stimuli presented in each condition now totals 20; consequently, 
participants made a total of 380 similarity comparisons, which reflected rating the 
similarity of all possible stimulus pairs once, excluding pairs o f identical stimuli.
Using these similarity ratings, the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) procedure 
derived a spatial representation in two-dimensions for the stimuli. For the stimulus 
set for which simplicity predicted a unidimensional classification preference, the best 
solution was associated with a stress o f 0.168, and for the stimulus set for which a 
two-dimensional classification preference was predicted, the best solution was 
associated with a stress of 0.149. The Orthosim procedure set out in Section 2.5.1.2 
was again used to assess the similarity of the MDS-derived representations for the
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stimuli with the experimenter-assumed coordinates. The similarity coefficient 
between the coordinates for the stimulus set for which unidimensional classification 
was predicted and the corresponding MDS solution was 0.74, and for the stimulus set 
for which two-dimensional classification was predicted, 0.72. To recapitulate, the 
similarity ratings procedure can lead to rather noisy data (see Section 2.5.1.2). 
Overall, therefore, I consider the similarity between the MDS solutions and the 
corresponding experimenter assumed coordinates to be adequate.
With the two new stimulus structures established, participants were asked to 
categorise the stimuli in exactly the way as in Experiment 1.
2.9.3 Results
The results from Experiment 5 are presented in Figure 14 (see Figure 32 of 
Appendix 1 for the frequency with which participants produced classifications based 
on a specific number of clusters). As can be seen, the pattern of results of Experiment 
5 is opposite to those of Experiments 1 - 4 .  As such, the results of Experiment 5 are 
consistent with the predictions of the simplicity model. That is, in the case where 
simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, participants’ 
classifications were more similar to Group(x) and Group(y) than to Group(x^y), and in 
the case where simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional classification, 
participants’ classifications were more similar to Group(x,jy) than to Group(x) or 
Group(y).
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected ANOVA, with condition (predicted 
unidimensional preference or predicted two-dimensional preference) as a between- 
participants factors and Rand similarity (Rand(x) or Rand(y) or Rand(x,^)) as a within- 
participants factor, revealed no effect of condition, F(l, 38) = 1.21,/? > .05, an effect 
of Rand similarity, F(1.43, 54.26) = 14.75, p  < .001, and a significant interaction 
between these factors, F(l.-43, 54.26) = 68.64,/? < .001. Tests of simple main effects 
revealed that there was a significant effect of condition at Rand(x), Rand(y), and 
Rand(x,y) (smallest F( 1, 114) = 4.25, p  < .05). Simple main effects further revealed 
that there was a significant effect of Rand similarity in the condition where a 
preference for unidimensional classification was predicted (F(l.72, 32.76) = 51.16,/? 
< .001), and in the condition where a preference for two-dimensional classification 
was predicted (F(1.09, 20.68) = 33.69,/? < .001).
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Critically, in the condition where simplicity predicted a preference for 
unidimensional classification, the similarity of participants’ classifications to 
Group(x,y) was significantly less than to both Group(x) and Group(y) (as assessed 
with Bonferroni-adjusted paired samples t-tests, t{ 19) = -11.06,/? < .001, and, f(19) = 
-2.95, p < .009, respectively). In the condition where simplicity predicted a 
preference for two-dimensional classification, similarity to Group(x,y) was 
significantly greater than to both Group(x) and Group(y) (assessed in the same way, 
/(19) = 21.73,/? < .001, and, /(19) = 6.44,/? < .001, respectively).
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Figure 14. The results of the Rand Index analyses for Experiment 5. Rand(x) means 
the Rand similarity of participants’ classifications to Group(x), etc. ‘Unidimensional 
Preference’ refers to the condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference 
for unidimensional classification. ‘Two-dimensional Preference’ refers to the 
condition where the simplicity model predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. Error bars denote the standard error.
2.9.4 Discussion
Experiment 5 employed two new stimulus structures in which the predicted 
‘optimal’ classifications did not share a superordinate-subordinate relationship with
Rand(x) Rand(y) Rand(x,y)
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the predicted ‘suboptimal’ classifications. For one of these stimulus structures, the 
simplicity model predicted a unidimensional classification preference, and for the 
other stimulus structure, simplicity predicted a two-dimensional classification 
preference. In contrast to the findings of Experiments 1 - 4 ,  participants’ 
classification preferences were found to be entirely consistent with the predictions of 
the simplicity model. That is, in the case where the simplicity model predicted 
unidimensional classification, participants’ classifications were more similar to 
Group(x) and Group(y) than to Group(x*y), and in the case where the simplicity model 
predicted two-dimensional classification, participants’ classifications were more 
similar to Group(x.j>) than to either Group(x) or Group(y).
What, then, is one to make of the results of Experiment 5 in the context of the 
earlier findings (Experiments 1 -  4)? First, the present results do encourage an 
account of the results of Experiments 1 -  4 in terms of category subclustering; this 
category subclustering resulting in participants’ final classifications being most 
similar to the predicted ‘suboptimal’ classifications in each condition. Why is this? 
Well, when presented with a situation in which the predicted ‘optimal’ classifications 
did not share a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
classifications, participants’ classification behaviour was found to match the 
predictions of the simplicity model. Despite the results of Experiment 5, it is still the 
case that participants appear to have readily engaged in category subclustering in 
Experiments 1 - 4 ,  and the simplicity model did not, and indeed would never, predict 
such classification behaviour. This is because the simplicity model will always 
consider category subclustering to be ‘suboptimal’ (i.e., less intuitive). This is not 
surprising; natural categories often have a kind of hierarchical structure -  in which the 
basic level (e.g., dog) shares a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the 
subordinate level (e.g., Poodle) -  and yet, in general, people choose to classify such 
stimuli at the basic level (see Rosch, et al., 1976). It is likely, therefore, that 
participants’ apparent ‘preference’ for category subclustering in Experiments 1 -  4 is 
partly a product of the artificial nature of the experimental task employed (e.g., the 
use of simple geometric stimuli, etc.). Overall, therefore, it is difficult to speculate 
about the ecological validity of the simplicity model from the present findings.
In summary, the success of the simplicity model to accurately predict 
participants’ classification behaviour appears to be dependent on whether a predicted 
‘optimal’ classification shares a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the
predicted ‘suboptimal’ classification(s). Before drawing some general conclusions 
from the findings of Experiments 1 -  5, it is first interesting to enquire whether other 
models of unsupervised categorisation are better able to capture the general patterns 
of results found in this chapter (albeit post hoc).
2.10 Other models
First, supervised models of categorisation, which employ free parameters for 
attentional weighting, would likely be able to describe all of the results of 
Experiments 1 - 5 .  However, it is unclear whether such models would predict these 
results without some constraints on determining these free parameters a priori (e.g., 
Nosofsky, 1989). With respect to the models of unsupervised categorisation outlined 
earlier, it was noted that SUSTAIN spontaneously classifies a set of stimuli on the 
basis of more than one dimension when (and for) dimensions that are highly 
intercorrelated with each other. Focusing first on the stimulus structures employed in 
Experiments 1 - 4 ,  SUSTAIN would appear to predict the following: for the stimulus 
structure of Figure 5, where simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional 
classification, the correlation between the two dimensions of variation was found to 
be -.002, {p > .05). For the stimulus structure of Figure 6, where simplicity predicted 
a preference for two-dimensional classification, the correlation between the two 
dimensions of variation was found to be .457 ip > .05). Broadly, therefore, these 
correlations suggest a similar pattern of predictions to the simplicity model, indicating 
a strong unidimensional classification bias for Figure 5, and a tendency towards a 
two-dimensional classification bias for Figure 6. Of course, these predictions were 
not supported. While thecorrelation between dimensions x and y  is not particularly 
high in the case where simplicity predicted a two-dimensional classification 
preference (Figure 6), it is at least substantially higher than the correlation between 
dimensions x  and y  in the case where simplicity predicted a preference for 
unidimensional classification.
Based on the assumptions of SUSTAIN, therefore, the finding that participants 
showed an overall preference for unidimensional classification in the case where a 
preference for two-dimensional classification was predicted is not all that surprising. 
However, based on the same assumptions, the finding that participants showed a 
preference for two-dimensional classification in the case where a preference for 
unidimensional classification was predicted is highly surprising (to reiterate, there
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existed almost zero correlation between dimensions x and y  for the stimulus structure 
of Figure 5).
Focusing now on Experiment 5, for the stimulus structure of Figure 11, where 
simplicity predicted a unidimensional classification preference, the correlation 
between dimensions x and y  was .763 (p<.01). For the stimulus structure of Figure 
12, where simplicity predicted a two-dimensional classification preference, the 
correlation between dimensions x and y  was almost identical (.760, /K.01). It is 
apparent, therefore, that SUSTAIN does not specify the unidimensional versus two- 
dimensional bias that was derived from the simplicity model; indeed, one can infer 
from these correlations that SUSTAIN would predict a preference for two- 
dimensional classification in both cases. However, while the simplicity model was 
specifically constructed to deal with classification based on the simultaneous 
presentation of stimuli, SUSTAIN is an incremental model of category learning. 
Consequently, it is possible that the conclusions just drawn may be somewhat unfair 
to SUSTAIN (although on average, any such discrimination against SUSTAIN should 
be ruled out).
Can the results of Experiments 1 -  5 be captured by the statistical clustering 
algorithms discussed briefly in Chapter 1? A couple of points are important to 
consider here: first, many statistical algorithms are not suitable here as they do not 
have a ready psychological interpretation. Second, while certain versions of AT-means 
clustering can be considered, as these algorithms specify clustering by maximising 
within-cluster similarity while minimising between-cluster similarity (similar to the 
simplicity model), as discussed in Chapter 1, they require information to be given 
about the number of categories sought (.K). As highlighted throughout Chapter 1 and 
this chapter, when assessing participants’ preference for unidimensional versus 
multidimensional classification, such information may prejudice the issue (see 
Murphy, 2002).
2.11 General Discussion
When asked to classify a set of stimuli without any feedback, participants will 
readily engage in this task. Intriguingly, the majority of laboratory research on human 
unsupervised categorisation has documented an overwhelming and robust bias for 
unidimensional classification (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; Medin et al., 1987; Regehr & 
Brooks, 1995). This unidimensional classification preference is, however,
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inconsistent with our current understanding of real world categorisation (e.g., Rosch 
& Mervis, 1975). While multidimensional (family resemblance) classification has 
been documented in the laboratory, these observations have often only been made 
after employing a specific task manipulation: this has included manipulations of 
stimulus format (e.g., Milton & Wills, 2004), procedural details (e.g., Milton et al., 
2008), and the introduction of prior knowledge (e.g., Ahn, 1990, 1991; Kaplan & 
Murphy, 1999; see also, Medin et al., 1987). The work presented in this chapter 
highlights the critical importance of stimulus similarity structure in influencing human 
unsupervised categorisation. Specifically, I have shown that, like SUSTAIN (Love et 
al., 2004), the simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation also predicts a 
unidimensional classification preference for the binary stimulus structure of Medin et 
al. (1987; see Figure 1, Chapter 1), on the basis of its abstract stimulus structure. To 
reiterate, this is consistent with Medin et al.’s (1987) findings. Critically, Experiment 
5 of this chapter documented the first empirical demonstration of a preference for 
two-dimensional classification, based solely on a set of stimuli’s abstract similarity 
structure.
To assess unidimensional versus two-dimensional classification, I employed 
the simplicity model of unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002) to derive 
a number of classification predictions about two stimulus structures, and the Rand 
Index analysis to compare participants’ classifications with the predicted 
classifications. For all experiments, one stimulus structure was derived where 
simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, and one stimulus 
structure was derived where simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification. In Experiments 1 - 4 ,  the pattern of results found did not support the 
predictions of the simplicity model; in fact, the results were in the opposite direction 
to the model’s predictions. These results appeared to reflect an instance of category 
subclustering. Indeed, focusing on the findings of Experiments 4 and 5 together, this 
suggested that participants had a preference for this kind of classification. However, 
due to the fact that the predicted ‘optimal’ classifications shared a superordinate- 
subordinate relationship with the predicted ‘suboptimal’ classifications in 
Experiments 1 -  4, it was not possible to unambiguously confirm a unidimensional 
versus multidimensional bias using the Rand Index. Consequently, in Experiment 5, 
two new stimulus structures were derived in which the predicted ‘optimal’ 
classifications did not share a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the
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predicted ‘suboptimal’ classifications. By employing these two new stimulus 
structures, participants’ classification behaviour was found to be consistent with the 
predictions of the simplicity model.
The results of this chapter, therefore, are important in informing our 
understanding of why participants often show a strong bias for unidimensional 
classification in the laboratory. To recapitulate, the unidimensional classification bias 
documented in many previous studies of unsupervised categorisation is odd given the 
nature of our everyday categories, which are based on a principle of family 
resemblance (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). One likely explanation for 
this laboratory-based unidimensional unsupervised categorisation bias, therefore, is 
that it is simply an artefact of the experimental procedures that have been employed. 
The work presented in this chapter supports this claim, and suggests that this artefact 
likely stems from a lack of understanding about the biases that are inherent within the 
similarity structure of the stimuli employed (e.g., Medin et al., 1987). For example, 
based on the binary stimulus structure of Medin et al. (1987), unidimensional 
classification should be considered more intuitive.
What do the contrasting findings of Experiments 1 - 4  and Experiment 5 mean 
for the validity of the simplicity model? First, they indicate that the model is only 
accurate in its predictions when dealing with stimulus structures where the basic level 
of classification does not have obvious substructure. This is a bit of a problem for the 
simplicity model, as many category structures have some sort of hierarchical 
structure. It is interesting that with respect to everyday categories, however, people 
often prefer basic level categorisation over subordinate level categorisation (Rosch et 
al., 1976). As noted earlier, It seems likely that participants’ tendency to engage in 
any category subclustering may have been driven by the artificial nature of the 
experimental task. The fact is this though, in Experiments 1 - 4 ,  participants’ 
classification behaviour simply did not match the classifications that were predicted to 
be ‘optimal’ (more intuitive) by the simplicity model. Whether this was because 
participants actually preferred unidimensional classification when a two-dimensional 
classification preference was predicted, for example, or it was brought about through 
category subclustering, the above fact is clearly a major limitation of the simplicity 
model. In its favour, of course, is the fact that the predictions of the simplicity model 
were supported in Experiment 5.
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Interestingly, it is apparent that SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004), for example, 
also fails to successfully capture the results of Experiments 1 - 4 .  Moreover, 
SUSTAIN further appears to fail to capture the results of Experiment 5 (on the basis 
of the correlations that exist between the dimensions of variation, at least). Of course, 
there are other model approaches to unsupervised categorisation which have not been 
considered here (e.g., Compton & Logan, 1993; Schyns, 1991). A number of 
considerations guided the emphasis on the simplicity model and SUSTAIN (and also 
on the Rational model earlier in the chapter). With respect to modelling human 
cognition, compelling arguments have recently been made for the relevance of 
simplicity and Bayesian principles in this endeavour (e.g., Chater, 1999; Feldman, 
2000; Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006). These models are proven in terms of 
their flexibility to capture a whole range of unsupervised categorisation data. 
Furthermore, the free parameters employed in both the Rational model and SUSTAIN 
have commonly been fixed over the course of various model demonstrations. Perhaps 
most important of all, however, is that the unidimensional bias documented in many 
unsupervised categorisation experiments has previously been directly investigated 
using SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004).
In conclusion, the results of Chapter 2 demonstrate that stimulus similarity 
structure influences people’s classification behaviour. Critically, the findings of 
Experiment 5 of this chapter document the first empirical observation of a preference 
for multidimensional unsupervised categorisation, on the basis of the abstract stimulus 
structure of the stimuli. However, while similarity structure is clearly influential, the 
results of Experiments 1 - 4  reinforce the sense that human classification is a complex 
phenomenon, driven by factors that transcend pure perceptual similarity. This point is 
important, and it highlights the clear limitations of the simplicity model. Indeed, with 
respect to natural, everyday categorisation, the simplicity model is limited in a 
number of ways: First, due to the combinatorics of the simplicity model,
classification that has to take into account many different stimulus dimensions, and 
many thousands of stimuli, would require a vast amount of computational power. 
Second, the simplicity model was specifically developed to model simultaneous 
unsupervised categorisation. However, in the real-world, stimulus classification will 
most often be sequential, occurring over a period of time. Consequently, stimulus 
categorisation will involve a memory component. Furthermore, while the simplicity 
model is able to find structure within a set of stimuli and form categories according to
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this, it is rather inflexible. By contrast, SUSTAIN, for example, was developed to be 
highly flexible. As Love et al. note, “the categorisation system must be able to both 
assimilate structure and discover or even create that structure” (2004, p. 309). One 
critical mechanism for determining category structure in SUSTAIN, at least, is 
‘surprisingness’. That is, if a novel stimulus is sufficiently surprising (i.e., it exceeds 
some threshold level of dissimilarity to an already formed category), then this is a 
good indicator that SUSTAIN should create a new category in which to accommodate 
the novel stimulus. Importantly, this parameter is flexible, based on prior stimulus 
experience. Indeed, ‘surprisingness’ has been shown to be an important mechanism 
for unsupervised category construction by Clapper and Bower (1994, 2002).
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I was interested in moving away from the specific 
question of unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised classification. 
Specifically, I wanted to explore aspects of unsupervised categorisation that are 
beyond the scope of the simplicity model. This included assessing the influence of 
‘surprise’, as well as other features of perceptual experience, which might influence 
whether stimuli are ‘classified together’ or ‘classified apart’. Moreover, I was keen to 
assess unsupervised categorisation using a procedure and stimuli that would more 
accurately reflect natural unsupervised categorisation (i.e., by sequentially exposing 
people to naturalistic stimuli that are composed of many dimensions of variation).
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Chapter 3
Within-category similarity structure and incidental unsupervised
categorisation
3. Introduction
The experiments of Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of abstract similarity 
structure in influencing people’s unsupervised classification behaviour. That is, 
people were shown to be sensitive to the perceived regularities and discontinuities (or 
similarity-based relationships) that exist within a stimulus set (albeit not in a manner 
that is always consistent with the predictions of the simplicity model; Pothos & 
Chater, 2002). Consequently, while certain stimulus structures were found to support 
classification based on a single dimension of variation (e.g., dimension x), other 
stimulus structures were found to support classification based on more than one 
dimension of variation (e.g., dimension x,y). However, as has been highlighted 
throughout this thesis, our ‘natural’, everyday categories are not unidimensional in 
kind. Rather, research has clearly established that our everyday categories are rich, 
broad constructs, based on a principle of family resemblance (Rosch, 1973, 1975; see 
also, Wittgenstein, 1953). In Rosch’s (1973, 1975) terms, natural categories have an 
internal structure; consequently, not all items are equally good members of a 
category.
Numerous differences exist between unsupervised categorisation that occurs 
naturally and that performed by participants in the experiments of Chapter 2 of this 
thesis. In natural unsupervised categorisation, category formation is incidental 
(Clapper & Bower, 1994; Love, 2002): this requires a person to a) realise that there is 
structure present, and b) to then utilise this structure to guide their classifications. In 
contrast, in the experiments of Chapter 2 of this thesis (and in the majority of previous 
investigations of unsupervised categorisation), participants were explicitly told to 
categorise a set of stimuli. This explicit instruction to categorise, therefore, will likely 
promote a belief in participants that their task is to find some experimenter defined
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category structure (i.e., the category structure that makes the most ‘intuitive’ sense) . 
Consequently, rather than identifying category structure incidentally, participants will 
be intentionally seeking structure within the experimental materials. To recapitulate 
from Chapter 0, this is important because these different forms of categorisation 
(intentional versus incidental) have been associated with different kinds of 
unsupervised classification. That is, while intentional unsupervised categorisation has 
been associated with more ‘rule-like’ (unidimensional) category learning, incidental 
unsupervised categorisation has been associated with classification based on family- 
resemblance (Love, 2002; the latter reflecting categorisation that is compatible with 
the nature of our everyday categories). Moreover, natural unsupervised categorisation 
will rarely, if ever, proceed under conditions of simultaneous stimulus exposure, as 
occurred in the experiments of Chapter 2. Instead, stimulus exposure will most likely 
be sequential, and stimulus categorisation will therefore involve a memory 
component: that is, stimulus comparisons will not be made on the basis of their 
veridical physical dimensions, but rather on participants’ stored representations of 
those stimuli (Clapper & Bower, 2002; Love et al., 2004). Finally, natural 
unsupervised categorisation will proceed with respect to complex stimuli constructed 
from many different dimensions of variation, rather than simple stimuli constructed 
from just a couple of dimensions of variation. Consequently, it is far harder to 
identify some defining feature for complex naturalistic stimuli compared to simple 
artificial stimuli. All these factors, therefore, will play a role in determining that 
natural, everyday categories reflect a principle of family resemblance.
The experiments reported in this chapter introduce a broader approach to the 
study of unsupervised categorisation. Specifically, these experiments focus on 
incidental unsupervised categorisation, following the sequential presentation of 
complex stimuli: for the purposes of this thesis, I will simply refer to this kind of 
unsupervised categorisation as incidental categorisation. The main benefits of 
studying incidental categorisation are two-fold: First, it affords a more naturalistic 
approach to the investigation of unsupervised categorisation. Second, it affords the 
unique ability to assess unsupervised categorisation in nonlinguistic agents. Clearly, 
it is not possible to ask a nonhuman animal to classify a set of stimuli in a way that
Even if  participants are told to group a set of stimuli in a natural and intuitive way, and that 
there is no correct answer, given the experimental situation they are in, why should they 
believe this?
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feels ‘natural and intuitive to them’. However, the procedures detailed below set out 
one way in which it is possible to investigate whether nonhuman animals, like 
humans, spontaneously group together stimuli in any meaningful sense. Moreover, in 
both humans and nonhuman animals, the procedures detailed below allow for an 
assessment of the conditions that may or may not promote the spontaneous 
classification together, or spontaneous classification apart, of different stimuli. 
Specifically, the experiments reported in this chapter sought to assess how within- 
category similarity structure influences the incidental classification of similar, but 
distinct stimuli in both humans and rats. In taking this comparative approach, I hope 
to assess more fully the role of the classifier in unsupervised categorisation.
3.1 Investigating incidental categorisation
To investigate incidental categorisation, the experiments reported in this 
chapter exploit a well-known influence that categorisation can have over the 
phenomenon of stimulus generalisation. The first formal demonstration of stimulus 
generalisation was described by Pavlov (1927), who observed that once a dog had 
come to show a conditioned salivary response to a tone of a specific frequency, other 
tones that were close in frequency to the trained tone would also “spontaneously” 
provoke salivation. The close relationship between stimulus generalisation and 
similarity has been widely documented (see Pearce, 1994). Shepard (1987) has 
shown that stimulus generalisation follows a lawful relationship with similarity, such 
that the amount of generalisation between two stimuli decays exponentially with their 
decreasing similarity. Interestingly, a number of authors have proposed that 
categorisation warps psychological similarity space (Nosofsky, 1989), such that 
categorisation influences the perceived similarity between stimuli. For example, 
Livingston, Andrews and Hamad (1998; see also, Kurtz, 1996) have shown that if 
participants are taught that stimuli are members of the same category, then they will 
later perceive these stimuli to be more similar than participants that did not learn this 
classification. The reverse is also tme; if participants are taught that stimuli are 
members of contrasting categories, then they will later perceive these stimuli to more 
distinct than participants that did not learn this classification (Goldstone, 1994). The 
two most commonly used terms to describe these compression and expansion effects 
are categorical perception (Hamad, 1987), and acquired equivalence and 
distinctiveness (Goldstone, 1998; Hall, 1991; Lawrence, 1949).
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The classic finding from research on categorical perception is that participants 
find it harder to distinguish between physically different stimuli when they come from 
the same category than when they come from different categories (see Hamad, 1987). 
For example, within the domain of speech perception, Liberman, Harris, Eimas, 
Lisker and Bastian (1957) found that participants were more accurate to confirm that a 
sound X was identical either to a sound A or a sound B when syllables A and B 
belonged to different phonemic categories than when they were variants of the same 
phoneme (the physical differences between A and B were equated between 
conditions). In their task, the three sounds were presented sequentially to participants 
(i.e., A followed by B followed by X). While the majority of research in this area has 
focused on colour categories (Bomstein, 1987) and phoneme categories (e.g., Pastore, 
1987), categorical perception effects have also been shown to occur with other visual 
stimuli (e.g., Livingston et al., 1998). Newell and Bulthoff (2002), for example, 
morphed together naturalistic stimuli from within the same basic level category (e.g., 
Wine-Coke bottle) and from different basic level categories (e.g., Bottle-Lamp). 
Using this morphing technique, they rendered 11 object images from each morph 
continuum. Initially, participants engaged in an ‘XAB’ discrimination task, in which 
they were presented with one stimulus, X, followed by the simultaneous presentation 
of two other stimuli, A and B. Stimuli A and B always differed from each other in 
their physical appearance, and stimulus X was identical to either stimulus A or B. 
Participants’ task was to decide whether stimulus X was identical to stimulus A or B. 
Subsequently, participants engaged in an identification task, in which they were asked 
to classify each morph image as either one end of a morph continuum (e.g., Wine 
bottle) or the other end of a morph continuum (e.g., Coke bottle). Employing a 
commonly used technique to index categorical perception (see Calder, Young, Perrett, 
Etcoff, & Rowland, 1996) -  in which participants’ discrimination performance is 
predicted from the identification data, based on the assumption that the objects were 
categorically perceived -  Newell and Bulthoff (2002) reported categorical perception 
for all object pairs created by morphing together two objects from the same basic 
level category. In a final experiment, inter-object perceptual similarity was shown to 
be closely correlated with categorical perception; the greater the similarity between a 
set of objects, the more likely it is that they will be perceived categorically (Newell & 
Bulthoff, 2002).
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While learned categorical perception has been widely documented through the 
use of supervised training procedures, as noted by Gureckis and Goldstone, “it 
remains a somewhat opaque question if learned CP [categorical perception] effects are 
restricted to cases where subjects make a differential response to each category or if 
other aspects of category organisation, such as the similarity structure or distribution 
of items within a category, may also exert an influence on perception” (2008, p. 
1876). In a recent conference paper, however, Gureckis and Goldstone (2008) 
reported some preliminary evidence for an unsupervised categorical perception effect, 
concluding that participants are sensitive to sources of within-category structure, as 
predicted by the SUSTAIN model of category learning (Love et al., 2004).
Learned discrimination-based studies clearly document that stimulus similarity 
is influenced by their classificatory status (or shared associative history). Given the 
relationship between similarity and stimulus generalisation (see Pavlov, 1927; 
Shepard, 1987), a number of studies, concentrated mainly within the domain of 
animal learning, have not surprisingly also shown that stimulus generalisation is 
directly influenced by the classificatory status of a set of stimuli (that is, whether the 
stimuli have acquired equivalence or distinctiveness). For example, Honey and Watt 
(1998, 1999; see also, Honey & Hall, 1989) initially gave rats training in a conditional 
discrimination task in which stimuli A and B (but not C and D) signalled a food 
reward when presented with a cue X, and stimuli C and D (but not A and B) signalled 
a food reward when presented with a cue Y. Following discrimination training, in 
which A and B, and, C and D should have acquired equivalence, stimulus A, but not 
C, was paired with a mild footshock. Subsequently, stimulus B was found to elicit a 
greater fear response than stimulus D. That is, the discrimination training employed 
by Honey and Watt altered the effective similarity of stimuli A, B, C and D, such that 
stimuli A and B came to be perceived as more similar than stimuli A and D. Similar 
patterns of generalisation behaviour have been reported in humans by Hodder, 
George, Killcross, and Honey (2003). In one of their experiments, participants were 
taught a conditional discrimination in which they learned that a person would suffer 
an allergic reaction if they ate meat products A and B (but not C and D) with 
vegetable X, and if they ate meat products C and D (but not A and B) with vegetable 
Y. Interleaved between the previous discrimination training, participants either 
received training in a second congruous or incongruous conditional discrimination 
involving two further vegetables (V and W). In condition Congruous, participants
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learned that a person would suffer an allergic reaction if they ate meat products A and 
B (but not C and D) with vegetable V, and if they ate meat products C and D (but not 
A and B) with vegetable W. In condition Incongruous, participants learned that a 
person would suffer an allergic reaction if they ate meat products A and D (but not B 
and C) with vegetable V, and if they ate meat products B and C (but not A and D) 
with vegetable W. In general, Hodder et al. (2003) found that the initial conditional 
discrimination training generalised better to participants in condition Congruous than 
it did to participants in condition Incongruous.
In summary, there exists a large body of evidence using supervised training 
procedures to support the claim that categorisation alters the effective similarity of 
stimuli, which directly influences the amount of subsequent stimulus generalisation. 
However, research that has directly addressed the influence that unsupervised 
categorisation has on altering the effective similarity of stimuli is extremely limited. 
Moreover, there has been little investigation into how within-category similarity 
structure influences the incidental classification of stimuli, and subsequent stimulus 
generalisation. The experiments reported in this chapter, therefore, sought to directly 
assess how within-category similarity structure influences incidental stimulus 
categorisation. Specifically, I was interested in assessing what aspects of within- 
category similarity structure influence whether stimuli are spontaneously classified 
together, or spontaneously classified apart, in both humans and rats. In the following 
sections, therefore, I outline a number of factors that may be influential in determining 
the incidental classification of stimuli.
3.1.1 Transformational knowledge
Objects in the environment can be seen to have a ‘natural’ direction; that is, 
they evolve in a manner that is principled (Hahn, Close, & Graf, 2009; Zaki & Homa, 
1999). For example, a tadpole has to undergo a marked change before it becomes a 
frog, and...
“If one were to look at these entities separately, having no knowledge of the 
nature of these changes, one might find it difficult to classify them as 
belonging to the same category. However, given the intermediate steps 
between the tadpole and the frog, it becomes easier to identify the two 
examples as being forms of the same category”.
(Zaki & Homa, 1999, p. 70)
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The appreciation of the various steps that lie intermediate within the transformation 
of one object into a different object has been termed transformational knowledge 
(Zaki & Homa, 1999). Based on the aforementioned reasoning, Zaki and Homa 
(1999) proposed that the acquisition of an object concept -  one’s mental 
understanding of what constitutes a member of a specific category -  will be facilitated 
by exposure to that object’s successive changes. Over four experiments using dot 
patterns, Zaki and Homa (1999) reported evidence to support their view. 
Transformational knowledge was found to enhance category learning, and more 
specifically, participants’ classification of novel items was shown to be better 
following category training that progressed in a systematic order rather than in a 
random order. They further found that novel patterns that lie on the transformational 
path were categorised more quickly only when participants had previously received 
systematic category training. Their results are consistent with research in faces that 
has shown that people are able to recognise faces that have undergone dynamic 
change (e.g., Seamon, 1982), and also with the phenomenon of representational 
momentum (e.g., Freyd & Finke, 1984). For example, Freyd and Finke (1984) found 
that when participants experienced a series of displays that implied rotation in a 
presented pattern, their short-term visual memory for the final position of that pattern 
was shifted forward along the direction of implied movement. Finke, Freyd and Shyi 
argued that “the induced shifts in visual memory occur because there is a natural 
tendency to mentally extrapolate implied motions into the future” (1986, p. 176).
It seems plausible, therefore, to suppose that transformational knowledge may 
play an important role in encouraging the incidental classification of two different 
stimuli into the same category. However, based on the findings of Newell and 
Bulthoff (2002) reported above -  who showed that participants often perceive a set of 
morphed stimuli categorically by imposing a category boundary at some point along 
the morph continuum -  it is possible that the presence of transformation knowledge 
between two stimuli may actually serve to reinforce the sense that the two different 
stimuli are distinct, and should therefore be classified apart into different categories. 
Consequently, this may mean that the two stimuli are actually treated as more 
different from each other than if transformational knowledge had not been present. 
Of course, it is also possible that these two influences may cancel each other out, 
leaving participants unsure about the classificatory status of the two different stimuli.
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3.1.2 Surprise-driven category invention
While some theories of spontaneous category learning have proposed that 
learning operates through explicit iterative hypothesis testing (Billman & Knutson, 
1996), other theories have proposed that, within a stimulus domain, correlational 
patterns are captured and are used to explicitly partition the stimuli (Clapper & 
Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004). These theories link the formation of new 
categories (or clusters) to unexpected changes in stimulus structure, which creates 
surprise within the categoriser (e.g., Clapper & Bower, 2002; Love et al. 2004).
Specifically, Clapper and Bower (1994) proposed that a novel exemplar is 
compared with respect to a person’s normative expectations (summary knowledge) 
about what it means to be a member of, for example, Category A. If this novel 
exemplar fits poorly into Category A, then it is likely that a new category will be 
invented to accommodate this distinct exemplar. Whether or not a new category will 
be invented depends on the level of surprise generated on presentation of the novel 
exemplar; specifically, “the probability of creating a new category in response to the 
first instance of Category B should increase with the number («) of prior instances of 
Category A” (Clapper & Bower 1994, p. 447). For example, following a single 
presentation of an instance of Category A, only a weak set of norms will have been 
established determining Category A membership. This means that presentation of a 
Category B instance will not make for a particularly surprising contrast to the 
Category A norms, and will not, therefore, warrant the invention of a new category. 
However, following many presentations of instances of Category A, a strong set of 
norms will have been established determining Category A membership. 
Consequently, when an instance of Category B is presented, it will readily violate 
these well-established norms, which would constitute a surprising stimulus event. In 
this case, therefore, the Category B instance will most likely be accommodated in a 
newly invented category. Using an attribute-listing task, Clapper and Bower (1994, 
2002) found good support for a surprise-driven category invention mechanism in 
unsupervised categorisation. Specifically, they found that participants were more 
likely to engage in category invention following blocked stimulus presentation 
compared to intermixed stimulus presentation. One implication of this is that 
participants should come to perceive a set of stimuli as less similar following blocked 
exposure than following intermixed exposure. Interestingly, this conclusion sits in
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contrast to formally equivalent results in nonhuman animals, detailed in Section 3.1.3. 
Briefly, a common finding in nonhuman animals is that two stimuli will be perceived 
as less similar following intermixed exposure (i.e., AX-BX-AX-BX) than blocked 
exposure (i.e., AX-AX-BX-BX; e.g., Symonds & Hall, 1995; Honey, Bateson & 
Horn, 1994). Equivalent findings have also been reported in humans (e.g., Lavis & 
Mitchell, 2006; Dwyer, Hodder & Honey, 2004). This suggests, therefore, that the 
contrasting results with those of Clapper and Bower (1994, 2002) are possibly due to 
the operation of different processes (i.e., “feature detection” as opposed to stimulus 
classification; Gibson, 1963), brought about through procedural and stimulus 
differences. Indeed, one particularly salient difference is the nature of the stimuli 
employed: while human and nonhuman animal studies investigating perceptual
learning have typically employed just a couple of non-variable stimuli, participants in 
Clapper and Bower’s (1994) study were presented with many complex stimuli, 
containing much variability. It is possible, therefore, that if one were to introduce a 
greater degree of stimulus variability in investigations of the intermixed versus 
blocked effect in perceptual learning, one might see the greatest reduction in stimulus 
similarity following blocked exposure, due to stimulus classification.
In SUSTAIN, a cluster can represent individual stimulus exemplars, a subset 
of feature values within a category, or the representation of a category as a whole 
(Love et al., 2004). With respect to unsupervised category construction, the notion of 
surprise again plays an important role in determining when SUSTAIN creates a new 
cluster (category). Here, ‘surprisingness’ reflects dissimilarity: that is, if a stimulus is 
sufficiently dissimilar from a previous cluster (and therefore makes for a sufficiently 
surprising event on presentation), SUSTAIN will recruit a new cluster (category) to 
house that stimulus. Two factors, therefore, influence how surprising a stimulus is: 
First, there is the similarity of the novel instance to existing clusters. Second, there is 
the threshold level of dissimilarity required before a new cluster will be recruited. 
The lower this threshold, the more surprising a moderately dissimilar instance to 
existing clusters will be perceived (at least, that is the assumption). If little variability 
exists in certain critical stimulus dimensions which have been selectively attended to, 
then smaller differences on these dimensions will be regarded as surprising. 
Consequently, as for the category invention mechanism, the more Category A 
exemplars that are presented before a Category B exemplar is presented, the more 
likely it is that a new cluster will be recruited to accommodate the Category B
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exemplar (Gureckis & Love, 2003). This is because increased exposure to a set of 
stimuli that are likely members of the same category will allow for the attentional 
mechanism of SUSTAIN to become tuned to the variability that exists in these 
stimuli. Consequently, a lower level of dissimilarity will be required for SUSTAIN to 
recruit a new cluster.
In summary, both the category invention mechanism and SUSTAIN suggest 
that a novel stimulus should recruit a new category (cluster) if the stimulus constitutes 
a change in stimulus structure of sufficient magnitude (i.e., it makes for a surprising 
enough event).
3.1.3 Stimulus exposure and stimulus similarity
While categorisation is one way in which the effective similarity of stimuli can 
be altered, it is important to note that mere exposure to stimuli, in the absence of any 
obvious spontaneous categorisation, has also been found to influence stimulus 
similarity. One phenomenon in this context has been termed perceptual learning, 
which involves “relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system 
that improve its ability to respond to its environment and are caused by this 
environment” (Goldstone, 1998, p. 586). That is, exposing humans and nonhuman 
animals to two similar stimuli (e.g., AX and BX) often results in a decrease in their 
effective similarity to each other, such that later discrimination between these stimuli 
is facilitated and generalisation between them is reduced (see Gibson, 1963, 1969; 
Goldstone, 1998; Hall, 1991; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000). Whether or not an 
effect of perceptual learning is shown has been found to be influenced by a number of 
different factors. One particularly important factor in this regard concerns the 
temporal dynamics of stimulus preexposure.
For example, in rats, Symonds and Hall (1995; see also, Honey et al., 1994) 
found that intermixed preexposure to two flavour compounds (i.e., AX-BX-AX-BX) 
resulted in less generalisation of a later conditioned aversion from AX to BX than in a 
condition in which rats received blocked preexposure to the same stimuli (i.e., AX- 
AX-BX-BX). Using chequerboard patterns, Lavis and Mitchell (2006; see also, 
Dwyer et al., 2004) have shown equivalent results to those of Symonds and Hall
(1995) in humans. Lavis and Mitchell (2006) further found that participants were 
more accurate to respond that two chequerboard patterns were different following 
intermixed preexposure than following blocked preexposure. In this case, then, it is
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apparent that when two similar stimuli are presented more closely in time, perceptual 
learning is enhanced (this is in line with the predictions of Gibson, 1969)9. 
Interestingly, Bennett and Mackintosh (1999) have, however, shown that if the time 
between intermixed preexposure of stimuli AX and BX is reduced to some nominal 
value just above zero seconds, then rats will actually come to show increased levels of 
generalisation between AX and BX, relative to other rats that received intermixed 
stimulus preexposure that incorporated a short temporal delay between presentations 
of the two stimuli. This result confirmed an earlier finding by Honey and Bateson
(1996): they found that later discrimination learning in chicks was worse following 
intermixed preexposure that incorporated a short interval (mean: 14 sec) between 
stimulus presentations compared to intermixed preexposure that incorporated a longer 
interval (mean: 28 sec) between stimulus presentations. This increase in the effective 
similarity of stimuli following mere exposure can be considered an instance of 
sensory preconditioning (see Hall, 1991).
When stimulus exposure will lead to perceptual learning and when it will lead 
to sensory preconditioning has proved notoriously difficult to predict. For example, 
Bateson and Chantrey (1972) found that monkeys showed poorer discrimination 
learning between two stimuli following simultaneous preexposure to these stimuli. 
Specifically, they simultaneously exposed rhesus monkeys either to the numbers 2 
and 5, or, 6 and 8 for 50 days. Following this exposure phase, monkeys were trained 
to discriminate between the numbers 2 and 5, by rewarding a touch of the number 2 
but not of the number 5. Monkeys that had previously been exposed to the numbers 2 
and 5 learned this discrimination more slowly than monkeys that had been preexposed 
to the numbers 6 and 8. This finding was replicated again in monkeys using letters as 
stimuli, and also in chicks. Interestingly, this was not the finding expected based on 
the theorising of Gibson (1969). Rather, she argued that perceptual learning should 
be at its most influential following simultaneous stimulus exposure, as this form of 
exposure would afford the best chance to compare the similar stimuli. In support of 
her claim, however, Mundy, Honey and Dwyer (2009; see also, Mundy, Honey & 
Dwyer, 2007) have recently shown that simultaneous preexposure to two highly 
similar chequerboard stimuli (e.g., AX-BX, BX-AX) enhanced their later
Of course, as well as meaning that the different stimuli will be presented more closely in time, 
the intermixed preexposure schedule also affords a greater number of comparisons between 
the two stimuli.
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discrimination more than did preexposure to highly similar chequerboard stimuli in a 
successive manner (CY-CY, DY-DY). Why their results contradict those of Bateson 
and Chantrey (1972) is still to be resolved; however, I would argue that one probable 
cause for this discrepancy lies in the nature of the stimuli used. That is, while the 
stimuli used by Bateson and Chantrey were readily discriminable to start with, the 
stimuli used by Mundy et al. (2007, 2009) were not (but, see Gibson & Walk, 1956).
In conclusion, mere exposure to stimuli can influence the effective similarity 
of stimuli. While the classification of stimuli into the same category or different 
categories has been proposed to explain some of these results (see Bateson & 
Chantrey, 1972), more commonly an explanation has been sought with respect to the 
influences of habituation and latent inhibition, and other associative processes (see 
Hall, 1991; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000). With respect to the ‘standard’ perceptual 
learning findings from intermixed versus blocked stimulus exposure, it is interesting 
to note that they are broadly inconsistent with the predictions of SUSTAIN (described 
above; see Section 3.1.2). That is, while the category learning model of SUSTAIN 
appears to predict a greater reduction in stimulus similarity following blocked 
stimulus exposure (due to more effective stimulus classification), intermixed stimulus 
exposure has traditionally been found to reduce stimulus similarity to a greater extent 
in nonhuman animals (Honey et al., 1994). As highlighted in Section 3.1.2, however, 
this may have a lot to do with a lack of stimulus variability in most perceptual 
learning studies in nonhuman animals.
3.1.4 Conclusions
In summary, categorisation can alter the effective similarity of stimuli. While 
the majority of evidence for this influence has come from supervised training 
procedures, there is some preliminary evidence that unsupervised categorisation, 
based on within-category similarity structure, can also influence stimulus similarity 
(Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008). However, the evidence for this modulation of 
similarity through unsupervised categorisation is clearly limited. What is more, to the 
best of my knowledge, no empirical research exists that has directly compared how 
different distributions of stimuli within a category affect how these stimuli are 
incidentally categorised, and how this impacts on later stimulus generalisation. That 
is, are there certain distributions that encourage the spontaneous classification of 
stimuli into the same category, while other distributions encourage the spontaneous
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classification of stimuli into different categories? Moreover, the discrimination based 
studies that have indexed an influence of categorisation on stimulus similarity have 
typically used designs in which participants engage in hundreds of experimental trials. 
However, it seems reasonable to assume that people’s sensitivity to category structure 
(if sufficiently obvious) should be immediate, and that the incidental categorisation of 
stimuli should be a rapid process that can proceed under conditions of minimal 
stimulus exposure.
In the present experiments, therefore, I was interested in establishing how 
within-category similarity structure (i.e., the distributional properties of stimuli within 
a category) influences incidental categorisation under conditions of minimal stimulus 
exposure. Based on the research outlined above, it is assumed throughout that, 
relative to a baseline, the incidental classification of stimuli into the same category 
will increase later generalisation between these stimuli. In contrast, the incidental 
classification of stimuli into different categories will decrease later generalisation 
between these stimuli.
3.2 Experiment 6
3.2.1 Introduction
Experiment 6 compared the influence of different conditions of one-shot 
stimulus preexposure on later stimulus generalisation in humans. Specifically, 
participants were allocated to one of four preexposure conditions where they received 
differential exposure to a set of morph stimuli. These stimuli were created by 
morphing together two naturalistic objects from the same basic level category (e.g., 
bird) and then rendering the 1%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% and 100% morph images 
(henceforth labelled A, B, C, D, E and F, respectively). The four preexposure 
conditions included one baseline condition (Baseline), one surprise condition 
(Surprise), one systematic transformation condition (Sys_trans), and one scrambled 
transformation condition (Scram_trans; see Table 1 for details). Specifically, in the 
Baseline condition, participants received preexposure only to the endpoints of each 
morph continuum (i.e., stimulus A and stimulus F). Participants in the Surprise 
condition were preexposed to three highly similar stimuli, taken from one end of the 
morph continuum, and one distinct stimulus that represented the most dissimilar 
morph image relative to the other three stimuli (e.g., stimuli A, B, C and F). In the
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Systrans condition, participants were preexposed to all six morph stimuli in a 
systematic order (i.e., A, B, C, D, E and F), and in the Scram_trans condition, 
participants were preexposed to all six morph stimuli in a fixed scrambled order (i.e., 
A, E, C, D, B and F). Following stimulus preexposure, a generalisation test was 
given: here, participants were simply asked to rate how likely they thought it was that 
one of the stimulus endpoints (e.g., stimulus F) shared a particular property of the 
other stimulus endpoint (e.g., stimulus A).
Graf (2002) found that the amount of morph transformation systematically 
influenced participants’ categorisation performance, such that judging whether two 
stimuli were from the same category worsened with increasing transformation 
distance. Given Grafs (2002) finding, the following predictions were made based on 
the factors outlined above: if transformational knowledge encourages the incidental 
classification of stimuli into the same category (Zaki & Homa, 1999), then one would 
expect participants in condition Sys_trans to show an increased level of property 
generalisation relative to participants in either the Baseline or Surprise conditions. 
Moreover, as Zaki and Homa state, “if subjects are acquiring transformational 
knowledge and using this knowledge in a categorisation task, then systematic training 
should result in superior classification and recognition performance compared with 
random presentation of the transformational items” (1999, p. 77). Zaki and Homa 
(1999) confirmed this hypothesis, with participants in their Experiment 1 showing 
significantly better classification accuracy following systematic, as opposed to 
scrambled (random), training (Zaki & Homa, 1999). Consequently, one would also 
expect participants in condition Sys_trans to show an increased level of property 
generalisation relative to participants in condition Scram trans. As noted earlier, 
however, it is also possible that systematic transformational knowledge may lead 
participants to view the stimuli categorically (due to the introduction of a category 
boundary at some point along the morph continuum; see Newell & Btilthoff, 2002). If 
such behaviour occurred, then one would expect the opposite results to those 
described above: participants in condition Sys_trans should show a reduced level of 
property generalisation relative to participants in the other conditions.
Assuming a surprise-driven category invention mechanism in spontaneous 
categorisation (Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004), one clear prediction 
is made. That is, given the skewed nature of the stimulus set, participants in the 
Surprise condition should show a reduced level of property generalisation relative to
115
participants in the other three conditions. If no incidental categorisation occurs, 
however, and instead the principles of perceptual learning operate (Gibson, 1969), 
then one would predict that participants in conditions Sys_trans and Scram_trans 
should show a reduced level of property generalisation relative to participants in the 
Baseline and Surprise condition. Moreover, one would expect participants in the 
Surprise condition to show a reduced level of property generalisation relative to 
participants in the Baseline condition. That is, based on the principles of perceptual 
learning, the greater the amount of stimulus exposure, the greater the reduction in 
property generalisation should be.
3.2.2 Method
3.2.2.1 Participants
Sixty-four Cardiff University students took part for course credit. 16 
participants were allocated to each of the four preexposure conditions detailed in 
Table 1.
Table 1. The four conditions employed to assess the influence o f within-category 
similarity structure on incidental stimulus classification in Experiment 6.
Condition Preexposure Conditioning Test
Baseline A / - / - / - / - / F A+ F
Surprise A / B / C / - / - / F A+ F
Sys_trans A / B / C / D / E / F A+ F
Scram trans A / E / C / D / B / F A+ F
Note. A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to renderings of the 1%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% 
and 100% images along a morph continuum. + denotes the application of a particular 
property to a stimulus.
3.2.2.2 Stimuli
The stimuli were individually rendered images taken with permission from 
Hahn et al. (2009). These stimuli were originally created by morphing together two 
objects from the same basic level category (Rosch et al., 1976), using 3ds max™
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software (Autodesk, Munich, Germany). The basic level objects were taken from five 
biological categories (bird, fish, head, mushroom, starfish, turnip) and one artefact 
category (light bulb; see Figure 15). For every category, two objects formed the end 
points of each morph continuum (the 1% and 100% morph stimuli), from which 20%, 
40%, 60% and 80% morph images were rendered. All morph images had a size of 
256 x 256 pixels and were presented in greyscale on a 15-in. computer monitor. 
Participants were seated at approximately arms length from the monitor for the 
duration of the experiment.
The use of topological (morphing) transformations was chosen as it allows the 
use of highly realistic experimental materials, and it also affords parametric variation 
in an object’s shape (Hahn et al., 2009).
Figure 15. Illustration of the morph stimuli used in the human experiments described 
in this chapter. The morph continuum was created by morphing between two stimuli 
from the same basic level category. The stimuli shown here are the 1%, 20%, 40%, 
60%, 80%, and 100% morphs, respectively.
3.2.2.3 Design and procedure
A 4 (exposure condition) x 7 (object category) mixed model design was 
employed. Exposure condition was manipulated as a between-participants factor, and 
participants in all conditions were exposed to the seven different object categories. 
On a given trial, participants were sequentially preexposed to a set of morph stimuli 
from one of the object categories. Within each of the four exposure conditions, half 
of participants received presentations of the morph stimuli in the order A to F, and 
half of participants received presentations of the morph stimuli in the order F to A.
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Each stimulus was presented for 3000 ms, and the temporal contiguity between the 
presentation of stimulus A and the presentation of stimulus F was held constant across 
exposure conditions by introducing a fixation cross when no morph (object) stimulus 
was scheduled to be presented. Within the subconditions created by the previous 
counterbalancing operation applied in each exposure condition, following a 1000 ms 
inter-stimulus interval (blank screen), half of participants were then presented with 
stimulus A, and half of participants were then presented with stimulus F. Situated 
above the stimulus was a sentence that informed participants about a particular 
property that the stimulus had: for example, “This person comes from a small, remote 
island in the Pacific Ocean”. This information remained on the screen until the space 
bar was pressed, at which point participants were immediately presented with the test 
screen. On the test screen, participants were simply asked to rate on a scale from 1 
(very unlikely) -  9 (very likely) how likely they thought it was that the stimulus now 
presented to them shared the property of the previously seen stimulus. If participants 
had previously been presented with stimulus A, then at test, they were presented with 
stimulus F, and if they had previously been presented with stimulus F, then at test, 
they were presented with stimulus A. The 1 - 9  rating scale was continuously 
presented beneath the test stimulus, and responses were made using the 1 - 9  keys on 
the top of a standard computer keyboard. A 1000 ms inter-trial interval (blank screen) 
separated participants’ likelihood ratings and their preexposure to the next object 
category. Exposure to the seven object categories was random for all participants in 
each of the four exposure conditions.
3.2.3 Results
Figure 16 shows the results of the generalisation test: the overall mean
likelihood ratings that the test stimulus shared the property of the previously seen 
stimulus, split by preexposure condition. Inspection of this figure reveals that, 
overall, participants in the Surprise condition reported lower mean likelihood ratings 
than participants in the other three preexposure conditions; overall likelihood ratings 
in the other three conditions were all very similar.
Due to a lack of homogeneity of variances between conditions (Levene’s test 
of homogeneity of variances, F(3, 60) = 5.23, p  < .003), the Brown-Forsythe 
correction for ANOVA was applied. A one-way ANOVA confirmed that there was 
an overall effect of preexposure condition, F(3, 40.51) = 2.85, p  < .05, r|2 = .12.
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Dunnett T3 post-hoc tests (equal variances not assumed) revealed that, overall, 
participants in the Surprise condition reported significantly lower mean likelihood 
ratings than participants in the Baseline condition (p < .05, r = .35). No other post- 
hoc comparisons were significant (all ps > .05).
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Figure 16. Results o f Experiment 6: overall mean likelihood ratings over the seven 
object categories, plotted by preexposure condition. Error bars indicate the standard 
error.
3.2.4 Discussion
Participants in the Surprise exposure condition reported significantly lower 
likelihood ratings over the seven generalisation tests than participants in the Baseline 
condition. However, likelihood ratings reported by participants in the Surprise 
condition did not differ significantly from likelihood ratings reported by participants 
in conditions S y stran s  and Scram trans. Moreover, likelihood ratings reported by 
participants in the Baseline condition also did not differ significantly from those 
reported by participants in conditions Sys trans and Scram trans.
The results o f Experiment 6, therefore, are broadly consistent with the 
predictions o f a surprise-driven category invention mechanism operating in incidental
B aseline Surprise Sys_trans Scram_trans
Preexposure condition
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categorisation (Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004). This assumes that 
the within-category similarity structure (i.e., distributional properties) of the Surprise 
condition encouraged participants to recruit an extra category (cluster) in which to 
accommodate the lone distinct stimulus. That is, in the Surprise condition, it is 
assumed that stimulus A was incidentally classified into a different category to that of 
stimulus F. Consequently, the amount of property generalisation between these 
stimuli was reduced (Hamad, 1987). It is assumed that an additional category 
(cluster) was not recruited in the Baseline condition because the within-category 
similarity structure did not warrant such. Specifically, given that preexposure was 
only given to the object category endpoints, according to Clapper and Bower (1994, 
2002), this would not allow participants to establish a particular set of norms about 
one of these stimuli. Therefore, presentation of the second stimulus would not make 
for a sufficiently surprising stimulus event to warrant the creation of a new category 
(cluster) to accommodate that stimulus. Why did the likelihood ratings reported by 
participants in the Surprise condition not differ significantly from the likelihood 
ratings reported by participants in conditions Sys_trans and Scram_trans, however? 
As for the Baseline condition, neither conditions Sys_trans or Scram_trans should 
have brought about the formation of separate categories in which to separately 
accommodate the object category endpoints. One likely reason for this is due to a 
small influence of perceptual learning operating in condition Sys_trans and 
Scram_trans, which reduced the perceived similarity between the object category 
endpoints (i.e., stimuli A and F). Consequently, this reduction in similarity led to a 
concomitant decrease in the amount of property generalisation between stimuli A and 
F of each object category (see Pavlov, 1927; Shepard, 1987) in conditions Sys_trans 
and Scram_trans, relative to the Baseline condition.
Comparing the Baseline condition to condition Sys trans and Scram_trans, it 
is apparent that transformational knowledge did not enhance the level of property 
generalisation between the object category endpoints by increasing the similarity of 
these stimuli (A and F). Such an increase in stimulus similarity and property 
generalisation between stimuli A and F was expected based on the assumption that 
transformational knowledge encourages the perception that two different, but similar 
stimuli should be ‘classified together’ (see Zaki & Homa, 1999). Indeed, as noted 
above, it appears that there was a small influence of perceptual learning in conditions 
Sys trans and Scram_trans, leading to a slight numerical reduction in likelihood
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ratings for these conditions relative to the Baseline condition. Moreover, there is no 
evidence to suggest that systematic transformational knowledge (condition Sys_trans) 
influenced participants’ response behaviour differently to non-systematic 
transformation knowledge (condition Scram_trans; cf. Zaki & Homa, 1999). Equally, 
there is no evidence to suggest that stimuli in condition Sys_trans were perceived 
categorically (cf. Newell and Btilthoff, 2002). If this condition had encouraged 
categorical perception (Hamad, 1987), then ratings in this condition should have 
mirrored those reported in the Surprise condition. It is possible, of course, that in 
condition Sys_trans, the opposing influences of transformational knowledge and 
categorical perception may cancelled one another out. This situation would, 
therefore, have left participants in condition Sys_trans uncertain about the 
classificatory status of stimuli A and F in each object category, which would have 
mirrored the uncertainty felt by participants in the Baseline condition and condition 
Scram_trans.
One problem with concluding that the results of Experiment 6 were driven by 
a surprise-driven category invention mechanism, operating specifically on within- 
category similarity structure, is that the Surprise condition also had a distinct temporal 
structure. That is, while the three stimuli with the highest perceptual similarity were 
presented in a temporally contiguous manner, a temporal gap of six seconds separated 
presentation of the distinct stimulus from the highly similar stimuli. It is possible, 
therefore, that it was this temporal discontinuity, rather than the perceived perceptual 
discontinuity, that encouraged the formation of a new category (cluster) so as to 
accommodate the distinct stimulus separately from the highly similar stimuli. This, of 
course, would have led to the decrease in property generalisation found between 
stimuli A and F in the Surprise condition, relative to the other three conditions. As 
documented earlier, a number of authors have found that the temporal dynamics of 
stimulus preexposure can influence later stimulus generalisation (Bennett & 
Mackintosh, 1999; see also, Chantrey, 1972, 1974). To assess the influence of this 
temporal discontinuity in producing the results of Experiment 6, Experiment 7 was 
undertaken.
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3.3 Experiment 7
3.3.1 Introduction
The design of Experiment 7 is summarised in Table 2 below. Participants 
were allocated to one of two exposure conditions: the first condition was the Baseline 
condition of Experiment 6. The second condition (Surprise_2) was similar to the 
Surprise condition of Experiment 6, with the exception that the stimuli were now 
preexposed in an even temporally spaced manner. That is, a 2000 ms temporal delay 
separated presentation of each of the four stimuli. Consequently, if the temporal 
discontinuity contained within the Surprise condition of Experiment 6 was critical in 
producing the significant difference found in Experiment 6, then the likelihood ratings 
given in the Surprise_2 condition should not differ significantly from those given in 
the Baseline condition. If, however, the significant difference found in Experiment 6 
was the result of the perceived perceptual discontinuity contained within the Surprise 
condition, then participants in the Surprise_2 condition should still report significantly 
lower likelihood ratings than participants in the Baseline condition.
3.3.2 Method
3.3.2.1 Participants
Thirty-two Cardiff University students took part for a small payment of £2. 16 
participants were allocated to the Baseline condition and 16 participants were 
allocated to condition Surprise_2 (see Table 2).
Table 2. The two conditions employed to assess the influence o f within-category 
similarity structure on incidental stimulus classification in Experiment 7.
Condition Preexposure Conditioning Test
Baseline A / - / - / - / - / F A+ F
Surprise_2 A / B / C / F A+ F
Note. A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to renderings of the 1%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% 
and 100% images along a morph continuum. + denotes the application of a particular 
property to a stimulus.
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3.3.2.2 Stimuli, design and procedure
The stimuli employed were those used in Experiment 6. The design and 
procedure was also that used for Experiment 6, with the following exception: during 
the preexposure phase of the Surprise_2 condition, presentations of the morph stimuli 
were separated by a 2000 ms long fixation cross. This not only eliminated the 
temporal discontinuity present in the Surprise condition of Experiment 6, but it also 
maintained an equivalent temporal spacing between presentations of the object 
category endpoints across the two conditions.
3.3.3 Results
Figure 17 shows the results of interest: the overall mean likelihood ratings 
split by preexposure condition. Inspection of Figure 17 shows that, overall, 
participants in the Surprise_2 condition reported lower likelihood ratings than 
participants in the Baseline condition. Due to a violation of normality in the Baseline 
condition (Shapiro-Wilk test of normality, p  < .007), the nonparametric Mann- 
Whitney U test was conducted on the data. This test revealed that overall likelihood 
ratings given in the Surprise_2 condition were significantly lower than those given in 
the Baseline condition, 1/(16, 16) = 56.50, p <  .008, r = .4910.
ANOVA also confirmed this difference to be significant, F( 1, 30) = 6.14, p  < .02.
123
5f
Baseline Surprise_2
Preexposure condition
Figure 17. Results o f Experiment 7: overall mean likelihood ratings over the seven 
object categories, plotted by preexposure condition. For purposes o f consistency, 
mean ratings rather than median ratings are presented. Error bars indicate the 
standard error.
3.3.4 Discussion
The results o f Experiment 7 confirm those o f Experiment 6. That is, 
participants in condition Surprise_2 reported lower likelihood ratings over the seven 
object categories relative to participants in the Baseline condition. Consequently, the 
current results provide no evidence to support the claim that it was the temporal 
discontinuity present during stimulus preexposure in the Surprise condition of 
Experiment 6 that was influential in producing the significant difference between the 
Baseline and Surprise conditions o f that experiment. Indeed, the effect size observed 
in the present experiment was actually numerically greater than that observed for the 
significant post hoc contrast between the Baseline condition and the Surprise 
condition in Experiment 6.
Taken collectively, I would argue that the results o f Experiments 6 and 7 
support the predictions o f a surprise-driven category invention mechanism in 
incidental categorisation, which operates on within-category similarity structure
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(Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004). That is, only the within-category 
similarity structure of the Surprise and Surprise_2 conditions encouraged participants 
to create a new category (cluster) so as to separately accommodate stimuli A and F of 
the object categories. Due to this ‘classification apart’ in the Surprise and Surprise_2 
conditions, stimuli A and F were perceived as less similar to each other, resulting in a 
concomitant decrease in the amount of property generalisation between these stimuli, 
relative to the Baseline condition.
Although the findings of Experiment 7 suggest that the temporal dynamics of 
stimulus preexposure in Experiment 6 were not critical in producing the reported 
results, more generally it is an interesting question whether the perceived similarity of 
the morph stimuli employed here is influenced by the temporal contiguity of stimulus 
preexposure. As documented earlier, the effective similarity of stimuli is influenced 
by the temporal dynamics of stimulus preexposure: while under certain conditions 
increased temporal contiguity between stimulus presentations can lead to enhanced 
perceptual learning -  as in the case of the intermixed versus blocked effect, for 
example -  under different conditions, increased temporal contiguity between stimulus 
presentations can encourage sensory preconditioning (see Bennett & Mackintosh, 
1999; Honey & Bateson, 1996). Specifically, Hall (1991, p. 235; see also McLaren & 
Mackintosh, 2000) has argued that sequential stimulus exposure that occurs at very 
high temporal contiguity should be most likely to lead to stimuli becoming 
associatively linked (or ‘classified together’; see Bateson & Chantrey, 1972). As a 
consequence of this, the effective similarity of stimuli should increase when stimuli 
are sequentially presented at high temporal contiguity, relative to some baseline. The 
majority of evidence for this, however, is from studies that have employed rather 
simple stimuli. Therefore, I was keen to assess whether the temporal contiguity of 
stimulus exposure would influence the perceived similarity of the complex, 
naturalistic stimuli employed in Experiments 6 and 7 of this chapter. In the following 
section (Section 3.4.1) I explore more fully why temporal contiguity should, under 
certain conditions, increase stimulus similarity.
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3.4 Experiment 8
3.4.1 Introduction
Why should temporally contiguous, sequential stimulus exposure increase the 
perceived similarity between the object category endpoints (A and F) of the 
previously employed stimuli? One possibility is that presenting stimulus F 
immediately after stimulus A, for example, will permit the formation of an association 
between these stimuli. This A -  F association means that the presentation of stimulus 
A will evoke a representation of stimulus F, causing these stimuli to be perceived 
equivalently, and therefore increasing their effective similarity (Hall, 1991; see also, 
Honey & Bateson, 1996). This position is similar in kind to the proposal of Bateson 
and Chantrey (1972; see also Chantrey, 1974), in which they suggested that two 
stimuli presented in close temporal contiguity in the same context will be ‘classified 
together’. In contrast, stimuli that are not presented in close temporal contiguity will 
be ‘classified apart’. One way of conceptualising this ‘classification together’ is in 
terms of the formation of a blended representation of stimulus A and stimulus F. That 
is, when stimulus A and stimulus F are presented in close temporal contiguity, this 
may establish the representation AF (Hall, 1991; see also, Pearce, 1987). 
Consequently, whenever stimulus A and stimulus F are attended to, these stimuli will 
evoke the blended representation AF, increasing their perceived similarity to each 
other.
Interestingly, the predictions made above do not follow from the theorising 
of Gibson (1969). Rather, she suggested that increasing the temporal contiguity of 
stimulus preexposure should result in stimuli becoming less similar. This is because 
being able to compare stimuli closer together in time will be particularly effective in 
encouraging a process of stimulus differentiation, in which attention is drawn to the 
unique features of the stimuli and away from their common features. Indeed, Gibson 
and Walk (1956) found that prolonged simultaneous stimulus exposure does result in 
better discrimination learning at a later time than no stimulus exposure. Recently, 
Mundy et al. (2007, 2009) have shown that simultaneous stimulus preexposure does 
lead to better discrimination learning than sequential stimulus preexposure. However, 
this facilitation effect from simultaneous preexposure appears to be sensitive to the 
similarity of the stimuli being exposed. That is, while highly similar stimuli have 
been shown to become more discriminable following simultaneous preexposure,
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Mundy et al. (2007) found no such effect for highly discriminable stimuli. This result 
is consistent with the idea that stimulus exposure engages both comparator and 
associative processes, and that under certain circumstances, it is simply a question of 
which, if any, process wins out (see Honey & Bateson, 1996; Honey et al., 1994).
When considering the morph stimuli used in the previous experiments, it 
therefore seems reasonable to suppose the following: given that stimuli A and F of 
each object category are readily discriminable from the outset, temporally contiguous 
exposure to just these stimuli should result in the formation of an excitatory 
association between them; in other words, they should become ‘classified together’. 
In contrast, when a temporal delay is introduced between exposure to stimuli A and F, 
the formation of an excitatory association between these stimuli is far less likely (or, 
at least, any excitatory association will form more weakly). Furthermore, when 
stimulus exposure is temporally contiguous overall, but there is a delay between 
exposure to stimuli A and F, due to the introduction of transformational knowledge, 
both associative and comparative processes will likely be active. That is, while 
excitatory associations should form between each contiguously presented pair of 
stimuli (e.g., between stimulus A and stimulus B, and, between stimulus B and 
stimulus C, and so on...), the fact that each presented stimulus is not readily 
discriminable from its neighbours means that a comparison process, or stimulus 
differentiation, should also be encouraged. If the influence of these two processes is 
relatively balanced, then the similarity of stimuli A and F may remain relatively 
unchanged. The upshot of all this is that one would predict that the perceived 
similarity of stimuli A and F should be greater following highly contiguous exposure 
to these two stimuli, relative to stimulus exposure that incorporates a delay between 
the presentation of stimulus A and stimulus F. Of particular interest is the comparison 
between highly contiguous stimulus exposure and stimulus exposure that incorporates 
transformational knowledge. If the prior prediction were supported, this would be 
contradictory to the proposal of Zaki and Homa (1999). To recapitulate, they 
suggested that transformational knowledge should encourage the classification of two 
distinct stimuli into the same category, which should increase stimulus similarity 
(Hamad, 1987).
Experiment 8, therefore, sought to assess whether the three conditions of 
stimulus exposure outlined in the previous paragraph differentially affected the 
perceived similarity between the previously employed object category endpoints (i.e.,
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stimuli A and F). To this end, participants were allocated to one of three preexposure 
conditions, detailed in Table 3. Specifically, participants in the Baseline condition 
received preexposure to the stimuli in the same manner as participants in the Baseline 
condition of Experiments 6 and 7. Participants in condition Sys_trans received 
stimulus preexposure in the same manner as participants in condition Sys_trans of 
Experiment 6. In the newly introduced Contiguous condition, participants received 
preexposure only to stimuli A and F of the object categories (as for participants in the 
Baseline condition), but in this condition, presentation of the second stimulus (e.g., F) 
followed immediately after presentation of the first stimulus (e.g., A). Following 
stimulus preexposure, participants were simply asked to rate how similar stimulus F 
was to stimulus A (or vice versa) on scale from 1 (very dissimilar) to 9 (very similar).
3.4.2 Method
3.4.2.1 Participants
Forty-eight Cardiff University students took part either for course credit or a 
small payment of £2. 16 participants were allocated to each condition (see Table 3).
Table 3. The three conditions employed to assess incidental stimulus classification in 
Experiment 8.
Condition Preexposure Test
Baseline A / - / - / - / - / F A-F
Sys_trans A / B / C / D / E / F A-F
Contiguous A /F A-F
Note. A, B, C, D, E and F correspond to renderings of the 1%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80% 
and 100% images along a morph continuum. + denotes the application of a particular 
property to a stimulus.
3.4.2.2 Stimuli, design and procedure
The same stimuli and design employed in Experiments 6 and 7 were used. 
Participants in the Baseline and Sys_trans conditions received stimulus preexposure 
that was identical to the Baseline and Sys_trans conditions in Experiment 6.
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Participants in the Contiguous condition received preexposure to the object category 
endpoints (stimuli A and F) in a temporally contiguous fashion. That is, presentation 
of the second stimulus (e.g., F) followed immediately after presentation of the first 
stimulus (e.g., A). As for Experiments 6 and 7, all stimuli were presented for 3000 
ms during preexposure. In each of the three exposure conditions, half of participants 
received stimulus preexposure in the order A to F, and half of participants received 
stimulus preexposure in the order F to A. Following stimulus preexposure, a 1000 ms 
inter-stimulus interval (blank screen) separated presentation of the test screen, on 
which was presented stimulus A and stimulus F. Within the subconditions created in 
each exposure condition following the previous counterbalancing operation, half of 
participants saw stimulus A surrounded by a red border on the test screen, and half of 
participants saw stimulus F surrounded by a red border on the test screen. Within 
each of the subconditions created by the previous counterbalancing operations, half of 
participants received presentations of stimulus A on the left-hand side of the test 
screen and presentations of stimulus F on the right-hand side of the test screen, and 
half of participants received the reverse. On the test screen, participants were simply 
asked to rate how similar they thought the object framed in red was to the object not 
framed in red, using a 1 (very dissimilar) to 9 (very similar) rating scale presented at 
the bottom of the test screen. Participant responses were made using the keys “1” 
through “9” on the top of a standard keyboard. Following a response, a 1000 ms 
inter-trial interval (blank screen) separated participants’ exposure to the next object 
category. Exposure to the seven object categories was again random for all 
participants in each of the three exposure conditions employed here.
3.4.3 Results
Figure 18 displays the results of interest: participants’ overall mean similarity 
rating over the seven object categories, split by preexposure condition. As predicted, 
overall similarity ratings were higher in the Contiguous condition than in the Baseline 
and Sys trans conditions. Overall similarity ratings in the Baseline condition differed 
little from those in the Sys_trans condition. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there 
was a significant effect of exposure condition, F( 2, 45) = ! 3 \ , p  < .003. Tukey HSD 
post-hoc tests revealed that, overall, participants in the Contiguous condition reported 
significantly higher ratings of similarity than participants in the Baseline condition (p
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< .05) and Sys trans condition (p < .002). Overall similarity ratings did not differ 
significantly between the Baseline and Sys trans conditions (p > .05).
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Figure 18. Results o f Experiment 8: overall mean similarity ratings over the seven 
object categories, plotted by preexposure condition. Error bars indicate the standard 
error.
3.4.4 Discussion
In agreement with the proposal o f Hall (1991, p. 235), the perceived similarity 
of stimuli A and F was rated highest in the Contiguous exposure condition. Of 
particular interest is the finding that ratings o f similarity in the Contiguous condition 
were significantly higher than those in the Sys trans condition. With respect to this 
contrast at least, the presumed transformational knowledge in condition Sys trans 
actually had a negative influence on the perceived similarity of stimuli A and F. As in 
Experiment 6, the Sys trans condition did not differ from the Baseline condition, 
demonstrating that under conditions o f brief stimulus exposure, transformational 
knowledge does nothing to increase the perceived similarity of two different, but 
similar stimuli. To reiterate, these latter findings contrast with the arguments o f Zaki 
and Homa (1999), who proposed that transformational knowledge should encourage
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two different, but similar stimuli to be classified into the same category; a process that 
should increase perceived stimulus similarity (Hamad, 1987). The results of 
Experiment 8 also do not support the predictions of Gibson (1969). To recapitulate, 
she argued that increasing the temporal contiguity between preexposure to different 
stimuli should result in greater perceptual learning, and therefore, a decrease in 
perceived stimulus similarity. Unfortunately the present results do not allow us to 
know whether the higher similarity ratings reported by participants in the Contiguous 
condition were the result of the formation of an excitatory association between stimuli 
A and F (Hall, 1991; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000), or due to stimuli A and F being 
‘classified together’ (Bateson & Chantrey, 1972; Chantrey, 1974). I leave it to future 
research to unpick this distinction.
3.5 General Discussion
The three experiments reported above provide a fast and effective way of 
assessing the influence of within-category similarity structure (i.e., the distributional 
properties of the stimuli) on people’s spontaneous classification behaviour. Indeed, 
one particularly notable feature of the designs of Experiments 6 -  8 is that participants 
only received a single presentation of each scheduled stimulus during preexposure. 
Two main findings were evident from Experiments 6 and 7: First, transformational 
knowledge did not increase the amount of property generalisation between the 
endpoints of the object categories (i.e., A and F). Second, when there was structural 
discontinuity that could be perceived within the preexposed stimulus set, this 
surprising event led to a reduction in the amount of property generalisation between - 
stimuli A and F. The latter result supports the assumption that a surprise-driven 
category invention mechanism operates within human spontaneous categorisation, 
and that participants in the Surprise condition likely came to classify stimuli A and F 
into different categories/ clusters (see Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 
2004; also, Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008). Such ‘classification apart’ would have 
resulted in a decrease in the perceived similarity of stimuli A and F, and as such, a 
concomitant reduction in the amount of generalisation between these stimuli (Hamad, 
1987). These findings support work by Grand, Close, Hale and Honey (2007), which 
has shown that stimulus similarity commands an important influence over the amount 
of associative transfer between two stimuli. For example, in one experiment, Grand et 
al. (2007) showed that one observes better associative transfer of a conditioned
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response between two stimuli when the stimuli are similar (e.g., AX and BX), 
compared to when they are dissimilar (e.g., CX and DY). Importantly, the pattern of 
results of Experiment 6 shows that stimulus generalisation was not simply determined 
by the amount of stimulus exposure. Experiment 8 compared the rated similarity of 
stimuli A and F following either preexposure only to stimuli A and F or to stimuli A, 
B, C, D, E and F as a systematic transformation. When the temporal delay between 
presentation of stimuli A and F was equated between conditions, no difference in 
rated similarity was observed. However, when stimuli A and F were presented 
contiguously, participants rated the similarity of these stimuli more highly than 
participants that received preexposure to stimuli A and F in a non-contiguous fashion, 
regardless of whether transformational knowledge was present or not.
In conclusion, Experiments 6 and 7 build on the work of Chapter 2 in further 
demonstrating that, in humans, the similarity structure of a set of stimuli influences 
their spontaneous classification. That is, perceived discontinuities in the environment 
appear to help guide people’s identification of category structure (Anderson, 1991; 
Malt, 1995; Rosch & Mervis, 1975); of course, other factors are clearly influential in 
determining this process too (e.g., temporal contiguity, see Experiment 8, and general 
knowledge, see Heit, 1997; Murphy, 2002). This conclusion is mirrored in a cross- 
cultural review of natural and artefactual categorisation carried out by Malt, in which 
she concluded that “there is structure in the environment that is perceived in a 
universal fashion by human categorizers” (1995, p. 128). While Malt (1995) 
specifically makes her conclusions with respect to human categorisation, the term 
universal is an evocative one: if structure in the environment is indeed perceived in a 
consistent manner across many different cultures by humans, then it seems plausible 
to suppose that other, nonhuman animal species may also be sensitive to this same 
structure. It is possible, therefore, that any tendency for spontaneous categorisation in 
nonhuman animals may be driven by similar principles as for human spontaneous 
categorisation. Malt (1995) notes, of course, that human categorisation must result 
from an interaction between the environment and the classifier, concluding that 
structure alone is not sufficient to determine categorisation. Consequently, it is 
equally plausible that any tendency for spontaneous categorisation in nonhuman 
animals may be qualitatively different from that of human spontaneous categorisation.
One of the particularly nice features about the experimental design of 
Experiments 6 and 7 is that it can be readily transposed and applied to an assessment
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of incidental categorisation in nonhuman animals. The assessment of incidental 
categorisation in nonhuman animals is, I believe, a particularly interesting question. 
First, it is still an open question whether nonhuman animals engage in any meaningful 
form of spontaneous categorisation at all. Second, if nonhuman animals do engage in 
incidental categorisation, is this determined by the same mechanisms that guide 
human incidental categorisation (i.e., a surprise-driven category invention 
mechanism)? The incidental categorisation procedure introduced in Experiment 6 
provides one possible direct test of these important questions. If nonhuman animals 
do engage in incidental categorisation in a manner that is consistent with the human 
results of Experiment 6, then this would suggest a common ancestry in the 
development of our spontaneous categorisation abilities, determined by the perceived 
structural properties within the environment. Consequently, the role of the classifier 
is somewhat downplayed. If, however, no evidence for incidental categorisation is 
found in the incidental classification task, then this would suggest a more primary role 
for the classifier. In the remaining half of this chapter, therefore, I sought to 
investigate incidental categorisation in one nonhuman animal species; namely, the rat. 
To reiterate, the aims of these experiments were to i) assess whether rats engage in 
incidental (spontaneous) categorisation, and ii) if they do, to determine whether this 
incidental categorisation occurs in a manner that is consistent with the human results 
of Experiment 6 (i.e., guided by a surprise-driven category invention mechanism).
Before presenting these experiments in rats, however, I will first briefly review 
the state of nonhuman animal categorisation research. Moreover, I will also review 
some of the factors that may influence whether nonhuman animals come to ‘classify 
together’ or ‘classify apart’ a set of stimuli. As will be shown, these factors are not 
dissimilar to the factors that may have influenced incidental categorisation in humans, 
which were identified earlier.
3.6 Categorisation in nonhuman animals
In his review of nonhuman categorisation, Hermstein (1990, p. 138) states that 
categorisation has “turned up at every level of the animal kingdom where it has been 
competently sought”. Indeed, under supervised task conditions, nonhuman animals 
are able to learn complex discriminations that resemble human categorisation. For 
example, Hermstein et al. (1976) showed that pigeons were able to leam a complex 
discrimination between different scenes presented on photographic slides; half of
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these scenes contained pictures of trees (which were not particularly prominent), and 
half did not. Slides were presented sequentially, and only those scenes that contained 
pictures of trees were rewarded with food following a peck at a response key. More 
than 500 different scenes made up the pool from which the slides could be selected. 
While the large number of different slides used makes it unlikely that pigeons simply 
remembered each slide and its associated outcome separately (but, see Vaughan & 
Greene, 1984), this possibility was ruled out in a further test of generalisation. 
Specifically, pigeons were shown to respond correctly to novel photographic slides 
containing either trees or no trees.
Similarly, Cerella (1979) showed that pigeons could leam a complex 
discrimination between different leaf types. Using 80 slides of different kinds of 
leaves, pigeons came to correctly respond in the presence of silhouetted oak leaves, 
but not in the presence of silhouetted non-oak leaves. Critically, this behaviour was 
also shown to generalise to novel silhouetted oak leaves. This proficiency for 
learning complex discriminations has been documented in many different animal 
species using both natural and artificial stimuli (e.g., Marsh & MacDonald, 2008; 
Mercado III, Orduna, & Nowak, 2005; Morgan, Fitch, Holman, & Lea, 1976; Schrier, 
Angarella, & Povar, 1984; Schrier & Brady, 1987; Vogels, 1999; Vonk & 
MacDonald, 2002, 2004). Porter and Neuringer (1984) have further shown that 
pigeon’s highly adept ability to leam certain discriminations is not confined to the 
visual domain. They showed that pigeons were able to leam an auditory 
discrimination between compositions by J.S. Bach and Stravinsky. There is also 
some evidence for discrimination learning based on the more abstract, relational 
notion of ‘sameness’: following discrimination learning between a set of stimuli
based on the human concept ‘same-different’, pigeons, corvids, rhesus monkeys, 
baboons and chimpanzees have all shown successful transfer of same-different 
learning to novel stimuli (e.g. Young & Wasserman, 1997; Wilson, Mackintosh, & 
Boakes, 1985; Mishkin, Prockop, & Rosvold, 1962; Fagot, Wasserman, & Young, 
2001; Oden, Thompson, & Premack, 1988; respectively). However, these studies 
have also shown that the manner in which nonhuman animals respond to same- 
different discriminations is somewhat different to the way humans respond to same- 
different discriminations. For example, whereas pigeons have been found to respond 
in a manner that is continuous in nature (e.g., Young & Wasserman, 1997; but see 
Premack, 1983; Thompson, Oden, & Boysen, 1997) -  that is, they respond
134
proportionally to intermediate arrays that contain some same and some different items 
-  humans have been found to respond categorically; responding, for the most part, 
“different” to the intermediate arrays (Young & Wasserman, 2001).
In summary, the above research has provided compelling evidence that 
nonhuman animals can come to treat an experimentally defined set of stimuli in the 
same way. However, it remains unclear from these studies whether nonhuman 
animals engage in meaningful stimulus grouping (i.e., categorization). Rather, the 
fact that nonhuman animals come to treat a set of stimuli in the same way may simply 
reflect the fact that each of the stimuli, which form an experimentally derived 
category, has been individually associated with the same outcome. Indeed, Chater 
and Heyes argue that “Experiments suggesting that animals can form ‘equivalence 
classes’ may be mistakenly interpreted as evidence that, contrary to the predictions of 
standard stimulus generalisation models, animals’ stored representations of category 
members do have something in common beyond the fact that each is independently 
associated with a common response or trial outcome” (1994, p. 216). However, not 
all experiments appear mistaken in this regard.
Honey and Watt (1998, 1999) had rats engage in a biconditional 
discrimination task involving two cues (X and Y) and four contexts (A, B, C and D). 
Presentations of AX and BX (but not CX and DX) signalled the delivery of food, and 
presentation of CY and DY (but not AY and BY) signalled the delivery of food. 
Critically, this arrangement meant that each context was paired equally often with the 
two cues, and with food and the absence of food (that is, everything was equal). 
Following discrimination training, context A was paired with shock, and context C 
was not. Honey and Watt (1998, 1999) found that rats showed greater generalisation 
of the fear response (produced by the shock) to context B than to context D. That is, 
discrimination training altered the effective similarity of the context stimuli, such that 
contexts A and B were perceived as more similar than contexts A and D, and contexts 
C and D were perceived as more similar than contexts B and C. This result is not 
predicted by prominent configural accounts of learning (e.g., Pearce, 1987, 1994), 
which would assume that contexts A, B, C and D would share an equivalent amount 
of similarity following the given discrimination training. One interpretation of these 
findings has therefore assumed a form of stimulus grouping: when similar
compounds (e.g., AX and BX) are followed by the same outcome (e.g., food), their 
components (i.e., a, b and x) come to address a shared configural unit within a
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connectionist network, and when similar compounds (e.g., AX and DX) are followed 
by different outcomes, their components (i.e., a, d and x) come to address different 
configural units (see Allman, Ward-Robinson, & Honey, 2004; Honey & Ward- 
Robinson, 2002). As in humans (see Hamad, 1987), stimulus grouping appears to 
alter the effective similarity of stimuli in nonhuman animals, such that stimuli that 
have been grouped together become more similar, and stimuli that have been grouped 
apart become less similar. Honey and Watt’s (1998, 1999) results are important, 
therefore, as this change in the effective similarity of stimuli following stimulus 
grouping (classification) formed the basic premise for Experiments 6 and 7.
So, supervised training can elicit both complex discriminatory behaviour and 
stimulus grouping in nonhuman animals. However, one rather important question still 
remains: do nonhuman animals engage in such stimulus grouping spontaneously? 
That is, does a pigeon really spontaneously group together different kinds of trees into 
some unitary category that is distinct from other environmental stimuli? While it is 
clear that animals are sensitive to the statistical properties of a supervised learning 
task, are they implicitly sensitive to these regularities and the structure of their 
environment? Of course, we know already that mere exposure to stimuli can 
influence the way in which both humans and nonhuman animals later perceive these 
stimuli (Hall, 1991). However, perceptual learning experiments have typically not 
been focused towards an understanding of nonhuman animals’ implicit sensitivity to 
category structure (i.e., the distributional properties of the stimuli that they are 
exposed to). Consequently, this has limited our understanding of spontaneous 
categorisation in nonhuman animals. There are, however, a number of studies that at 
least suggest that nonhuman animals are sensitive to the distributional properties of a 
set of stimuli, and to stimulus structure.
3.6.1 Transformational information in chicks
A number of situations exist throughout the animal kingdom that may require 
similar stimuli to be spontaneously classified into the same category. For example, a 
young chick will obviously view its mother from many different viewpoints and 
through seasonal changes, and yet it must be able to appreciate that all these snapshot 
images signify its mother. The mother hen faces an even more challenging problem; 
Ryan and Lea (1990) have shown that mother hens recognise their offspring, and they 
must continue to do so throughout the chick’s marked maturational development. Of
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course, family unity can be maintained in a number of ways, which most likely 
include using auditory and olfactory references (although vocal changes are also 
associated with chick maturation; Ryan & Lea, 1990). However, Ryan (1982) has 
shown that chickens are readily able to leam a purely visual discrimination between 
two object birds, and that this discrimination learning is unaffected by the age of the 
object birds. She further found that, after being trained to discriminate between the 
two object birds at a specific age (e.g., 2 days old), chickens showed some ability to 
generalise their learning to a discrimination that involved the same object birds but at 
a different age (e.g., up to 43 days old). Based on a series of experiments, and given 
the marked maturational changes development of the chick, Ryan and Lea concluded 
that “generalization per se would not be sufficient to allow continued recognition 
from hatching to independence” (1990, p. 98). What is required, they argue, is a 
process of representational updating, which would compliment the principles of 
stimulus generalisation.
The process of representational updating could proceed in one of two ways: it 
could be that the mother hen engages in a process whereby she periodically updates 
her old representations of each of her offspring by simply overwriting these with new 
ones. Equally, it is possible that the mother hen might incorporate the maturational 
changes that her offspring go through into her original representations of each chick. 
That is, rather than simply replacing a sibling’s representation with a more up-to-date 
version, the mother hen may gradually enlarge her category of “offspring”. Ryan and 
Lea (1990) sought to test between these accounts by using an imprinting procedure in 
chicks, rather than focusing on the mother hen. Imprinting refers to the phenomenon 
that chicks are predisposed to move towards and follow the first salient object that 
they view following birth (normally their mother). In Ryan and Lea’s (1990) 
experiment, 121 chicks were initially imprinted on a string of four table tennis balls 
(e.g., AAAA), and were then housed in visual isolation, away from other chicks. 
Chicks in the experimental condition were then subjected to a gradual change in the 
colour of the string of balls (either from white to brown or vice versa) by replacing the 
four balls, one at a time, for balls of the opposite colour. One ball was replaced for 
the opposite colour every four days. Three control groups were used for comparison. 
The first group consisted of birds that were simply exposed to the imprinted string of 
balls (i.e., AAAA) over the whole 21 days of the experiment. The second group of 
birds experienced an abrupt change in stimulus form; that is, chicks were exposed to
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the imprinted string of balls (i.e., AAAA) for the first 17 days, and then they were 
exposed to a string of balls of the opposite colour (e.g., BBBB) for the remaining 4 
days of the experiment. The third group of birds were only exposed to the imprinted 
string of balls (i.e., AAAA) for the first four days of the experiment, at which point 
the balls were removed and not replaced. Subsequently, a preference test was 
undertaken using a Y-maze: chicks could choose to move towards either the
originally imprinted coloured string of balls (i.e., AAAA), or towards the string of 
balls of the opposite colour (i.e., BBBB). Ryan and Lea (1990) found that while birds 
in the control groups showed a preference to move towards the originally imprinted 
string of balls (i.e., AAAA), those birds in the experimental group did not show any 
choice preference. Of particular interest is the comparison between the experimental 
group and the control birds that experienced the abrupt change of ball colour at 17 
days. As Ryan and Lea (1990) state, if chicks engaged in complete, successive 
replacement of old representations with new ones, then the chicks that experienced 
this abrupt change should have shown a preference for the coloured string of balls 
presented over the final four days, and not for the originally imprinted string of balls. 
To reiterate, however, chicks that experienced the abrupt change in stimulus form 
showed a choice preference for the originally imprinted string of balls (i.e., AAAA).
These results, therefore, provide some evidence to support the claim that 
chicks engage in a process of representational updating, which is afforded by the 
introduction of transformational information. That is, the intermediate, 
transformational steps present only in the experimental condition encouraged chicks 
to expand their initial representation of the imprinted stimulus to include all 
subsequent changes in its form; or to put this another way, chicks in the experimental 
condition appear to have spontaneously ‘classified together’ the various stimulus 
forms into the same category. It seems, therefore, that transformational information 
can influence both human (e.g., Zaki & Homa, 1999) and nonhuman animal 
classification behaviour. This experiment also highlights the importance of stimulus 
similarity in the process of representational updating. Based on chicks’ behaviour in 
the abrupt change condition of Ryan and Lea’s (1990) study, it is apparent that a 
novel stimulus will only be incorporated into the originally imprinted stimulus 
representation if it shares some degree of similarity (here in terms of feature overlap) 
with the imprinted stimulus.
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3.6.2 Abstract similarity structure
Other research that has assessed whether nonhuman animals engage in 
spontaneous categorisation has been conducted in nonhuman primates. One notable 
reason for this is because other primate species are able to manipulate objects in the 
same manner as human children. Therefore, the pre-linguistic tasks that have been 
developed to investigate spontaneous categorisation in infants (most commonly the 
sequential touching procedure) can be readily translated for use with nonhuman 
primates. In a review of spontaneous categorisation in chimpanzees and monkeys, 
Spinozzi has concluded that “the ability to classify objects according to perceptual 
rules of similarity occurs spontaneously in language-trained chimpanzees” (1996, p. 
21). For example, Premack (1976) report that with little or no guidance, two 
language-trained chimpanzees spontaneously classified novel objects into two 
containers based either on the object’s form or colour: when presented with red and 
yellow triangles and squares, for example, one chimpanzee was found to shift 
between an initial partitioning on colour, to a partitioning on form, and so on. 
Intriguingly, the second chimpanzee partitioned these stimuli only on form (i.e., 
grouping triangles together and squares together). Other research in non-language 
trained chimpanzees and monkeys, which has mostly employed the sequential 
touching procedure, has found that chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys (and to a 
lesser degree macaque monkeys) manipulate objects drawn from two different classes 
in a consistent, sequential manner. For example, when given yellow, blue and red 
sticks, and yellow, blue and red rings, these animals have been found to manipulate 
and group together all the stick objects first, followed by all the ring objects second 
(Spinozzi, 1993; Spinozzi & Natale, 1989; Spinozzi et al., 1999). What these studies 
suggest, therefore, is that chimpanzees and some monkey species appear to 
spontaneously appreciate the similarity structure of their environmental stimuli (i.e., 
the similarities and differences among the stimuli), and that they use this structure to 
guide their behaviour towards these stimuli.
3.6.3 Conclusions
In summary, nonhuman animals, like humans, can engage in complex 
discrimination behaviour when guided by supervised training. What is more, this 
supervised training can bring about a change in the effective similarity of stimuli, 
such that stimuli that are paired with the same outcome come to acquire equivalence,
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and stimuli that are paired with different outcomes come to acquire distinctiveness 
(Honey & Watt, 1998, 1999; see also, Honey & Hall, 1989). One interpretation of 
this change in stimulus similarity assumes that it is based on a form of stimulus 
grouping, or classification (see Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002). While it is clear that 
mere exposure can alter stimulus similarity (Hall, 1991; McLaren & Mackintosh, 
2000), and specifically that temporally contiguous preexposure to two stimuli can 
increase stimulus similarity (e.g., Bateson & Chantrey, 1972), it is not clear, to my 
mind anyway, that nonhuman animals really do engage in meaningful spontaneous 
categorisation. Furthermore, whether or not nonhuman animals are sensitive to the 
category structure contained within a set of stimuli is still a somewhat open question. 
Yes, the work by Ryan and Lea (1990) and, for example, Spinozzi (see Spinozzi, 
1996) is suggestive of the fact that nonhuman animals, like humans, are sensitive to 
stimulus structure. What is more, this work suggests that this structure is likely to be 
influential in guiding any spontaneous classification behaviour. However, further 
research on spontaneous categorisation in nonhuman animals is clearly required in 
order to establish whether it obeys the same principles as for humans.
Investigating spontaneous categorisation in nonhuman animals is difficult, as 
categorisation can often only be indirectly confirmed from measuring stimulus 
generalisation and discrimination performance. However, the experimental design 
described in Experiment 6 can be readily applied to the study of incidental 
categorisation in many different animal species. In the second half of this chapter, 
therefore, I sought to assess incidental categorisation in the rat using the experimental 
design (and the associated assumptions) detailed in Experiment 6. In particular, I was 
interested in contrasting the results from rats with the results from humans. So, do 
rats, like humans, utilise a ‘surprise-driven’ category invention mechanism in 
incidental categorisation, or will other factors, such as transformational information 
and perceptual learning, dominate?
3.7 Experiment 9
3.7.1 Introduction
To investigate the questions posed above, rats were allocated to one of four 
exposure conditions, where they received preexposure over a number of days to a set 
of four tone stimuli of 1 kHz, 2 kHz, 3 kHz and 4 kHz (henceforth labelled A, B, C
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and D, respectively). Specifically, rats allocated to the Baseline condition were 
preexposed only to the endpoints of the tone continuum (i.e., to stimulus A and 
stimulus D). Rats allocated to the Surprise condition were preexposed to the 
endpoints of the tone continuum, plus one of the intermediate stimuli (i.e., either 
stimuli A, B and D, or, stimuli A, C and D). Rats allocated to the final two conditions 
were preexposed to all four tone stimuli. However, while rats in condition Sys_trans 
were preexposed to the four stimuli in a systematic order (e.g., A, B, C and D), rats in 
condition Scramjxans were preexposed to the four stimuli in a fixed scrambled order 
(e.g., A, C, B and D). Following stimulus preexposure, an appetitive response was 
conditioned either to stimulus A or stimulus D. Subsequently, rats received a 
generalisation test. If rats had received appetitive conditioning to stimulus A, then at 
test, rats received test presentations of stimulus D, and vice versa. To assess the 
extent of generalisation, the number of magazine entries made during presentations of 
the test stimulus was recorded.
As for Experiments 6 and 7, it was assumed that, relative to a baseline, the 
spontaneous classification of stimuli into the same category would increase later 
generalisation between the test stimuli, whereas the spontaneous classification of 
stimuli into different categories would decrease later generalisation between the test 
stimuli. If rats are sensitive to transformational information through a process of 
representational updating, then it was expected that rats in condition Sys_trans should 
show an increased level of generalisation between stimulus A and stimulus D, and 
therefore show a greater level of responding to the test stimulus, relative to rats in the 
other three conditions. In contrast, if rats came to perceive the four tone stimuli as 
members of different categories (through the process of categorical perception), then 
one would expect rats in condition Sys_trans to show a decreased level of 
generalisation between stimulus A and stimulus D, and therefore show a reduced level 
of responding to the test stimulus, relative to rats in the other three conditions. If 
preexposure to the tone stimuli resulted in perceptual learning, then it was expected 
that rats in both condition Sys_trans and Scram_trans would show a reduced level of 
generalisation between stimulus A and stimulus D compared to rats in the Baseline 
condition and the Surprise condition. However, if rats are sensitive to abstract 
stimulus structure in the way that humans are, then based on the predictions of a 
surprise-driven category invention mechanism (Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love
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et al., 2004), rats in the Surprise condition should show less generalisation between 
stimulus A and stimulus D, relative to the other three conditions.
3.7.2 Method
3.7.2.1 Subjects
Thirty-two experimentally naive male Lister hooded rats (Rattus norvegicus) 
obtained from OLAC, Bicester, UK were maintained at 80% of their free feeding 
weights (mean: 395.6g; range: 363g-422g) by giving them a restricted quantity of 
food (Teklad laboratory diet, Harlan Teklad, Bicetser, Oxfordshire, UK) at the end of 
each day. All rats were housed in pairs in a colony room that was illuminated 
between 8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Each housing cage contained a single cardboard 
tube (18.0 cm length x 10.0 cm diameter) throughout the course of the experiment. 
Eight rats served as subjects in each of the four conditions (see Table 4 for an 
overview of the experimental design).
Table 4. Experimental design o f Experiment 9.
Condition Preexposure Magazine Training Conditioning Test
1st Four Days 2nd Four Days Two Days Three Days Two Days
Baseline A / - / - / D D / - / - / A + A+ D
Surprise A / B / - / D D / - / B / A + A+ D
Sys_trans A / B / C / D D / C / B / A + A+ D
Scram trans A / C / B / D D / B / C / A + A+ D
Note. A, B, C and D represent four separate tone stimuli of 1 kHz, 2 kHz, 3 kHz and 
4 kHz, respectively. + denotes the delivery of a single food pellet.
3.7.2.2 Apparatus
Four standard operant chambers (23.0 cm length * 24.5 cm width x 21.0 cm 
height; Campden Instruments Ltd., Loughborough, England) housed in sound- and 
light-resistant cabinets were used. After rats had been placed in the operant chambers, 
the doors of the cabinets were closed for testing. The chambers were arranged in a 2 
x 2 array, and each received local illumination from a single house light. Each 
chamber was equipped with a food well into which 45-mg of food pellets could be 
delivered. A transparent plastic flap, 6 cm high x 5 cm wide, hinged along the top of
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the food well opening, guarded access to the food well. A movement of this flap of, 
approximately, 2 mm was automatically recorded as a single response or food well 
entry. The floors of the chambers were constructed from stainless steel rods (with 
diameters of 5 mm and mounted 15 mm apart). A speaker mounted on the ceiling of 
each operant chamber was used to present the auditory stimuli A, B, C and D. The 
four, 10-s auditory stimuli were constant tones of 1 kHz, 2 kHz, 3 kHz and 4 kHz 
(produced by one audio generator; Campden Instruments Ltd., Model no. 258). These 
stimuli were presented at an intensity of, approximately, 75 dB (A weighting). A 
computer controlled the apparatus and recorded all food well entries.
3.7.2.3 Design and procedure
Preexposure phase
Stimulus preexposure lasted a total of eight days. Whether or not a rat 
received stimulus exposure on each of the eight days of stimulus preexposure was 
determined by whether the rat was in the Baseline, Surprise, Sys_trans, or 
Scram_trans condition (see Table 4). When a rat was scheduled to receive stimulus 
exposure, rats received 20, 10-s presentations of a single tone stimulus, separated by a 
30-s inter-trial interval between the offset of one tone presentation and the onset of 
another. One preexposure session, therefore, lasted a total of 13 min 20-s. When a rat 
was not scheduled to receive stimulus exposure, they were simply placed into the 
operant chamber for a duration of 13 min 20-s.
Initially, rats were transferred from their home cages to the operant chambers. 
All rats in the Baseline condition received stimulus exposure on days 1, 4, 5 and 8; on 
days 2, 3, 6 and 7 these rats did not receive any stimulus exposure. Half of rats in the 
Baseline condition received stimulus exposure in the configuration A, -, -, D, D, -, -, 
A (1 -  8), while the other half of rats received stimulus exposure in the configuration 
D, -, -, A, A, -, -, D (1 -  8). (‘-’ indicates the absence of stimulus exposure). For half 
of rats in the Surprise condition, exposure was given to stimuli A, B, and D, and for 
the other half of rats, exposure was given to stimuli A, C, and D. For rats exposed to 
stimuli A, B, and D, half of these rats received stimulus exposure in the configuration 
A, B, -, D, D, -, B, A (1 -  8), while the other half of these rats received stimulus 
exposure in the configuration D, -, B, A, A, B, -, D (1 -  8). For rats exposed to 
stimuli A, C, and D, half of these rats received stimulus exposure in the configuration 
A, -, C, D, D, C, -, A (1 -  8), while the other half of these rats received stimulus
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exposure in the configuration D, C, A, A, C, D (1 -  8). Rats allocated to 
condition Sys_trans or condition Scram_trans received stimulus exposure on each of 
the 8 preexposure days. In condition Sys_trans, half of rats received stimulus 
exposure in the configuration A, B, C, D, D, C, B, A (1 -  8), while the other half of 
these rats received stimulus exposure in the configuration D, C, B, A, A, B, C, D (1 -  
8). In condition Scram_trans, half of rats received stimulus exposure in the 
configuration A, C, B, D, D, B, C, A (1 — 8), while the other half of these rats 
received exposure in the configuration D, B, C, A, A, C, B, D (1 -  8).
Magazine training
Following the preexposure phase, over the next two days rats were trained to 
collect food pellets (Noyes Precision Pellets supplied by Sandown Chemicals Ltd, 
Hampton, England) from the food well. On the first day of training, the plastic flaps 
that guarded access to the food wells were fixed in a raised position to allow rats clear 
sight of, and easy access to, the food pellets. During the second day of training, the 
plastic flaps were lowered to their normal positions, and rats had to move the flaps to 
gain access to the food pellets. On each day of training, a total of 20 food pellets were 
delivered one at a time on a fixed-time 60-s schedule.
Conditioning and test
On the three days that followed magazine training, an appetitive response was 
conditioned to one of the two stimulus endpoints (i.e., A or D). Within each of the 
subconditions created through the previous counterbalancing operations employed 
during the preexposure phase, half of rats received appetitive conditioning to stimulus 
A, and half of rats received appetitive conditioning to stimulus D. On each day, rats 
received one session of appetitive conditioning in which they received 20, 10-s 
presentations of their scheduled tone stimulus, separated by a 30-s inter-trial interval. 
A single food pellet was delivered immediately after the offset of each 10-s tone 
presentation, meaning that each rat received a total of 20 food pellets per session.
Following appetitive conditioning, rats received two test days in which 
generalisation of the appetitive response to the opposite stimulus endpoint was 
assessed (A or D). Specifically, if  an appetitive response had been conditioned to 
stimulus A, then these rats received a total of eight, 10-s nonreinforced presentations 
of stimulus D on each test day. In contrast, if an appetitive response had been 
conditioned to stimulus D, then these rats received a total of eight, 10-s nonreinforced
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presentations of stimulus A on each test day. Presentations of the eight, 10-s stimulus 
were separated by a 30-s inter-trial interval.
3.7.2.4 Measures
To assess appetitive conditioning, I compared the number of food well entries 
that rats made during presentations of the reinforced stimulus (CS) to the number of 
food well entries made during a 10-s pre-stimulus period (PCS). Successful 
appetitive conditioning was taken to reflect two observations: First, that the
difference in the number of food well entries made during the PCS and CS was larger 
on day 3 of conditioning than on day 1 of conditioning. Second, that the number of 
food well entries made during the CS was significantly greater than the number of 
food well entries made during the PCS by day 3 of conditioning.
Generalisation of the conditioned appetitive response at test was taken to 
reflect the total number of food well entries made during the eight presentations of the 
test stimulus. For the purpose of analyses, these eight test trials were split into two 
equal blocks of four test trials.
3.7.3 Results
Figure 19 displays the overall results from appetitive conditioning (see 
Appendix 2, Table 8, for PCS and CS means split by condition). Inspection of this 
figure reveals that, overall, the number of food well entries made during both the PCS 
and CS declined across conditioning. While one might have expected the number of 
food well entries made during the CS to increase across conditioning, this decline is 
likely due to the large number of trials (i.e., 20) given on each day of conditioning. 
That is, across conditioning, rats became more targeted in their responding. 
Importantly, conditioning was restricted to three days so as not to undermine any 
effect of preexposure. What is critical, however, is that the overall difference between 
the number of food well entries made during the PCS and CS became larger as 
conditioning progressed. Moreover, rats made a far greater number of food well 
entries during the CS than during the PCS. ANOVA, with condition (Baseline, 
Surprise, Sys_trans or Scram_trans), day (1-3), and conditioning period (PCS or CS) 
as factors, revealed no effect of condition, F(3, 28) = 1.72, p  > .05, a significant effect 
of day, F(2, 56) = 3.87,/? < .03, and a significant effect of conditioning period, F(l, 
28) = 55.66, p <  .001. None of the interactions between these factors were significant
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(largest F(3, 28) = 2.35, p  > .05). On day 3 of conditioning, the number of food well 
entries made during the CS was significantly greater than the number of food well 
entries made during the PCS (as assessed with a Bonferroni-corrected paired samples 
t-test, 7(31) = -5.68, p  < .001). I took this to be satisfactory evidence that by day 3 of 
conditioning, rats had acquired an appetitive response to the CS.
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Figure 19. Appetitive conditioning in Experiment 9: overall mean number of food 
well entries across the three days of conditioning. Error bars indicate the standard 
error.
The results of principle interest are presented in Figure 20: for presentation 
purposes, the data are presented pooled over the two test days. Inspection of this 
figure reveals that while the number of food well entries made during the first four 
test trials (Block 1) differed little between preexposure conditions, marked differences 
were observed in the final four test trials (Block 2). Specifically, rats in condition 
Sys_trans and Scram_trans made fewer food well entries during block 2 of test than 
rats in either the Baseline condition or the Surprise condition. ANOVA, with 
condition (Baseline, Surprise, Sys_trans or Scram trans), day (1-2), and block (1-2) 
as factors, revealed a main effect of day, F (l, 28) = 36.13,/? < .001, and block, F (l, 
28) = 11.60, p  < .003. While the main effect of condition was found not to be
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significant, F(3, 28) = 1.58, p  = .22, there was a significant interaction between block 
and condition, F{3, 28) = 3.13, p  < .05. No other interactions were found to be 
significant (Fs<l). Critically, simple main effects revealed that while there was no 
effect of exposure condition in block 1 o f test, F{3, 112)= 1.14, p  > .05, there was a 
highly significant effect o f  exposure condition in block 2 o f test, F(3, 112) = 4.72, p  < 
.004. Collapsed across day, simple comparisons confirmed that in block 2 o f test, rats 
in condition Sys trans and Scram trans made significantly fewer food well entries 
during presentations o f the test stimulus than rats in both the Baseline condition and 
the Surprise condition (smallest F ( l, 112) = 6 .2 \,p  < .015).
Block 1 Block 2
Preexposure condition 
■ Baseline a Surprise □ Sys_trans □ Scram_trans
Figure 20. Results from the generalisation test of Experiment 9: mean number of 
food well entries collapsed across the two test days and split by block. Error bars 
indicate the standard error.
3.7.4 Discussion
The present findings indicate that rats that were preexposed to all four tone 
stimuli came to perceive stimulus A and stimulus D as more distinct than did rats that 
were preexposed to two or three o f the four tone stimuli. Interestingly, the order in 
which the four stimuli were preexposed made little difference to rat’s food well
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responding at test, and no significant differences were found between condition 
Sys_trans and condition Scram_trans. While acknowledging the fact that there are a 
number of important differences between this experiment and Experiment 6 (e.g., the 
fact that different stimuli were used), the current findings clearly sit in contrast to the 
findings of Experiment 6. Specifically, they provide no evidence that rats in the 
Surprise condition spontaneously classified stimulus A and stimulus D into different 
categories; an operation that should have decreased the effective similarity of these 
stimuli relative to the Baseline condition, at least. The present results, therefore, do 
not support the predictions of a surprise-driven category invention mechanism in rat 
spontaneous categorisation. Furthermore, the results also do not support the 
predictions made based on the assumption that transformational information, through 
a process of representational updating, should encourage rats to spontaneously 
classify stimulus A and stimulus D into the same category; a process that should 
increase the perceived similarity of these stimuli. The fact that condition Sys_trans 
and Scram_trans did not differ from one another also suggests that the results of 
Experiment 9 were not the product of categorical perception. Based on the 
assumptions of Newell and Biilthoff (2002), described earlier, categorical perception 
should have only been encouraged in condition Sys_trans and not in condition 
Scram_trans. Rather, the results of Experiment 9 appear to reflect an instance of 
perceptual learning.
One mechanism that has been proposed for perceptual learning, and which I 
would argue best captures the present results given the nature of the stimuli used, is 
based on the proposal of latent inhibition of common elements (McLaren & 
Mackintosh, 2000). Latent inhibition refers to the observation that preexposure to a 
stimulus will later retard subsequent conditioning to that stimulus (Lubow, 1989). To 
explain perceptual learning through latent inhibition, it has been proposed that when 
stimuli share common elements, latent inhibition will differentially affect the stimuli’s 
common and unique features. As McLaren and Mackintosh note, “The argument rests 
on the seemingly plausible, even incontrovertible, assumption that the magnitude of 
any latent inhibition effect will be proportional to the amount of exposure to the 
stimulus or stimulus elements in question” (2000, p. 228). If one assumes, therefore, 
that the four tone stimuli presented in this experiment contain both unique elements 
(e.g., a, b, c and d) and common elements (e.g., x), then it is clear that rats in 
condition Sys_trans and Scram_trans will simply have received more preexposure to x
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than rats in the other two conditions. Consequently, when either stimulus A or 
stimulus D is later paired with food, it seems reasonable to assume that rats in 
condition Sys_trans and Scram trans will be subject to greater latent inhibition of the 
common elements x than rats in either the Baseline or Surprise condition. Therefore, 
the appetitive conditioning will accrue preferentially to the unique elements of the 
conditioned stimulus (e.g., a or d) in condition Sys trans and Scram trans, at the 
expense of the shared elements (i.e., x). Thus, there will be less of a basis for 
generalisation of the appetitive response from, for example, stimulus A to stimulus D 
at test, which is driven by their shared elements (x). While it must be acknowledged 
that, based on this account, one would have expected to also see a lower level of 
generalisation in the Surprise condition, relative to the Baseline condition, it is 
possible that the lack of this difference might simply reflect the fact that this effect is 
quite small. However, this result suggests that the stated argument of McLaren and 
Mackintosh (2000, p. 228) needs to be refined. The present mechanism is favoured 
over, for example, the process of unitisation, given the nature of the stimuli used. 
Unitisation refers to the process of establishing a more veridical representation of the 
stimulus being sampled through the formation of associations between the elements 
that make up a stimulus. A tone stimulus has generally been regarded as a simple 
stimulus, meaning that most of its elements will be sampled on any given 
presentation. The impact of unitisation, therefore, will only be influential when 
dealing with complex stimuli, where different elements of a stimulus are sampled on 
each presentation, until a veridical representation has been formed (see McLaren & 
Mackintosh, 2000).
One reason why latent inhibition may have come to produce the present 
perceptual learning effect is due to the temporal dynamics of the preexposure regime 
employed (i.e., stimulus preexposure occurred across different days). A number of 
studies have found that spaced stimulus preexposure enhances latent inhibition, 
relative to massed stimulus preexposure (e.g., Schnur & Lubow, 1976); an 
observation which has been confirmed in modelling work (see McLaren & 
Mackintosh, 2000). A straightforward prediction from this work, therefore, is that the 
present perceptual learning effect should be attenuated following massed stimulus 
preexposure. What is more, as has been noted at various points in this chapter, 
increasing the temporal contiguity between stimulus presentations may encourage the 
formation of stronger excitatory associations between stimuli (see Hall, 1991; Honey
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& Bateson, 1996). It is possible, then, that if rats’ preexposure to the simple tone 
stimuli used here was massed together closer in time, this may also encourage a 
beneficial effect of transformational information. Irrespective of this theoretical 
analysis, one clear difference between Experiment 6 in humans and Experiment 9 in 
rats (apart from the nature of the stimuli used), regards the schedule of stimulus 
preexposure. While stimulus exposure in Experiment 6 was very much massed, 
stimulus exposure in Experiment 9 was not. Experiment 10, therefore, sought to test 
whether massed stimulus exposure would attenuate the perceptual learning effect 
found in Experiment 9. If it does, then these results would be somewhat more 
consistent with the results of Experiment 6, where participants’ responding was found 
to be equivalent between the Baseline, Sys_trans, and Scram_trans conditions.
3.8 Experiment 10
3.8.1 Introduction
To this end, Experiment 10 employed only two of the four conditions of 
Experiment 9; namely, the Baseline condition and condition Sys trans. These 
conditions were focused upon as they represent the minimal and maximal amounts of 
preexposure to the shared elements (x), and because it is assumed that any influence 
of transformational information, through a process of representational updating, 
should be most likely to be found following systematic presentations of the four tone 
stimuli. The basic design of the present experiment was the same as that of 
Experiment 9, with the exception that stimulus preexposure was now massed rather 
than spaced. That is, all scheduled tone stimuli were now presented on the same day, 
with preexposure occurring over a two day period.
3.8.2 Method
3.8.2.1 Subjects and apparatus
Sixteen experimentally naive male Lister hooded rats (Rattus norvegicus) 
obtained from OLAC, Bicester, UK were maintained in exactly the same way as in 
Experiment 9 (mean free feeding weights: 482.5g; range: 442g-534g). Eight rats 
served as subjects in the Baseline condition and eight rats served as subjects in 
condition Sys_trans (see Table 5). Rats in the Baseline condition were preexposed 
only to stimuli A and D, and rats in condition Sysjxans were preexposed to all four
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tone stimuli in sequence (A, B, C then D). The apparatus used was that of 
Experiment 9.
Table 5. Experimental design o f  Experiment 10 and 11.
Condition Preexposure Magazine Training Conditioning Test
Day 1 Day 2 Two Days Three Days Two Days
Baseline A / - / - / D A / - / - / D + A+ D
Sys_trans A / B / C / D A / B / C / D + A+ D
Note. A, B, C and D represent four separate tone stimuli of 1 kHz, 2 kHz, 3 kHz and 
4 kHz, respectively. + denotes the delivery of a single food pellet.
3.8.2.2 Preexposure, magazine training, conditioning and test
Stimulus preexposure occurred over the first two days of the experiment. On 
each day of stimulus preexposure, rats were given nonreinforced presentations of the 
tones they were scheduled to receive over four sessions; each session was separated 
by, approximately, 1 hr. Within each session of stimulus exposure, rats received 20, 
10-s tone presentations, separated by a 30-s inter-trial interval between the offset of 
one tone presentation and the onset of another. Half of rats in the Baseline condition 
received stimulus preexposure in the configuration A, -, -, D, A, -, -, D (1 -  4), and the 
other half of rats received stimulus preexposure in the configuration D, -, -, A, D, -, -, 
A (1 -  4). For rats in condition Sys trans, half received stimulus preexposure in the 
configuration A, B, C, D, A, B, C, D (1 -  4), and half received stimulus preexposure 
in the configuration D, C, B, A, D, C, B, A (1 -  4). As for Experiment 9, when rats in 
the Baseline condition were not scheduled to receive presentations of a tone stimulus 
(i.e., on sessions 2 and 3 of each day), they were simply placed into the operant 
chamber for 13 min 20 s (i.e., the duration of stimulus exposure on a trial). Within 
each of the subconditions created by the previous counterbalancing operation, half of 
rats received appetitive conditioning to stimulus A and were presented with stimulus 
D at test, and half of rats received appetitive conditioning to stimulus D and were 
presented with stimulus A at test. Magazine training, conditioning and the 
generalisation test all proceeded in exactly the same manner as for Experiment 9.
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3.8.3 Results
Figure 21 displays the overall results from appetitive conditioning (see 
Appendix 2, Table 8, for PCS and CS means split by condition). As for Experiment 
9, inspection of this figure reveals, critically, that the difference in responding during 
the PCS and CS became larger as conditioning progressed. Moreover, rats made a far 
greater number of food well entries during the CS than during the PCS. ANOVA, 
with condition (Baseline or Sys_trans), day (1-3), and conditioning period (PCS or 
CS) as factors, revealed no effect of condition, F (l, 14) = 2.37, p  > .05, a significant 
effect of day, F(2, 28) = 5.81,/? < .009, and a significant effect of conditioning period, 
F( 1, 14) = 32.17, p  < .001. None of the interactions between these factors were 
significant (largest F(2, 28) = 1.94, p  > .05). On day 3 of conditioning, the number of 
food well entries made during the CS was significantly greater than the number of 
food well entries made during the PCS (as assessed with a Bonferroni-corrected 
paired samples t-test, /(15) = -4.29, p  < .002). Again, I took this to be satisfactory 
evidence that by day 3 of conditioning, rats had acquired an appetitive response to the 
CS.
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Figure 21. Appetitive conditioning in Experiment 10: overall mean number of food 
well entries across the three days of conditioning. Error bars indicate the standard 
error.
Concerning the results of principle interest (see Figure 22), one rat was 
removed from this analysis on the basis of being a clear statistical outlier, defined as 
being over two standard deviations away from the overall condition mean. This rat 
had served as a subject in the Baseline condition. Figure 22 displays the results of 
interest; again, for presentation purposes, the data are presented pooled over the two 
test days. Block 1 refers to the first four test trials, and block 2 refers to the final four 
test trials. Inspection of this figure reveals that while little difference existed between 
the two conditions in block 1 of test, over the final four trials in block 2 of test, a 
marked difference emerged. Interestingly, the pattern of results was in the opposite 
direction to those of Experiment 9. That is, rats in condition Sys_trans made a greater 
number of food well entries in block 2 of test than rats in the Baseline condition. 
ANOVA, with condition (Baseline or Sys_trans), day (1-2), and block (1-2) as 
factors, revealed significant main effects of day, F(\> 13) = 6.95, p  < .025, and block, 
F(l, 13) = 15.46,/? < .003, but no main effect of condition, F (l, 13) = 1.25,/? > .05. 
Furthermore, none of the interactions between these factors were significant (largest 
F (l, 13) = 1.65,/? > .05, which represents the block * condition interaction).
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While the interaction between block and condition was found not to be 
significant in Experiment 10, when split by block, there is a clear trend in the data. 
To reiterate, while there is little difference in the number o f food well entries made 
between the two conditions in block 1, in block 2, rats in condition S ystrans 
produced a greater number o f food well entries than rats in the Baseline condition. 
This trend in the data was explored using a Bonferroni corrected critical value of 
p<.025. Follow-up tests revealed that while the two conditions do not differ 
significantly from one another in block 1 (F<1), when collapsed over day, rats in 
condition Sys trans produced a greater number o f food well entries in block 2 than 
rats in the Baseline condition, and this difference closely approached significance at 
the corrected value (F ( l , 13) = 5.51, p  = .035).
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Figure 22. Results from the generalisation test o f Experiment 10: mean number of 
food well entries collapsed across the two test days and split by block. Error bars 
indicate the standard error.
3.8.4 Discussion
The results o f Experiment 10 show a pattern o f results opposite to that of 
Experiment 9: rats in condition Sys trans made more magazine entries in block 2 o f
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test than did rats in the Baseline condition, although the two conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other at any point. In this regard, therefore, the results are 
more similar to the pattern of results found in Experiment 6, suggesting some level of 
consistency in incidental categorisation between humans and rats. These results, 
therefore, provide some support for the idea that the schedule of stimulus preexposure 
influences perceptual learning (McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000; Schnur & Lubow, 
1976). Specifically, massing stimulus preexposure appears to reduce the influence of 
perceptual learning.
Of particular interest in the results of Experiment 10 is the trend that exists in 
the data: while the two conditions showed little difference in number of food well 
entries during block 1, during block 2, rats in condition Sys_trans produced a greater 
number of food well entries than rats in the Baseline condition. This finding suggests 
that rats in condition Systrans showed greater generalisation of the appetitive 
response at test than rats in the Baseline condition. Given this particularly interesting 
trend in the data, I sought to replicate the present experiment with a further 16 naive 
rats in Experiment 11, with a view to combine Experiments 10 and 11 if similar trends 
in the data were observed.
3.9 Experiment 11
3.9.1 Introduction
Experiment 11 was a direct replication of Experiment 10.
3.9.2 Method
3.9.2.1 Subjects, apparatus, design, preexposure, magazine training, conditioning, 
and test
Sixteen experimentally naive male Lister hooded (Rattus norvegicus) rats (free 
feeding weights mean: 390.4g; range: 359g-412g) that came from the same supplier 
and were maintained in the same way as those used in Experiments 9 and 10. Again, 
eight subjects served in each condition. All aspects of the apparatus, design and 
procedure were identical to Experiment 10 (see Table 5).
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3.9.3 Results and discussion
Figure 23 displays the overall results from appetitive conditioning (see 
Appendix 2, Table 8, for PCS and CS means split by condition). Once again, the 
difference in responding during the PCS and CS was larger on day 3 of conditioning 
than on day 1 of conditioning. Moreover, rats made a far greater number of food well 
entries during the CS than during the PCS. ANOVA, with condition (Baseline or 
Sys_trans), day (1-3), and conditioning period (PCS or CS) as factors, revealed no 
effect of condition, F< 1, no effect of day, F(2, 28) = 2.24, p  > .05, and a significant 
effect of conditioning period, F(1, 14) = 74.34, p  < .001. A significant interaction 
between day and conditioning period, F(2, 28) = 3.82, p  < .05, was also found (no 
other interactions were significant). Simple main effects revealed that the number of 
food well entries made during the CS was significantly greater than the number of 
food well entries made during the PCS at each day of conditioning (smallest F{ 1, 14) 
= 12.97,/? < .003). It is clear, however, that this difference was most pronounced on 
day 3 of conditioning. As for Experiments 9 and 10, I took this to be satisfactory 
evidence that by day 3 of conditioning, rats had acquired an appetitive response to the 
CS.
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Figure 23. Appetitive conditioning in Experiment 11: mean number of food well 
entries across the three days of conditioning. Error bars indicate the standard error.
Focusing now on the results of principle interest displayed in Figure 24 
(presented in the same way as for Experiment 10), it is clear that the results confirm 
the findings of Experiment 10. Indeed, the pattern of results is near identical. Once 
again, therefore, rats in condition Sys trans showed a higher level of responding in 
block 2 of test than did rats in the Baseline condition. ANOVA, with day (1-2), block 
(1-2), and condition (Baseline or Sys_trans) as factors, revealed significant main 
effects of day, F( 1, 14) = 13.66, p  < .003, and block, F(l, 14 ) = 6.14, p  < .03, but no 
effect of condition, F<1. Moreover, none of the interactions between these factors 
were significant, however the day * block interaction closely approached significance 
(largest F (l, 14) = A .\6 ,p  = .06).
Given the same interesting trend as for Experiment 10, a Bonferroni corrected 
critical value of p <.025 was again employed to further explore the data. Follow-up 
tests revealed that rats in the Baseline condition and condition Sys_trans did not differ 
significantly in their level of responding either on block 1 (F<1) or block 2 of test 
(F(l, 14) = 2.07, p  > .025). To increase the power of any conclusions, the results of 
Experiment 10 and 11 were combined, and statistical analyses run on this expanded 
data set.
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Figure 24. Results from the generalisation test of Experiment 11: mean number of 
food well entries collapsed across the two test days and split by block. Error bars 
indicate the standard error.
3.10 Combining Experiments 10 and 11
The method chosen to combine Experiments 10 and 11 involved introducing 
‘Experiment’ as a second between-subjects variable in the ANOVA11. If no 
significant differences are found with respect to this factor, then further conclusions 
will be drawn. To this end, ANOVA, with experiment (Experiment 10 or Experiment 
11), condition (Baseline or Sys trans), day (1-2), and block (1-2) as factors, revealed 
that there was no main effect o f  experiment, F ( l, 27) = 2.43, p  > .05, and that there 
were no significant interactions between experiment and any other factor (largest F (l, 
27) = 1.33, p  > .05). Collapsing across experiment, therefore, ANOVA confirmed 
significant main effects o f day, F{ 1, 27) = 19.65, p  < .001, and block, F{ 1, 27) = 
17.29, p  < .001, but no main effect o f condition, F( 1, 27) = 2.13 ,p >  .05. Moreover,
The meta-analytic procedures described by Rosenthal (1991) produced results that were 
entirely consistent with the findings presented below, where ‘Experiment’ was introduced as a 
second between-subjects variable.
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there were no significant interactions between day, block and condition (largest F (l, 
27) = 2.26,/? > .05).
As combining Experiments 10 and 11 did not reveal a significant block x 
condition interaction as hoped for, follow-up tests were conducted in the same manner 
as for Experiments 10 and 11, assuming a Bonferroni corrected critical value of 
p<.025. Focusing first on block 1, rats in the Baseline condition and condition 
Sys trans did not differ in their number o f food well entries made (F<1). However, in 
block 2, analysis revealed that the number o f food well entries made by rats in 
condition Sys trans was significantly greater than the number o f food well entries 
made by rats in the Baseline condition, F ( l ,  29) = 5.97,/? < .025 (see Figure 25).
Block 1 Block 2
Preexposure Condition 
■ Baseline □ Sys_trans
Figure 25. Results from combining the generalisation tests o f Experiment 10 and 
Experiment 11: mean number o f food well entries collapsed across the two test days 
and split by block. Error bars indicate the standard error.
3.10.1 Conclusions
Overall, the pattern o f  results found in Experiments 10 and 11 sits in contrast 
to the pattern o f results found in Experiment 9. While the pattern o f results found in 
Experiment 9 appeared to document an instance o f perceptual learning, the results of
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Experiment 10 and 11 documented an attenuation of this perceptual effect. These 
findings are consistent with those of Schnur and Lubow (1976), and the predictions of 
McLaren and Mackintosh (2000), that more massed stimulus exposure attenuates the 
influence of perceptual learning. I would argue, therefore, that the results of 
Experiments 10 and 11 indirectly favour an account of the perceptual learning effect 
seen in Experiment 9 based on latent inhibition to the common elements (see 
McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000).
Of particular interest is the fact that while combining Experiments 10 and 11 
did not reveal the significant block x condition interaction hoped for, follow-up tests 
confirmed that rats in condition Sys trans made significantly more food well entries 
during block 2 than rats in the Baseline condition. This important finding documents 
the first evidence of a facilitative influence of transformational information on later 
stimulus generalisation in rats. That is, by including presentations of intermediate 
stimuli (i.e., B and C) between stimuli A and D, this increased the effective similarity 
of stimuli A and D relative to a situation in which these stimuli are presented without 
the intermediate stimuli. While it is true that any conclusions in this regard, drawn 
from the combination of Experiments 10 and 11, are inherently weak, they are 
certainly intriguing. Whatever the case, it is clear that in Experiments 10 and 11, 
generalisation between stimulus A and stimulus D at test was more robust and 
pronounced in condition Sys_trans than in the Baseline condition. This finding was 
likely a product of the following two consequences of increasing the temporal 
contiguity between stimulus presentations: first, by preexposing the stimuli in a more 
massed manner, latent inhibition to the common elements would have been reduced. 
Second, increasing the temporal contiguity between stimulus presentations would 
have encouraged the formation of stronger excitatory associations between the 
stimuli. This would have been particularly prominent in condition Sys_trans, where 
preexposure to each stimulus was only separated by, approximately, an hour. One 
further possibility is that rats in condition Sys_trans engaged in a process of 
representational updating, whereby the discrete stimulus presentations were integrated 
into some single representation (e.g., “Tone”) and ‘classified together’ (cf. Ryan & 
Lea, 1990). This latter account of the results is not favoured, however, as the process 
of representational updating should not be particularly affected by the schedule of 
stimulus exposure. Indeed, in the natural world, representational updating will likely 
be a fairly slow process, occurring over a long period of time. That is, if chicks do
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integrate discrete “snapshots” of their mother hen into a single representation 
(Bateson, 1973), these different “snapshots” will be accumulated over many days and 
months. Consequently, if rats do engage in representational updating, then there is no 
reason to believe that they should not have engaged in such a process in Experiment 9 
(which would have overridden any extra influence of latent inhibition to the common 
elements). Rather, the results of Experiments 10 and 11 appear to reflect an instance 
of sensory-preconditioning (Hall, 1991).
3.11 General Discussion
The findings of Chapter 3 highlight a number of interesting consequences that 
different conditions of stimulus preexposure can have on later stimulus generalisation. 
The interesting feature of the research presented here is that, rather than simply 
assessing the influence that stimulus preexposure has per se (i.e., comparing a 
situation in which some form of stimulus preexposure is given to a situation in which 
no preexposure is given), the experiments have been focused towards understanding 
how perceived structure, contained within the distributional properties of a set of 
stimuli, influences stimulus similarity. This approach was taken so as to be able to 
focus on categorisation that was truly incidental and spontaneous, rather than on 
categorisation that was guided either by some explicit instruction to categorise or 
through reinforcement (feedback). In particular, I was interested in trying to better 
understand what aspects of perceived structure within a set of distributed stimuli will 
come to influence whether those stimuli are incidentally ‘classified together’ into the 
same category, or ‘classified apart’ into different categories. To assess this, the 
influence of four different conditions of stimulus exposure on later stimulus, 
generalisation was assessed.
Following on from the work presented in Chapter 2, in the first three 
experiments I focused on human incidental categorisation. In Experiment 6, I found 
evidence to support the view that incidental categorisation in humans is guided by a 
surprise-driven category invention mechanism (see Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; 
Love et al., 2004). While it is possible that the temporal dynamics of stimulus 
preexposure was influential in generating these results, this was ruled out in 
Experiment 7. Rather, based on the similarity structure of the complex, naturalistic 
morph stimuli presented, I would argue that participants in the Surprise condition 
came to spontaneously classify the object category endpoints (i.e., stimuli A and F)
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into different categories. As a result of this incidental categorisation, participants in 
the Surprise condition reported a lower level of property generalisation between 
stimuli A and F, relative to participants in the other three conditions.
Interestingly, no evidence was found to support the prediction that 
transformational knowledge should enhance generalisation between two distinct, but 
similar stimuli, relative to a situation in which no transformational knowledge existed 
(see Zaki & Homa, 1999). Indeed, the results of Experiment 8 showed that, under 
certain circumstances, transformational knowledge can actually lead to a reduction in 
the perceived similarity of stimuli A and F, by increasing the temporal spacing 
between presentations of these stimuli. That is, Experiment 8 found that when stimuli 
A and F were preexposed in a manner that was highly temporally contiguous (i.e., 
stimulus F followed immediately after stimulus A, for example), participants 
perceived these stimuli as significantly more similar than participants in a condition 
where presentation of stimuli A and F was separated by a temporal delay. This was 
true whether stimuli A and F were separated by a simple fixation cross, or by 
transformational knowledge (i.e., the intermediate, transformational steps that resulted 
from transforming stimulus A into stimulus F). This finding is reminiscent of work 
by Pothos, Hahn and Prat-Sala (2008): specifically, they found that for items about 
which participants had prior knowledge, a slow transformation from one object (e.g., 
A) to a different object (e.g., B) can result in participants viewing A and B as less 
similar than in a situation in which an abrupt change occurs between these two 
stimuli. They explain their results in terms of psychological essentialism (see Malt, 
1990; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Putnam, 1975; Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006), such 
that participants who were told o f a slow transformational change inferred something 
about the evolutionary origin of stimulus B, in which the essence of stimulus B has 
been altered through evolutionary pressures. This change in essence was not inferred 
by those participants told of an abrupt transformational change, and consequently, the 
effective similarity of stimulus A and stimulus B remained high. However, this view 
offers no reason as to why incorporating a temporal delay between presentations of 
stimuli A and F should reduce stimulus similarity compared to when stimuli A and F 
are presented in a temporally contiguous fashion.
More broadly, the results of Experiments 6 and 7 build on the work of Chapter 
2 (see also Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008) in showing that within-category similarity 
structure is very important in human spontaneous categorisation. As has been noted,
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Murphy and Medin (1985) have argued that “we categorise not on the basis of a 
similarity cluster, but on the basis of selecting the concept that best explains the 
instance to be categorized” (Hampton, 2001, p. 16). Given the naturalistic stimuli that 
were employed in Experiments 6 -  8, it is important to appreciate that participants 
would have had some prior knowledge regarding the category of the presented stimuli 
as a whole; although not specifically about the individual stimuli per se. However, 
there is no reason to believe that the amount of prior knowledge that participants had 
differed between the different preexposure conditions. Consequently, given the four 
preexposure conditions, it seems that the only basis by which participants in the 
Surprise condition could have come to show a reduced amount of property 
generalisation between stimuli A and F, relative to participants in the other three 
conditions, was on the basis of one similarity cluster (containing, for example, stimuli 
A, B and C) being spontaneously classified as distinct from a second cluster 
(containing, for example, stimulus F). This result supports the intuitive notion that the 
clustering together of similar stimuli provides an important mechanism for human 
spontaneous categorisation (Hampton, 2001). To provide direct support for this 
claim, future research could also look to assess the amount of property generalisation 
(or perceived similarity) between the stimuli that form the cluster of highly similar 
stimuli. Based on the view outlined above, one would expect to see a greater amount 
of property generalisation between stimuli A and C in the Surprise condition than in 
the other three conditions (if the cluster of highly similar stimuli was formed from 
stimuli A, B and C, and the distinct cluster contained stimulus F).
One particularly interesting finding from Experiments 6 -  8 is that human 
participants do not appear inclined to incidentally ‘classify apart’ two distinct, but 
similar stimuli (e.g., stimuli A and F). That is, participants in the Baseline condition 
showed no evidence of classifying stimuli A and F into different categories. Rather, 
the incidental classification of two distinct, but similar stimuli is driven by the 
existence of other stimuli that are highly similar to one of the two stimuli, allowing 
for certain norms to be developed around the highly similar stimuli. Consequently, it 
is only through the creation of these norms that perceived discontinuity within the 
stimulus set becomes meaningful. The findings of Experiment 6 and 7, therefore, fit 
nicely with an account of human spontaneous categorisation based on a surprise- 
driven category invention mechanism, which operates on stimulus similarity structure 
(see Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004, see also, Anderson, 1991).
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In conclusion, while it is true that prior knowledge increases the likelihood 
with which people come to identify a specific category structure (e.g., Clapper, 2007; 
Spalding & Murphy, 1996), the present results, and those of Chapter 2, clearly 
document that category structure can readily be imposed on a set of stimuli based 
purely on stimulus similarity structure. The results of Experiments 6 - 8 ,  therefore, 
strongly suggest that perceived discontinuities within our environment, based on 
stimulus similarity, are an important influence in guiding human spontaneous 
categorisation (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
While it is difficult to draw direct comparisons between Experiments 6 — 8 in 
human participants and Experiments 9 -  11 in rats, what is clear is that, in a formally 
equivalent design, rats showed a qualitatively different pattern of generalisation 
behaviour at test than did the human participants. These results, therefore, suggest a 
more primary role for the classifier in categorisation. Specifically, in Experiment 9, 
rats in condition Sys_trans and Scram_trans showed a reduced amount of 
generalisation of the appetitive conditioned response from, for example, stimulus A to 
stimulus D, relative to rats in the Baseline and Surprise conditions. I argued that this 
apparent perceptual learning effect was most likely the result of stronger latent 
inhibition to the common cues in conditions Sys_trans and Scram_trans, brought 
about by the extra amount of stimulus preexposure in these conditions. This account 
was strengthened by the results of Experiment 10 and 11, which showed that more 
massed stimulus presentation brought about a reversal in the aforementioned pattern 
of results. Specifically, in Experiments 10 and 11, rats in condition Sys trans showed 
an increased amount of generalisation of the appetitive conditioned response from, for 
example, stimulus A to stimulus D, relative to rats in the Baseline condition. Despite 
these latter findings, I would argue that, overall, the results of Experiments 9 - 1 1  
show little evidence to support the view that rats engaged in incidental, spontaneous 
categorisation.
Of course, a number of important differences between Experiments 6 - 8  and 
Experiments 9 - 1 1  may have contributed to the contrasting pattern of results found 
for humans and rats. First, whereas the stimuli presented to the human participants 
were complex, naturalistic objects, the stimuli presented to the rats were simple tone 
stimuli. Perhaps the tone stimuli were not distributed in a manner that was most 
likely to promote perceived discontinuity between the highly similar set of stimuli and 
the dissimilar stimulus in the Surprise condition of Experiment 9. Furthermore, it is
164
worth noting that in the Surprise, Sys_trans and Scram_trans conditions, the number 
of stimuli preexposed to the human participants was greater than the number of 
stimuli preexposed to the rats; again, this may have reduced the perceived structure 
contained within the presented tone stimuli. What is more, stimulus preexposure was 
rather different in the human experiments than in the rat experiments (in terms of 
exposure schedule, at least).
While the above factors may have played a contributory role in producing the 
qualitatively different pattern of results found for humans and rats, one further 
possibility is that rats may simply not possess the required level of cognitive 
flexibility to spontaneously appreciate the similarity-based relationships that exist 
between stimuli. Indeed, a number of authors, for example Chater and Heyes (1994), 
have proposed that there exists no evidence to support the view that nonhuman 
animals engage in categorisation in a manner that is qualitatively similar to humans. 
If correct, then it is hardly surprising that rats showed a qualitatively different pattern 
of generalisation behaviour to humans in the experiments reported in this chapter. 
However, more recent connectionist analysis (e.g., Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002) 
has shown that simple associative processes (albeit ones applied in a three-layer 
network) should be capable of affording true stimulus grouping behaviour in 
nonhuman animals, and experimental results have supported this (e.g., Honey & Watt, 
1998, 1999). Moreover, this connectionist analysis, based on basic associative 
processes, supports a view of nonhuman categorisation that is far more flexible than 
some have assumed (e.g., Chater & Heyes, 1994). Consequently, in the final 
experimental chapter of this thesis (Chapter 4), I investigate whether rats exhibit 
another important aspect of human categorization; namely, stimulus cross­
classification. As such, the role of the classifier in affording this complex form of 
categorisation behaviour was assessed.
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Chapter 4
Cross-classification in rats
4 Introduction
As postulated at the end of Chapter 3, one possible reason why rats showed a 
qualitatively different pattern of generalisation behaviour to humans is due to a lack of 
required cognitive flexibility on the part of rats, which facilitates incidental 
categorisation. Premack, for example, has suggested that “only primates may sort the 
world, i.e., divide it into its indeterminately many classes” (1976, p. 215). Chater and 
Heyes have gone one step further, arguing for what can be seen as a qualitative 
distinction between human and nonhuman animal categorisation:
“the significance of the distinction between symbolic labelling and association 
is that the same set of exemplars can be labelled by many different labels (so 
that, for example, a given pair of exemplars can be represented as both being 
instances of ANIMAL, DOG and FURRY, but as differing regarding 
FIERCE) whereas association between exemplars is merely present or absent. 
Therefore, while it is possible for different labels to capture many different 
classifications, which may cross-classify or be arranged in hierarchies, 
associations can only produce a single partition of exemplars into two or more 
disjoint sets” (1994, p. 216).
To recap, the results from the human studies of Chapter 3 showed that human 
participants in the Surprise condition -  which received preexposure to three highly 
similar stimuli and one distinct stimulus (e.g., A, B, C and F) -  showed a lower level 
of later property generalisation between stimuli A and F than participants that either 
received preexposure only to stimuli A and F, or to stimuli A, B, C, D, E and F. I 
argued that this result could be explained by assuming that the similarity structure of 
the Surprise condition encouraged participants to spontaneously classify the three 
highly similar stimuli (e.g., A, B and C) into a different category from the distinct 
stimulus (e.g., F), on the basis of surprise-driven category invention mechanism (see 
Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002; Love et al., 2004). This pattern of results was not 
observed in rats; albeit using a very different set of stimuli.
While driven by similarity, the above pattern of assumed incidental 
classification in humans requires a certain level of cognitive flexibility. Specifically,
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in the human and rat experiments of Chapter 3, given the high level of within- 
category similarity, two levels of stimulus classification were possible: First, at the 
presumed basic level, which would encompass all of the similar stimuli into a single 
category, and second, at the subordinate level, which would result in further divisions 
of the basic level of categorisation. If one assumes that the nonreinforced stimulus 
exposure given in Chapter 3 encouraged the formation of associations between the 
stored representations of the similar stimuli (see McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000), such 
that they became connected with one another, then based on the arguments of Chater 
and Heyes (1994), only humans would have the cognitive flexibility to impose a 
further, subordinate level form of classification (see Gureckis & Goldstone, 2008). 
That is, it is supposed that rats may be incapable of treating the physically similar 
stimuli A, B, and D equivalently in one set of conditions, and differently in a second 
set of conditions.
The results of Chapter 3, therefore, beg the question of the flexibility of 
stimulus classification in rats. As documented in the previous chapter of this thesis, 
the classification of stimuli into the same category has been associated with an 
increase in stimulus similarity, whereas the classification of stimuli into different 
categories has been associated with a decrease in stimulus similarity (Hamad, 1987). 
In rats, this change in stimulus similarity through stimulus classification has been 
highlighted in demonstrations of the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues. 
To recapitulate, Honey and Watt (1998, 1999), for example, gave rats appetitive 
training in which four compounds were paired with food (AX, BX, CY & DY), and 
four were paired with no food (CX, DX, AY & BY). Following training, A was 
paired with footshock and C was not. They found that this revaluation treatment 
resulted in B eliciting greater generalised fear than D. Given the fact that A shares no 
more common elements with B than it does with D, these results suggest that the 
initial appetitive training modified the effective similarity of the stimuli, such that A 
and B were seen as similar, whereas A and D were not. One interpretation of the 
results reported by Honey and Watt (1998, 1999) assumes that when similar 
compounds (e.g., AX & BX) are followed by the same outcome (e.g., food), their 
components (i.e., A, B & X) come to address a shared configural unit within a 
connectionist network (see Allman et al., 2004; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002). 
According to this form of analysis, the appetitive training stage from Honey and Watt 
(1998, 1999) should result in four such configural units of the following form: ABX,
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CDX, ABY, and CDY. Under these conditions, therefore, when A was later paired 
with shock, ABX  and /or ABY  should become active and linked to a representation of 
shock. Consequently, presentations of B will be more likely to provoke fear than D, 
as B will activate the configural units ABX  and ABY.
The above presented work, and other research on the acquired equivalence and 
distinctiveness of cues, is particularly interesting as it challenges the most widely 
accepted account of stimulus generalisation, which is based upon the suggestion that 
stimuli activate sets of elements, and that while some of these elements might be 
uniquely activated by a particular stimulus presented during training, other elements 
will be commonly activated by both the training and test stimuli. According to this 
account, therefore, similarity is fixed  between any two stimuli at a given point in time: 
similarity and generalisation both simply reflecting the proportion of common 
elements that the two stimuli activate (e.g., Atkinson & Estes, 1963; Pearce, 1994; see 
also, McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000, 2002). The connectionist approach outlined 
above, which is based on a process of configural grouping, makes an intriguing, yet 
straightforward prediction about the flexibility of rats’ classification behaviour, which 
has not been the subject of investigation. This prediction concerns the possibility that 
rats might be capable of forming groupings that allow for the cross-classification of a 
given set of stimuli (e.g., A, B, C and D): for example, grouping A with B, and, C 
with D in some conditions, while grouping A with D, and, B with C in others. Based 
upon the rationale and experimental design outlined in the next paragraph, I examined 
this prediction in two experiments.
Imagine that a rat is given the following set of appetitive training trials: AX 
and BX are paired with food, CX and DX are paired with no food; AY and DY are 
paired with food, and BY and CY are paired with no food (see Table 6). According to 
the theoretical analysis described above, this training should result in the formation of 
the following four configural units: ABX , CDX, ADY  and BCY. That is, A is grouped 
with B, and C is grouped with D, when these stimuli are presented with X, whereas, A 
is grouped with D, and B is grouped with C, when these same stimuli are presented 
with Y. Under these circumstances, subsequent aversive trials in which A, for 
example, is paired with shock, and C is paired with no shock, should result in ABX  
and ADY (but not CDX or BCY) becoming linked to shock. After such revaluation, it 
follows that B should be no more likely to elicit fear than D, as both B and D can 
activate a configural unit linked to shock (namely, ABX & ADY, respectively).
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However, presentation of BX will elicit more fear than DX if dual activation of a 
single hidden unit that is linked to shock provokes more fear than does singly 
activating two hidden units linked to shock (see Allman et al., 2004). Specifically, 
whereas BX provides two sources of activation to hidden unit ABX  (that is linked to 
shock), and a single source of activation to two units that are linked to no shock (CDX 
& BCY), DX provides two sources o f activation to hidden unit CDX (that is not linked 
to shock), and a single source of activation to two units that are linked to shock (ABX 
& ADY). For the same reasons, DY should elicit greater fear than BY: briefly, DY 
provides dual input to hidden unit AD Y  (that is linked to shock), and BY provides dual 
input to BCY (that is not linked to shock).
Table 6. Experimental designs fo r  Experiments 12 and 13.
Experiment 12
Appetitive Training Revaluation Tests
AX—► food AY—► food
BX—► food BY—► no food A —► shock l . B X & D X
CX—► no food CY—► no food C —► no shock 2. BY & DY
DX—► no food DY—► food
Experiment 13
Appetitive Training Revaluation Tests
A X -*  food AY—► food
B X -*  food BY—► no food B —► shock 1. AX&CX
CX—► no food CY—► no food D —► no shock 2. AY & CY
DX—► no food DY—► food
Note. A, B, C, and D refer to four different wallpapered environments in which rats 
were placed; X and Y refer to two different auditory stimuli. Food denotes the 
delivery of a single food pellet, whereas no food denotes its absence. Shock refers to 
the delivery of footshock, and no shock refers to its absence.
If the pattern of results predicted above were observed (i.e., stimulus 
generalisation was modulated by ‘context’ X and Y), then it would represent an 
interesting observation in its own right. Moreover, these results would also provide 
further support for a connectionist analysis of the acquired equivalence and 
distinctiveness of cues. Finally, such contextual modulation of stimulus 
generalisation in rats would resonate with the flexible stimulus classification
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documented in humans, and the observation that human similarity judgements are 
influenced by the context in which those judgements are made (Barsalou, 1982; 
Medin et al., 1993; Tversky & Gati, 1978).
Experiment 12 used the design that was outlined earlier to assess the 
prediction that contextual modulation of similarity can be observed in rats. 
Experiment 13 used a variant of this design to both extend the generality of the results 
of interest, and to contrast two theoretical interpretations for them.
4.1 Experiment 12
4.1.1 Introduction
The experimental design used is summarised in the upper rows of Table 6. 
During the first stage of appetitive conditioning, rats were placed in four, visually 
distinct experimental chambers (A, B, C & D) in which two auditory stimuli could be 
presented (X or Y). Four of the resulting compounds (AX, BX, AY and DY) were 
paired with one outcome (food in the example presented in Table 6), and the 
remaining four compounds (CX, DX, BY and CY) were paired with a second 
outcome (e.g., no food). All rats then received aversive conditioning in which A was 
paired with footshock and C was not. Finally, rats received test trials in which X and 
Y were presented in conjunction with placement in B and D. If rats had come to 
group the stimuli in the manner anticipated by the proposed connectionist analysis -  
that is, through their capacity to activate different configural units (ABX, CDX, ADY, 
BCY) -  then ABX  and /or A D Y  should have become linked to shock during pairings of 
A with shock. Consequently, rats should show greater generalised fear to the 
compound BX than to the compound DX, and similarly, greater fear to DY than to 
BY.
4.1.2 Method
4.1.2.1 Subjects
Sixteen experimentally naive male Lister hooded rats (Rattus norvegicus) 
obtained from OLAC, Bicester, UK were maintained at 80% of their free feeding 
weights (mean: 397g; range: 360-423g) by giving them a restricted quantity of food 
(Teklad laboratory diet, Harlan Teklad, Bicester, Oxfordshire, UK) at the end of each 
day. All rats were housed in pairs in a colony room that was illuminated between
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8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. Each housing cage contained a single cardboard tube (18.0 
cm length x 10.0 cm diameter) throughout the course of the experiment. All 
procedures commenced at 2:00 p.m.
4.1.2.2 Apparatus
Four standard operant chambers (23.0 cm length x 24.5 cm width x 21.0 cm 
height; Campden Instruments Ltd., Loughborough, England) housed in sound- and 
light-resistant cabinets were used. The doors of the cabinets were left open 
throughout the experiment to allow the rats’ behaviour to be video recorded (during 
the final test) using a Panasonic movie camera (model number: NV-M40). The 
chambers were arranged in a 2 x 2 array, and each received local illumination from a 
single house light and ambient illumination from an overhead strip-light on the ceiling 
of the experimental room. The walls and ceiling of each chamber were lined with 
Perspex, behind which different types of wallpaper were hung. Working clockwise 
from the top-left chamber, the wallpapers in each chamber were as follows: black, 
spot (diameter: 15 mm; centre-to-centre distance: 25 mm), white, and check (29 mm x 
29 mm squares). These wallpapered environments served as the four visual stimuli: 
A, B, C and D. Each chamber was equipped with a food well into which 45-mg food 
pellets could be delivered. A transparent plastic flap, 6 cm high x 5 cm wide, hinged 
along the top of the food well opening, guarded access to the food well. A movement 
of this flap of, approximately, 2 mm was automatically recorded as a single response 
or food well entry. The floors of the chambers were constructed from stainless steel 
rods (with diameters o f 5 mm and mounted 15 mm apart); these rods could be 
electrified using a shock generator coupled with a shock scrambler (Campden 
Instruments Ltd., Loughborough, U.K., Model no: 521C and 52IS, respectively). A 
speaker mounted on the ceiling of each operant chamber was used to present the 
auditory stimuli, X and Y. An aperture cut into the Perspex and aligned with the 
position of the speaker allowed for unimpeded delivery of sound. The two, 10-s 
auditory stimuli were a 10-Hz train of clicks (produced by one audio generator; 
Campden Instruments Ltd., Model no. 258) and a 2000-Hz constant tone (produced 
by a second and identical audio generator). These stimuli were presented at an 
intensity of, approximately, 75 dB (A weighting). A computer controlled the 
apparatus and recorded food well entries.
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4.1.2.3 Procedure
Magazine training
Before the chambers were decorated, rats were trained to collect food pellets 
(Noyes Precision Pellets supplied by Sandown Chemicals Ltd, Hampton, England) 
from the food well over the course of two days. On the first day of training, the 
plastic flaps that guarded access to the food wells were fixed in a raised position to 
allow rats clear sight of, and easy access to, the food pellets. During the second day 
of training, the plastic flaps were lowered to their normal positions, and rats had to 
move the flaps to gain access to the food pellets. During both training sessions, 20 
food pellets were delivered on a fixed-time 60-s schedule. The chambers were then 
decorated, and rats received 32 days of discrimination training.
Discrimination training
On each day of training, rats received one session of training with each of the 
four visual stimuli (A, B, C and D). Following completion of a session of training, 
rats were given experience with the next designated visual stimulus. For all rats, 
alternate days of training were conducted in the presence of auditory stimulus X and 
Y; in each session there were 10, 10-s presentations of either X or Y, and the interval 
between successive presentations within a session was 30-s. For half of the rats, 
presentations of X were immediately followed by the delivery of a single food pellet 
in A and B and were nonreinforced in C and D, and presentations of Y were 
reinforced in A and D, but not in B and C (see Table 6). For the remaining rats, the 
presentations of X were nonreinforced in A and B and reinforced in C and D, and 
those of Y were nonreinforced in A and D and reinforced in B and C. For all rats, the 
black and white visual stimuli served as A and C and the check and spot visual stimuli 
served as B and D. For half of the rats in the above subconditions, black served as A 
and white as C, and for the remainder this arrangement was reversed. For half of the 
rats in the subconditions created by the previous counterbalancing operations, check 
served as B and spot served as D, and for the remainder, the reverse was the case. 
The order in which rats received the four sessions within a day changed from one day 
to the next. Within an 8-day block of training, each visual stimulus was presented in 
the four possible positions within a day (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th), and experience with any one 
of the visual stimuli was equally likely to be immediately followed by or preceded by 
experience with any of the other three visual stimuli.
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Revaluation and test
On the next two days, rats received aversive conditioning. On each day, rats 
received two sessions of training that were separated by a 2-hr interval. During one 
session, rats were placed in A where they received three 0.5-s, 0.5 m A electric shocks. 
Shocks were delivered at the rate of one every min. After approximately 30 s, rats 
were removed from A. In the other session, rats were simply placed in C for 3.5 min 
and were then removed. Within each of the sub-conditions created by the previous 
counterbalancing operations, for half of the rats, the orders in which A and C occurred 
were A, C (day 1) and C, A (day 2), and for the remainder the orders were C, A (day 
1) and A, C (day 2). On both of the following two days, the behaviour of rats was 
video recorded during sessions in B and D that were separated by a 2-hr interval. On 
one day, rats received eight presentations of X that were separated by 10-s intertrial 
intervals, and on the other day, they received eight presentations of Y, again separated 
by 10-s intertrial intervals. This resulted in an overall session length of 2 m in 40-s. 
Half of the rats received sessions with presentations of X on day 1 and Y on day 2, 
and the remainder received the reverse arrangement. Within the subconditions 
created by the previous counterbalancing operations, half of the rats received the 
sequence B, D on both days and the rest received the sequence D, B on both days.
Behavioural measures
Appetitive discrimination learning was assessed using the rate of food well 
entries (in responses per minute, rpm) during presentations of X and Y on the eight 
trial types. In fact, the eight trial types were separated into the simple discrimination 
(reinforced: AX & AY; nonreinforced: CX & CY) and the configural discrimination 
(reinforced: BX and DY; nonreinforced: BY and DX). Generalised fear, in the form 
of freezing behaviour, was assessed using a semi-automated scoring system reported 
in Grand and Honey (2008). Briefly, an observer (J.C.) watched the videotaped 
behaviour of rats from the test sessions and held down a mouse button when the rat 
moved, and released this button when the rat was stationary (i.e., freezing). 
Movement was defined as any behaviour with the exception of that necessary to 
maintain breathing. Each consecutive 2-s bin was scored as either containing a 
depression of the mouse button (i.e., the rat was active) or no depression of the mouse 
button (i.e., the rat was inactive or freezing). The trace of each rat’s behaviour was 
then converted into the percentage of 2-s periods in which the rat was freezing. Data 
from 12 rats (18.75% of the data set) for Experiments 12 and 13 was second coded in
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order to assess inter-rater reliability. The second coder (R.C.H.) was blind with 
respect to the individual predictions for each rat. The inter-rater correlations (r) 
exceeded 0.95 in both Experiments 12 and 13,/?s<.001.
4.1.3 Results
The results from the first stage of appetitive training are presented in 8-day 
blocks in Table 7. Inspection of Table 7 suggests that from the first block (involving 
8 days) there was greater responding on the reinforced than on the nonreinforced trials 
and that this difference became more evident as training progressed for both the 
simple and configural discriminations. It is also apparent that the difference in 
responding between reinforced and nonreinforced trials for the simple discrimination 
was more marked than for the configural discrimination. ANOVA, with block (1-4), 
discrimination type (simple or configural), and reinforcement (+ or -) as factors, 
confirmed that there was an effect of discrimination type, F(l,  15) = 46.13,/? < .001, 
an effect of reinforcement, F{ 1, 15) = 151.73, p  < .001, but no effect of block, F(3, 
45) = 1.17, p  > .05. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between 
discrimination type and reinforcement, F (l, 15) = 13.84, p  < .003; no other 
interactions between factors were significant (largest F(3, 45) = 2.19, p  = .10). 
Analysis of simple main effects revealed that whereas responding on the reinforced 
trials did not differ significantly between the two types of discrimination, F( 1, 15) =
1.61, p  > .05, responding on nonreinforced trials was significantly lower for the 
simple discrimination than for the configural discrimination, F(1, 15) = 67.87, p < 
.001. For both discrimination types, there was more responding on reinforced than on 
nonreinforced trials (smallest F( 1, 15) = 125.10,/? < .001).
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Table 7. Results from discrimination training in Experiments 12 and 13.
Experiment 12
Simple Discrimination
Trial Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
+ 4.20 4.07 4.12 4.14
- 0.84 0.65 0.59 0.35
Configural Discrimination
Trial Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
+ 4.28 4.14 4.44 4.36
- 1.88 1.48 1.32 1.21
Experiment 13
Simple Discrimination
Trial Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
+ 4.79 3.81 4.12 4.67
- 1.08 0.73 0.73 0.70
Configural Discrimination
Trial Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
+ 5.17 4.16 4.25 4.57
- 2.29 1.62 1.44 1.25
Note. Mean rate of food well entries (in responses per minute, rpm) on reinforced (+) 
and nonreinforced (-) trials over each 8-day block, split by discrimination type (simple 
or configural).
Figure 26 shows the results of principal interest from Experiment 12: the 
amount of freezing elicited by B and D as a function of whether they were 
accompanied by auditory stimulus X or Y, pooled over the test periods. Inspection of 
this figure reveals that B elicited greater freezing than D when they were presented 
with auditory stimulus X, and that the reverse was true when they were presented with 
auditory stimulus Y. ANOVA, with visual stimulus (B or D) and auditory stimulus 
(X or Y) as factors, showed that while there were no main effects of visual or auditory 
stimulus (Fs<l), there was a significant interaction between these factors, F( 1,15) = 
23.89, p  < .001. Analysis of simple main effects confirmed that B elicited 
significantly greater freezing than D when they were presented with X, F{ 1, 15) — 
7.50, p  < .02, and that the reverse was true when they were presented with Y, F( 1, 15) 
= 11.19, ^ < .005 .
175
35
30
BX DX BY DY
Figure 26. Results of Experiment 12: mean percentages of time freezing to visual 
stimuli B and D as a function of whether they were presented with auditory stimuli X 
or Y. Error bars indicate the standard error.
4.1.4 Discussion
Experiment 12 demonstrated that the generalisation of fear from A to the test 
stimuli (B and D) depended upon which auditory stimulus (X or Y) those test stimuli 
were accompanied by: generalisation of fear from A was more marked to BX than it 
was to DX, and it was more marked to DY than to BY. The sole way in which this 
pattern of results could have been generated is through the prior appetitive training. 
But, what feature of this prior training was critical?
According to the configural grouping account (detailed in Section 4), similar 
compounds (e.g., AX & BX) that are followed by the same outcome (e.g., food) 
become grouped -  in the sense that they come to address a common configural unit 
{ABX). The appetitive training phase of Experiment 12, which involves eight trial 
types (e.g., AX-»food, BX—»food, CX-*no food, DX-*no food, AY-»food, BY^no 
food, CY—»no food, DY-»food), should therefore result in pairs of similar compounds 
coming to address four configural units: ABX  (for AX & BX), CDX (for CX & DX), 
ADY (for AY & DY), and BCY (for BY & CY). Once the network is configured in
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this way, pairing A with shock will activate ABX and /or ADY, and these units will be 
linked to shock. Subsequently, those test configurations that are most similar to 
(provide dual input into) ABX  and ADY, namely BX and DY, will be more likely to 
elicit fear than the remaining test configurations of BY and DX. There is, however, 
another possible account for the results of Experiment 12 that needs to be considered.
An alternative feature of prior appetitive training that might have been critical 
relates solely to the outcomes (food or no food) associated with the various stimulus 
configurations. Inspection of the training regime, outlined in Table 6, reveals that 
both of the configurations that provoked most freezing at test (BX & DY) had 
originally been paired with the same outcome as stimulus A (here food, for those rats 
that received the training shown in Table 6). These conditions might allow a process 
of mediated generalisation of fear to operate between A, BX, and DY. Briefly, on 
entering the second stage of training, the presentation of A will provoke activity in 
memory about the outcome with which it was paired during appetitive training (e.g., 
food). Under these conditions, A ’s pairing with shock might allow the associatively 
provoked memory of food to also become linked with shock. Therefore, when a 
representation of food is activated, for example, during presentations of BX and DY 
(but not of DX & BY), conditioned freezing may be generated. Although this 
analysis cannot explain many recent observations involving configural learning (e.g., 
Allman et al., 2004; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002; Honey & Watt, 1998, 1999), it 
has been applied to simple instances of the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness 
of cues (see, e.g., Honey & Hall, 1989). Experiment 13 was designed to discriminate 
between the two forms of analysis outlined above: one based on a process of
configural grouping, and the other on simple mediated conditioning.
4.2 Experiment 13
4.2.1 Introduction
The design of Experiment 13 is summarised in the lower rows of Table 6. The 
first stage of training was identical to Experiment 12. However, during the second, 
revaluation stage, B was paired with shock and D was not, and in the final test stage, 
rats received test trials in which A and C were accompanied by X and Y. As can be 
seen from Table 6, B alone is uninformative about whether food or no food would be 
delivered during appetitive training. This means that when B is paired with shock, it
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is no more likely to activate a representation of food than of no food. However, if, for 
whatever reason, the associatively activated representation of food (or equally no 
food) did become linked to shock during the revaluation stage, then there would be no 
basis upon which to expect differential responding to A and C as a consequence of 
whether they are presented with X and Y: both AX and AY will provoke an
associatively activated representation of one outcome (e.g., food), and both CX and 
CY will provoke an associatively activated representation of a different outcome (e.g., 
no food). This prediction contrasts with that made by the alternative configural 
grouping account. According to this account, B should activate the hidden units ABX  
and CBY during revaluation, resulting in these representations becoming linked to 
shock. Consequently, the test configurations that are most similar to ABX  and CBY, 
namely AX and CY, respectively, should be more likely to elicit freezing than the 
remaining test compounds, AY and CX. Experiment 13 assessed these contrasting 
predictions.
4.2.2 Method
4.2.2.1 Subjects, apparatus and procedure
Sixteen naive male hooded Lister rats (mean: 365g; range: 323-383g) that 
came from the same supplier and were maintained in the same way as those used in 
Experiment 12. The apparatus was that used in Experiment 12. All details of the 
experiment were the same as Experiment 12 with the following three exceptions: B 
was paired with footshock and D was not during the revaluation stage; AX, CX, AY 
and CY were presented during the test stage; and, the identities of the pairs of stimuli 
that served as A and C or B and D were exchanged in order to maintain the identities 
of the stimuli that were presented during revaluation (black and white) and test (check 
and spot).
4.2.3 Results
The results from the first stage of appetitive training, again divided according 
to discrimination type (simple or configural), are shown in Table 7. Inspection of this 
table suggests that, from the first block of training, there was more responding on the 
reinforced than on the nonreinforced trials, and again this difference increased as 
training progressed for both types of discrimination. Also, it is apparent that for the 
final two blocks of training, the difference in responding to the reinforced and
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nonreinforced trials was more pronounced for the simple discrimination than for the 
configural discrimination. ANOVA, with block (1-4), discrimination type (simple or 
configural), and reinforcement (+ or -) as factors, confirmed that there was a 
significant effect of block, F(3, 45) = 7.21, p  < .001, discrimination type, F( 1, 15) = 
29.84, p  < .001, and reinforcement, F (l, 15) = 201.14, p  < .001. Also, significant 
interactions were revealed between block and discrimination type, F(3, 45) = 5.71, p  
< .003, and between discrimination type and reinforcement, F (l, 15) = 31.66, p < 
.001, but not between block and reinforcement, F(3, 45) = 2.56, p  = .07. The three- 
way interaction between these factors was not significant, F<1. Analysis of simple 
main effects performed on the two significant interactions revealed that, for both types 
of discrimination, there was a significant reduction in responding on both rewarded 
and nonrewarded trials over block, smallest F(3, 13) = 3.74, p  < .05. Also, for the 
first three blocks of training, the overall level of responding on the configural 
discrimination trials was significantly higher than the overall level of responding on 
the simple discrimination trials, smallest F (l, 15) = 14.83, p  < .003; on the final block 
of training, this difference was not significant, F (l, 15) = 4.12, p  > .05. As in 
Experiment 12, responding on reinforced trials did not differ significantly between the 
two types of discrimination, F (l, 15) = 1.94, p  > .05, whereas responding on 
nonreinforced trials was significantly lower for the simple discrimination compared to 
the configural discrimination, F (l, 15) = 114.48, p  < .001. For both types of 
discrimination, however, there was significantly more responding on reinforced trials 
than on nonreinforced trials (smallest F (l, 15) = 142.72, p  < .001).
Figure 27 shows the test results from Experiment 13: the amount of freezing 
elicited by A and C as a function of whether they were presented with auditory 
stimulus X or Y, pooled over the test periods. Inspection of this figure reveals that A 
elicited greater freezing than C when these stimuli were presented with auditory 
stimulus X (i.e., AX elicited greater fear than CX), and that the reverse was true when 
they were presented with auditory stimulus Y (i.e., CY elicited greater fear than AY). 
ANOVA, with visual stimulus (A or C) and auditory stimulus (X or Y) as factors, 
found that there were no main effects of visual or auditory stimulus (Fs<l), but that 
there was a significant interaction between these factors, F( 1, 15) = 41.90, p  < .001. 
Analysis of simple main effects confirmed that AX elicited greater freezing than CX, 
F(l, 15) = 11.13, p  < .006, and CY elicited greater freezing than AY, F(l, 15) =
11.05,/? < .006.
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Figure 27. Results o f  Experim ent 13: mean percentages o f time freezing to visual 
stimuli B and D as a function o f whether they were presented with auditory stimuli X 
or Y. Error bars indicate the standard error.
4.2.4 Discussion
The results o f  Experim ent 13 confirm those o f Experiment 12 in 
demonstrating a switch in similarity-based generalisation to two test stimuli (in this 
case A and C) that is dependent upon the stimulus (X or Y), or context, in which 
generalisation is assessed. They also allow us to discriminate between the two 
contrasting accounts proposed for the contextual modulation o f stimulus 
generalisation shown in Experim ent 12. Specifically, the results o f Experiment 13 are 
inconsistent with an account based on simple mediated conditioning, and instead 
favour an account based on configural grouping. I will now consider in greater detail 
the implications o f the results o f  Experiments 12 and 13.
4.3 General Discussion
The current experiments assessed the prediction that rats should be capable of 
forming groupings that allow for the cross-classification o f a given set o f stimuli (e.g., 
A, B, C and D), based upon the ‘contextual’ stimuli that accompany them (e.g., X or
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Y). This prediction was derived from one connectionist analysis of the acquired 
equivalence and distinctiveness of cues. In two experiments, rats first received 
training in which certain pairs of stimuli were associated with a common outcome 
when accompanied by X (e.g., A and B-^food, and, C and D->no food), while 
different pairs of stimuli were associated with a common outcome when they were 
accompanied by Y (e.g., A and D->food, and, B and C-»no food). Following this 
stage of appetitive training in Experiment 12, it was found that pairing A with shock 
resulted in greater generalised fear to BX than to DX, and greater generalised fear to 
DY than to BY. Similarly in Experiment 13, after fear had been conditioned to B, it 
was found that rats showed greater generalised fear to AX than to CX, and greater 
generalised fear to CY than to AY. This contextual modulation of stimulus 
generalisation to A and C, based on the presence of auditory stimuli X and Y, is an 
intriguing empirical observation that has two, clear-cut general implications: First, 
these results provide further support for one connectionist analysis of learning and its 
application to the acquired equivalence and distinctiveness of cues (see Allman et al., 
2004, Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002). Second, they are clearly inconsistent with the 
suggestion that, unlike humans (Barsalou, 1982; Medin et al., 1993; Tversky & Gati, 
1978), nonhuman animals are incapable of showing contextual modulation of 
similarity (cf. Chater & Heyes, 1994).
There are several possible ways in which the kind of connectionist approach 
described in the Introduction could be implemented (e.g., Allman et al., 2004; Gluck 
& Myers, 1993; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002), and there is independent support 
for some of these suggestions from procedures similar to those used in Experiments 
12 and 13 (e.g., Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2001). However, it is worth noting that 
not all configural theories that have been implemented as connectionist networks are 
able to explain the results of Experiments 12 and 13. For example, Pearce’s (1994) 
model supposes that each new pattern of stimulation (e.g., AX, BX, CX, DX, AY, 
BY, CY, DY) recruits a new configural (hidden) unit, and denies the possibility that 
there will be integration of configurations that are presented on different trials. For 
this model, therefore, the similarity between a given pair of configurations is fixed, 
being determined simply by the proportion of common elements that they share. 
However, one way in which similarity could be modified by experience in such a 
model is by allowing the outcome of a trial to be encoded as part of the configural
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representation of that trial (cf. Rescorla, 1991). This form of analysis is inconsistent 
with the results of other demonstrations of the acquired equivalence and 
distinctiveness of cues that use stimuli and procedures similar to those employed in 
Experiments 12 and 13 (see Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2001; see also, Delamater & 
Joseph, 2000; Hodder et al., 2003; Nakagawa, 1986; Urcuioli, Zentall & DeMarse, 
1995; Zentall, Steim, Sherburne, & Urcuioli, 1991). I therefore prefer the general 
suggestion, howsoever it is implemented, that similar patterns of stimulation that 
predict the same outcome come to address the same hidden unit, whereas otherwise 
equivalent patterns of stimulation that predict different outcomes come to address 
different hidden units (see Allman et al., 2004; Honey & Ward-Robinson, 2002).
As I have already mentioned, the results of Experiments 12 and 13 resonate 
with work in humans, where it is well established that similarity is not fixed in the 
manner prescribed by theories of stimulus generalisation in animals (e.g., Atkinson & 
Estes, 1963; McLaren & Mackintosh, 2000, 2002; Pearce, 1994). Instead, human 
judgements of similarity are highly flexible, being influenced by the context in which 
those judgements are made (e.g., Barsalou, 1982; Medin et al., 1993; Tversky & Gati, 
1978). For example, a flashlight and a rope are only considered similar to one another 
when they are presented in the context ‘taken on camping trips'. I have presented a 
theoretical analysis of the contextual modulation of similarity in rats that appeals to 
relatively simple associative principles — albeit ones that are implemented within a 
three-layer connectionist network. Consequently, as well as establishing an important 
continuity in cognitive flexibility between humans and rats, these results also raise the 
intriguing possibility that the influence of context on human judgements of similarity 
may arise in an analogous fashion to that o f rats. If human judgments of similarity are 
found to arise in an analogous fashion, then this would have important implications 
with respect to discussion about the role of the classifier in categorisation behaviour. 
Indeed, they would suggest that categorisation behaviour in all animals may stem 
from the same underlying, associative roots.
In Chapter 0, the idea was introduced that connectionist architectures may 
provide the best hope for providing a single model that can explain both human and 
nonhuman animal categorisation behaviour. The experiments presented in this 
chapter were developed from one connectionist architecture that affords a relatively 
high level of cognitive flexibility in nonhuman animals (Honey & Ward-Robinson, 
2002), based on simple associative mechanisms (see also, Le Pelley, 2004). By
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finding this hypothesised continuity in cognitive flexibility between humans and rats, 
this lends hope to the aforementioned idea. With regards to the proposal of Chater 
and Heyes (1994) outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the shared influence of 
context on similarity across different species demonstrates that natural language is not 
a prerequisite for this form of complex, cognitively flexible behaviour. The results of 
Chapter 4, therefore, lend promise to the possibility that rats do have the cognitive 
requisites to engage in spontaneous categorisation. Moreover, this may well be in a 
manner that is qualitatively similar to incidental (spontaneous) categorisation 
behaviour in humans.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
5. Introduction
In this chapter I look to first summarise the main findings and implications of 
this thesis, and then look to the possible future research implications of my findings. 
Finally, I provide some general conclusions with respect to the findings presented in 
this thesis.
5.1 Summary and theoretical implications of the main findings
In this thesis, I investigated how stimulus similarity structure and the statistical 
properties of the environment influence categorisation behaviour in both humans and 
rats. In Chapter 1 of this thesis I conducted a review of the human literature on 
laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation and found that, for the most part, people 
show an overwhelming preference to engage in unidimensional unsupervised 
classification. This unidimensional unsupervised classification is odd, however, given 
that it does not conform with current understanding about the nature of people’s 
everyday categories, which are built around a principle of family resemblance, and 
not ‘definitions’ (Rosch, 1975; Wittgenstein, 1953). While manipulations of stimulus 
format and experimental procedure (e.g., Milton & Wills, 2004; Milton et al., 2008), 
or the introduction of prior knowledge (e.g., Spalding & Murphy, 1996), have 
increased the prevalence of multidimensional (family resemblance) sorting, often, an 
overall preference for unidimensional classification remains. As noted in Chapter 1, 
however, one likely source of participants’ unidimensional classification bias is the 
abstract similarity structure of the stimuli being classified. That is, I argued that the 
similarity-based relationships contained within a set of stimuli’s abstract stimulus 
structure will likely command a strong influence over the issue of umdimensional 
versus multidimensional (family resemblance) classification. In Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, therefore, I investigated whether it was possible to predict unidimensional 
versus multidimensional unsupervised classification on the basis of abstract stimulus 
structure. In Chapter 3 of this thesis I looked to broaden the work of Chapter 2 by 
examining the general influence of stimulus similarity structure on whether a set of 
stimuli are spontaneously ‘classified together’ or spontaneously classified apart .
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More specifically, I introduced a new procedure to investigate some of the factors that 
might influence incidental unsupervised categorisation in both humans and nonhuman 
animals. Finally, given the findings of Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 of this thesis I 
examined the basic flexibility of rats’ classification abilities when determined by the 
statistical properties of the environment.
5.1.1 Unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised categorisation
The dominance of unidimensional classification in studies of human 
unsupervised categorisation, identified in Chapter 1, has been the subject of much 
curiosity among categorisation researchers. Taking up this theme, Chapter 2 of this 
thesis investigated one likely factor in generating the laboratory-based unidimensional 
unsupervised classification bias; namely, the abstract similarity structure of the 
stimuli being classified. Specifically, I employed the simplicity model of 
unsupervised categorisation (Pothos & Chater, 2002) to predict when participants 
should prefer unidimensional classification and when they should prefer two- 
dimensional classification, on the basis of the abstract similarity structure of a set of 
stimuli.
In Experiment 1, participants’ classifications were found to be more similar to 
the predicted ‘suboptimal’ (‘less intuitive’) category structure than the predicted 
‘optimal’ (‘more intuitive’) category structure. That is, in the condition where 
simplicity predicted a unidimensional classification preference, participants’ 
classifications were more similar to the predicted two-dimensional classification 
structure; in the condition where simplicity predicted a preference for two- 
dimensional classification, participants’ classifications were more similar to the 
predicted unidimensional classification structure. However, for the stimulus 
structures employed in Experiment 1, the classification(s) predicted to be ‘optimal’ in 
each condition shared a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the 
classification(s) predicted to be ‘suboptimal’. Consequently, it was not possible to 
determine whether participants’ classification behaviour in Experiment 1 (which was 
opposite to the predictions of the simplicity model) represented a true preference, 
some unanticipated emergent dimension, or category subclustering. In Experiments 2 
-  4, therefore, I sought to investigate these possibilities further. The results of 
Experiment 2 indicated that the results of Experiment 1 were unlikely to be the 
product of an unanticipated emergent dimension. Moreover, the results of
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Experiments 3 and 4, which sought to reduce the likelihood of category subclustering, 
showed that participants’ classification behaviour in Experiment 1 was robust to 
change. Critically, there was little evidence that participants initially classified in a 
manner that was consistent with the predictions of the simplicity model. One may 
argue, therefore, that this was indicative of a true preference, not necessarily for two- 
dimensional classification when simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional 
classification, for example, but for category subclustering (see Gosselin & Schyns, 
2001). While category subclustering is compatible with the simplicity model, it is 
still the case that participants’ final classifications did not resemble most closely the 
classifications predicted to be ‘optimal’ by the simplicity model. Indeed, the 
simplicity model would never predict such category subclustering to be preferred by 
participants.
In the final experiment of Chapter 2, Experiment 5, two new stimulus 
structures were employed where the predicted ‘optimal’ classification(s) did not share 
a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the predicted ‘suboptimal’ 
classification(s). That is, the categorisation that represented classification along a 
single dimension of variation was as different as possible from the classification that 
took into account both dimensions of variation together. The results of Experiment 5 
were found to support the predictions of the simplicity model. That is, where 
simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, participants’ 
classifications were most similar to the predicted ‘optimal’ unidimensional 
classifications. Where simplicity predicted a preference for two-dimensional 
classification, participants’ classifications were most similar to the predicted ‘optimal’ 
two-dimensional classification.
The findings from Chapter 2 of this thesis have a number of important 
theoretical implications for our understanding of human unsupervised categorisation. 
First, the experiments of Chapter 2 highlight the important influence of abstract 
similarity sfn.ictnT*e nn h^man unsupervised classification. This is exemplified by the 
results of Experiment 5 in which I documented the first empirical demonstration 
showing a two-dimensional bias in unsupervised classification, on the basis of the 
abstract stimulus structure. Moreover, the results of Experiment 5 support the 
assumptions of Rosch (1975) that i) people engage in category construction by 
considering the similarity among a set of stimuli, and ii) that good categories are 
those that maximise within-category similarity and minimise between-category
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similarity. Second, the results of Experiments 1 — 4 document that human 
categorisation does not always fit these assumptions. As shown, when there is 
meaningful substructure contained within the presumed ‘optimal’ classification (i.e., 
the classification that maximises within-category similarity and minimises between- 
category similarity), then participants may likely engage in category subclustering. 
This means that participants’ final classifications will often reflect the subordinate 
level, presumed ‘suboptimal’ classification. Indeed, the results of Experiment 4, and 
to a lesser extent Experiment 3, show that this preference to generate classification 
hierarchies (see Gosselin & Schyns, 2001) is rather robust. Third, therefore, the 
findings of Chapter 2 clearly question the validity of the simplicity model. That is, 
while the simplicity model’s predictions appear accurate under certain sets of 
conditions, under others, it will never correctly predict participants’ classification 
behaviour (although, seeking category subclusters is, at least, compatible with the 
model). Overall, therefore, the findings of Chapter 2 appear to suggest that human 
category constructions is a product of an interaction between the processing biases of 
the classifier and the similarity structure of the stimuli (Ahn & Medin, 1990; see Love 
et al., 2004).
Finally, with respect to the overwhelming prevalence of unidimensional 
classification in the human unsupervised categorisation literature, the findings of 
Chapter 2 strongly suggest that this has arisen partly because of a lack in 
understanding of the biases that exist within the abstract similarity structure of a set of 
stimuli. Specifically, Chapter 2 showed that, as for SUSTAIN (Love et al., 2004), the 
simplicity model also predicts a unidimensional classification preference for the 
widely employed stimulus structure of Medin et al. (1987; see Figure 1, Chapter 1). 
Consequently, while Medin et al. (1987) assumed that this stimulus structure should 
promote family resemblance sorting — because people would construct categories 
around the category prototypes — actually, the structure was biasing people towards 
unidimensional classification. This confusion has therefore fostered a sense that 
people are acting oddly in many laboratory-based unsupervised categorisation studies, 
when in fact they are classifying the stimuli in the most intuitive way, on the basis of 
abstract similarity structure.
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5.1.2 Within-category similarity structure and incidental categorisation
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I investigated incidental categorisation in humans 
and rats. The reasons for taking this comparative approach were two-fold: first, it 
allowed for an examination of whether the mechanisms that underlie incidental 
categorisation in humans might also underlie incidental categorisation in rats. 
Second, therefore, it allowed for an assessment of the role of the classifier in 
spontaneous categorisation.
The findings of Experiment 6 appeared to support the view that humans are 
sensitive to a surprise-driven category invention mechanism in incidental 
categorisation (Clapper & Bower, 1994, 2002). That is, participants preexposed to a 
stimulus similarity structure that contained three highly similar stimuli (e.g., A, B, and 
C) and one distinct stimulus (e.g., F) showed a reduced amount of later property 
generalisation between stimuli A and F than participants preexposed only to stimuli A 
and F. This finding is consistent with the assumption that participants in the former 
group ‘classified apart’ stimuli A and F, and one presumes ‘classified together’ 
stimuli A, B, and C. Moreover, Experiment 7 confirmed that this result was the 
product of the distinct perceptual discontinuity created by exposure to, for example, 
stimuli A, B, C, and F, and not the result of the temporal discontinuity that existed in 
Experiment 6 between exposure to stimulus C and exposure to stimulus F, for 
example. Although temporal factors were not critical in determining the incidental 
categorisation behaviour of participants in Experiments 6 and 7, Experiment 8 
demonstrated that temporal factors play an important role in human incidental 
categorisation. Specifically, Experiment 8 showed that increasing the temporal 
contiguity between the presentation of two similar, but distinct stimuli (e.g., A and F) 
increases their subsequent perceived similarity to each other.
Following this work in humans, Experiments 9 - 1 1  examined incidental 
categorisation in rats. Overall, the pattern of results observed in rats was qualitatively 
different from that observed in humans. Specifically, in Experiment 9, an effect of 
perceptual learning was observed. That is, rats that received preexposure to all of the 
four tone stimuli employed (i.e., A, B, C and D) showed a reduced amount of later 
generalisation between stimuli A and D than those rats that were preexposed only to 
stimuli A and D, and to A, B, and D, for example. In Experiment 10, the temporal 
properties of stimulus preexposure were found to command a strong influence over
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rats’ later generalisation behaviour. Specifically, by massing stimulus exposure, rats 
that received exposure to all four tone stimuli (in condition Sys_trans) came to show 
somewhat greater levels of generalisation between stimuli A and D than rats that 
received exposure only to stimuli A and D. This result was confirmed in Experiment 
11. By combining Experiments 10 and 11, it was possible to conclude that rats in 
condition Sys trans (i.e., those that received preexposure to stimuli A, B, C and D) 
subsequently showed significantly more generalisation between stimuli A and D 
relative to rats that only received preexposure to stimuli A and D.
The implications, both theoretical and practical, of Chapter 3 are broad. First, 
a new experimental procedure was introduced that allowed for a formally equivalent, 
comparative assessment of incidental categorisation in humans and rats. Second, 
although the patterns of results were qualitatively different, the findings of Chapter 3 
showed that the stimulus similarity structure of an exposed set of stimuli commands 
an important influence over later generalisation behaviour in both humans and rats. 
Specifically, the findings of Experiments 6 and 7 support the view that humans 
engage in incidental category formation on the basis of stimulus similarity structure. 
Moreover, they appear consistent with the proposal of Rosch (1975) that people prefer 
to form categories that maximise within-category similarity and minimise between- 
category similarity. Experiments 6 and 7 lend strong support to the proposal of 
Clapper and Bower (1994, 2002) that human spontaneous categorisation is guided by 
a surprise-driven category invention mechanism (see also Love et al., 2004). 
Interestingly, the patterns of results from Experiments 6 -  8 do not support the 
proposal that transformational knowledge encourages stimuli to be ‘classified 
together’ (cf. Zaki & Homa, 1999).
One of the most important findings of Chapter 3 was that, using a formally 
equivalent experimental design to Experiment 6, rats showed little evidence of 
meaningful, human-like incidental categorisation. Rather, simpler associative 
mechanisms could readily explain the rat results of Experiments 9 —11. Of course, 
this is not to say that other nonhuman animals would not show incidental 
categorisation behaviour that is consistent with the findings from humans. Overall, 
however, the findings o f Chapter 3 suggest an important role for the classifier in 
incidental categorisation.
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5.1.3 Cross-classification in rats
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I investigated whether rats exhibited another 
important aspect of human categorisation; namely, stimulus cross-classification. To 
recapitulate, some authors have argued that, on the basis of simple associative 
processes, nonhuman animals are incapable of meaningful, human-like categorisation 
(see Chater & Heyes, 1994). In particular, whereas human categorisation is 
effortlessly flexible, nonhuman animal categorisation will be inflexible, due to the 
nature of association formation. If one accepts this argument, it is hardly surprising 
that rats did not show incidental classification behaviour that was consistent with that 
of humans in Chapter 3. However, recent experimental results (see Honey & Watt, 
1998, 1999), and the connectionist architectures bom from this work, have challenged 
the arguments of Chater and Heyes (1994). In Chapter 4 of this thesis, therefore, I 
examined one prediction from the connectionist architecture outlined by Honey and 
Ward-Robinson (2002). Specifically, this architecture predicts that simple associative 
processes should afford flexible forms of categorisation behaviour, such as stimulus 
cross-classification. Over the two experiments detailed in Chapter 4, I showed that 
rats do have the cognitive requisites to engage in stimulus cross-classification, by 
demonstrating that rats’ perceptions of similarity are context-dependent.
The results of Chapter 4, therefore, supported the connectionist analysis of 
learning outlined by Honey and Ward-Robinson (2002), demonstrating that relatively 
simple associative principles can bring about complex, cognitively flexible forms of 
classification behaviour. This has important implications with respect to the 
plausibility of spontaneous categorization in nonhuman animals. Specifically, the 
findings of Chapter 4 are, at least, suggestive of the possibility that spontaneous 
categorisation is not beyond the cognitive capacities of rats. Moreover, Experiments 
12 and 13 of Chapter 4 have two further theoretical implications: First, they show 
that natural language is not a prerequisite for complex, cognitively flexible cognition. 
Second, they raise the question of whether the context-dependent nature of similarity 
in humans arises through similar associative processes.
5.2 Suggestions for future research
The experiments detailed in this thesis raise many interesting questions for 
future research. In this section, therefore, I propose a number of avenues for future
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research that would help to explore more fully some of the theoretical implications 
raised from this thesis.
5.2.1 Unidimensional versus multidimensional unsupervised categorisation
In a general sense, the results of Chapter 2 of this thesis demonstrate that 
further empirical investigation of the influence of abstract stimulus structure on 
unsupervised categorisation is an important topic for future research. A number of 
more specific suggestions for future research are apparent from the experiments of 
Chapter 2, however, and these are discussed further below.
One particularly interesting topic for future research concerns the issue of 
category subclustering (or subordinate level categorisation) in human unsupervised 
categorisation; this issue arose in Experiments 1 -  4 of Chapter 2. One immediate 
question is as follows: when employing stimulus structures where the predicted
‘optimal’ classiflcation(s) shares a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the 
predicted ‘suboptimal’ classification(s) (at least, according to the simplicity model), is 
it the case that participants’ final classifications will always be more similar to the 
‘suboptimal’ (subordinate level) classification(s)? Moreover, following up the work 
conducted in Experiments 3 and 4 of Chapter 2, what factors influence the occurrence 
of category subclustering in unsupervised categorisation? Milton et al. (2008), for 
example, have shown that taxing working memory influences participants’ 
classification behaviour. If one were to impose a strict time constraint on 
classification and tax working memory at the same time, would this be sufficient to 
eradicate any influence of category subclustering, and therefore reverse the results of 
Experiments 1 - 4 ?
When the issue of category subclustering is negated, the simplicity model of 
unsupervised categorisation accurately predicts when participants will prefer 
unidimensional classification, and when they will prefer multidimensional 
classification (see Experiment 5, Chapter 2). A number of obvious follow-ups to this 
finding present themselves: First, it is important to establish if the simplicity model 
makes accurate predictions with respect to binary dimensioned, as opposed to 
continuous dimensioned, stimuli. As documented in Chapter 2, the simplicity model 
accurately predicted a bias for unidimensional unsupervised classification for the four 
dimensional, binary-valued stimulus structure employed by Medin et al. (1987; see 
Figure 1, Chapter 1). However, it is not known whether participants would
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preferentially engage in family resemblance sorting when presented with a binary­
valued stimulus structure for which simplicity predicts a preference for 
multidimensional unsupervised classification. The fact that so many unsupervised 
categorisation studies have employed binary-valued stimuli makes research of this 
nature particularly interesting, although not the most naturalistic. Second, it would be 
interesting to extend this work into stimuli with more than two dimensions. 
Obviously natural stimuli are composed of many different dimensions of variation; 
consequently, to study unsupervised categorisation in a naturalistic way in the 
laboratory, those stimuli employed should similarly have many dimensions of 
variation. Unfortunately, modelling work becomes particularly complex when 
employing stimuli with a great number of dimensions of variation. In future research, 
though, modelling work involving three dimensions of variation would be an obvious 
next step.
Third, focusing on the stimulus structures employed in Experiment 5 of 
Chapter 2, it would be interesting to see whether participants’ classification 
preferences were observable in a supervised learning task. That is, in the condition 
where simplicity predicted a preference for unidimensional classification, is it the case 
that people learn the predicted classifications along either just dimension x or just 
dimension y  more quickly than the predicted classification that takes into account both 
dimensions of variation together? Similarly, in the condition where simplicity 
predicted a preference for two-dimensional classification, is it the case that people 
learn the predicted classification that takes into account both dimensions of variation 
together more quickly than the predicted classification along either just dimension x 
or just dimension y? If people do show faster learning of the classification(s) that are 
predicted to be ‘optimal’ in each condition, then it would be a simple matter to 
employ the same learning task in, for example, pigeons or nonhuman primates. This 
interesting research would therefore allow for an assessment of uni dimensional versus 
multidimensional classification in nonhuman animals. Moreover, it would allow for a 
direct comparative contrast of the classification biases that arise from abstract 
stimulus structure in human and nonhuman animals.
Finally, in future research I would like to introduce a time constraint on 
people’s unsupervised classification of the stimuli derived from the two stimulus 
structures employed in Experiment 5. To recapitulate, time pressure has been 
associated both with an increase in uni dimensional unsupervised classification (e.g.,
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Milton et al., 2008), and an increase in unsupervised classification based on a 
principle of family resemblance (e.g., Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1984). In Experiment 
5 of Chapter 2, one situation was established that promoted a unidimensional 
classification bias, and a second situation was established that promoted a two- 
dimensional classification bias. Consequently, these conditions provide a perfect 
situation through which to assess whether a time constraint should be associated with 
a unique increase in unidimensional sorting, or a unique increase in family 
resemblance sorting. If it should be associated with an increase in unidimensional 
unsupervised classification, then one should expect an enhancement in 
unidimensional classification in the condition where such a bias is predicted, and a 
reduction in two-dimensional classification in the condition where such a bias is 
predicted. In contrast, if  imposing a time constraint should be associated with an 
increase in family resemblance sorting, then one should expect a reduction in 
unidimensional classification in the condition where such a bias is predicted, and an 
increase in two-dimensional classification in the condition where such a bias is 
predicted. Equally plausible, however, is the possibility that a time constraint will 
simply lead to an enhancement of the results of Experiment 5, due to people being 
forced to only classify on the basis of the classification(s) that they perceive to be 
more intuitive, or ‘optimal’. This research would have wide implications for our 
understanding of the basis of unsupervised category construction, as it would allow 
for a clear assessment of which classification strategy should be regarded as the 
‘primitive’ of human unsupervised categorisation.
5.2.2 Within-category similarity structure and incidental categorisation
A number of important theoretical implications of the findings from Chapter 3 
were considered in Section 5.1.2. With these implications in mind, a number of 
follow-up studies present themselves for future research.
First, the findings of Experiments 6 -  8 in humans need to be replicated with a 
different stimulus set. This is important to establish that the findings were not a 
product of some particular quality of the stimulus set employed in these experiments, 
and to also confirm the robustness of the findings. In particular, it would be 
interesting to employ stimuli that were entirely arbitrary, meaning that there was 
absolutely no associated prior knowledge with the stimuli being classified (e.g., Grand 
et al., 2007). Second, it would be interesting to extend the stimulus set used to try to
193
increase the size of the effects found. Based on the theorising of Clapper and Bower 
(1994, 2002), for example, the surprise-driven category invention mechanism should 
be more effective the more information people have about the ‘norms’ that establish 
membership in Category A, and the norms that establish membership in Category B. 
Consequently, it would be interesting to replicate Experiment 6 employing a stimulus 
set that contains renderings of morph stimuli at 1%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 
60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 100%. Given such a stimulus set, one would then be able 
to expose participants in the Surprise condition to the 1%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 
80%, and 100% morph renderings, for example. This should enhance the perceived 
perceptual discontinuity between the 1%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% stimuli and the 
80% and 100% stimuli, meaning that participants in the Surprise condition should be 
more definite in their belief that the 1% and 100% stimuli should be classified in 
separate categories. If  true, then later generalisation between the 1% and 100% 
stimuli should be reduced to a greater extent than that found in Experiment 6.
In future research, I would also like to introduce a fifth condition that explores 
participants’ perceptions of the 1% and 100% stimuli after viewing morph animations 
of the 1% stimuli morphing into the 100% stimuli. To recapitulate, in Experiments 6 
-  8 of Chapter 3, no effect of transformational knowledge was found. It would be of 
particular interest, therefore, if viewing the complete morph animation (i.e., the 1% 
stimuli morphing into the 100% stimuli) did influence later generalisation between 
these stimuli, relative to a baseline condition. Indeed, there is good reason to think 
that it might: recent research has shown that exposure to short animations of one 
object morphing into another object does influence participants’ perceptions of 
stimulus similarity (Hahn et al., 2009; see also, Hockema, Blair, & Goldstone, 2005).
The findings of Chapter 3 also raise the interesting question of whether 
incidental categorisation, guided by a surprise-driven category invention mechanism, 
is prevalent throughout human development. Due to the flexibility of the 
experimental procedure introduced to study incidental categorisation in Chapter 3, this 
should be a relatively simple question to test. For example, following stimulus 
preexposure in older children, one could establish a small startle response (e.g., loud 
noise) to, for example, the 1% stimulus. Subsequently, one could monitor the child’s 
response during presentation of the 100% stimulus. The prediction would be that the 
greater the perceived similarity of the 1% and 100% stimuli, the greater the startle 
response will be to the 100% stimulus, in this case. The experimental procedure
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could also be adapted to the study of incidental classification in infants and neonates. 
Specifically, following stimulus preexposure, one could then present, for example, the 
1 % stimulus for a period of time until the infant/ neonate loses interest in the stimulus. 
Subsequently, one could monitor the infant’s/ neonate’s looking time to the 100% 
stimulus, in this case. Critically, novelty has been found to be closely related to an 
increase in looking time (e.g., Behl-Chadha, 1996; Murai et al., 2004). The prediction 
here would be, therefore, that the more similar the 1% and 100% stimuli are perceived 
to be, the less novel the 100% stimulus will appear, which will reduce infant/ neonate 
looking time to this stimulus. This research would be of particular interest to the 
question of whether humans engage in category construction first, and then later apply 
language labels to these categories, or whether category construction is based on 
previously learned language labels (see Nelson, 1974).
The results of Experiments 9 — 11 in rats raise a number of interesting 
questions for future research. First, do other nonhuman animals engage in incidental 
categorisation in a manner that is consistent with the mechanisms that appear to 
underlie incidental categorisation in humans? Critically, the experimental procedure 
developed in Chapter 3 can be employed to assess incidental categorisation in many 
different species of nonhuman animal. To reiterate from Chapter 3, important 
differences existed between the assessment of incidental categorisation in humans 
(Experiments 6 - 8 )  and the assessment of incidental categorisation rats (Experiments 
9 -  11). Most obvious of these differences is that while humans received exposure to 
visual stimuli, rats received exposure to auditory stimuli. In future research, 
therefore, I am keen to employ the experimental procedure introduced in Chapter 3 to 
examine incidental categorisation in pigeons and nonhuman primates. By focusing on 
these animals, it would be possible to expose exactly the same visual stimuli that were 
exposed to the human participants in Experiments 6 — 8. Consequently, a more direct 
comparative assessment of incidental categorisation in human and nonhuman animals 
would be possible. Second, the findings of Experiments 10 and 11 showed some 
evidence that transformational information increased the perceived similarity of 
stimuli A and D in rats, relative to a baseline condition. Specifically, those rats 
preexposed to stimuli A, B, C and D showed a greater amount of subsequent 
generalisation between stimuli A and D than rats preexposed only to stimuli A and D. 
This finding was brought about by massing stimulus preexposure to a greater extent 
than in Experiment 9. In future research, therefore, I would like to mass stimulus
195
preexposure further by exposing rats to all of the stimuli they are scheduled to receive 
within a single session. That is, exposure to stimulus B would occur immediately 
after exposure to stimulus A, and so on. Moreover, future research could look to play 
a dynamic auditory stimulus to rats, where stimulus A is heard to transform into 
stimulus D. To the best o f my knowledge, nonhuman animals have not been 
preexposed to transformational stimuli such as this, which makes research of this type 
particularly interesting.
Finally, in future research I hope to investigate incidental categorisation 
further using a within-participants version of the incidental classification task 
introduced in Chapter 3, which I have developed. A within-participant design would 
be particularly useful when assessing incidental categorisation in nonhuman animals, 
as having sufficient experimental power is always an issue.
5.2.3 Cross-classification in rats
The experimental results o f Chapter 4 raise the intriguing possibility that the 
influence of context on human judgements of similarity may arise on the basis of 
simple associative processes (i.e., in an analogous way to that of rats). One possible 
way to test this would be to adapt the experimental task employed by Grand et al. 
(2007). For example, one could have participants initially learn a discrimination in 
which different ‘spacebugs’ are killed by different insecticide sprays. That is, while 
in context X, a red insecticide spray kills spacebug stimuli A and B and a blue 
insecticide spray kills spacebug stimuli C and D, in context Y, the red insecticide 
spray kills spacebug stimuli A and D, and the blue insecticide spray kills spacebug 
stimuli B and C. After learning this discrimination, one could then teach participants 
that only a new yellow insecticide spray will now kill spacebug stimulus B, while a 
new green insecticide spray is required to kill spacebug stimulus D. Subsequently, 
generalisation of the use of the yellow and green insecticide sprays can be assessed to 
spacebug stimuli A and C within each context (i.e., X and Y). The prediction here 
would be that, in context X, participants should come to use the yellow insecticide 
spray to kill spacebug stimulus A and the green insecticide spray to kill spacebug 
stimulus C. In contrast, in context Y, participants should come to use the yellow 
insecticide spray to kill spacebug stimulus C and the green insecticide spray to kill 
spacebug stimulus A.
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The findings o f Experiments 12 and 13 of Chapter 4 supported the predictions 
of the connectionist analysis outlined by Honey and Ward-Robinson (2002). In future 
research, I also hope to interrogate this connectionist architecture further to see 
whether other unique predictions are made about the flexibility of nonhuman animal 
behaviour, based on simple associative principles.
5.3 Conclusions
This thesis investigated how stimulus similarity structure and the statistical 
properties of the environment influence certain categorisation behaviour in humans 
and rats. With respect to humans, the experimental work presented in this thesis has 
shown that stimulus similarity structure commands an important influence over our 
unsupervised categorisation behaviour. Indeed, stimulus similarity structure is likely 
to be a key determinant of the overwhelming bias for unidimensional unsupervised 
classification found in the laboratory. This influence of stimulus similarity structure 
on human unsupervised categorisation makes sense; to quote Anderson, 
“psychologists must understand human behaviour by assuming it is adapted to the 
environment” (1991, p. 409). That is, Anderson (1991) argues that the human mind is 
adapted to pick up on perceived regularity within the environment, and that this 
perceived regularity will be utilised by humans. However, the findings of Chapters 2 
and 3 of this thesis also show that human categorisation is a complex phenomenon, 
which is influenced by many different factors. Consequently, while categorisation 
based simply on a principle of maximising within-category similarity and minimising 
between-category similarity is appealing, it can only take one so far. The complexity 
of human categorisation is where flexible models, such as SUSTAIN (Love et al., 
2004), come to the fore, while more inflexible models, such as the simplicity model 
(Pothos & Chater, 2002), show their limitations. With respect to the simplicity model 
of unsupervised categorisation, ultimately I believe that the combinatorics involved in 
the model will let it down. The amount of processing power that would be required to 
deal with real world categorisation, in which one sees thousands of dimensionally 
complex stimuli, is vast. Perhaps, however, this is where knowledge factors may 
play a role in the model. Specifically, prior knowledge may be able to provide further 
constraints on categorisation, which may radically reduce the amount of processing 
power required to deal with natural categorisation. To reiterate though, the interaction 
between general knowledge and unsupervised categorisation is an incredibly complex
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process (see, e.g., Heit, 1997; Malt & Sloman, 2007). To accommodate general 
knowledge factors, therefore, the simplicity formalism would need considerable 
revision.
With respect to rats, the experimental work presented in this thesis has shown 
that they are sensitive to stimulus similarity7 structure, but in a qualitatively different 
way to humans. On the one hand, therefore, little evidence was found to support the 
idea that rats engage in spontaneous categorisation in a manner that is similar to 
humans, or even at all. On the other hand, however, the findings of Chapter 4 show 
that rats can show complex, cognitively flexible form of classification behaviour. To 
my mind, I believe that the findings of Chapter 4 are at least suggestive of the 
possibility that rats (and most likely other nonhuman animals) do have the cognitive 
requisites to engage in some rudimentary form of spontaneous categorisation; the 
problem is how to reveal this. With respect to this problem, I hope that the 
experimental procedure introduced in Chapter 3 will be at the forefront of future 
investigations of spontaneous categorisation behaviour in nonhuman animals.
To conclude, as highlighted at the beginning of this thesis, the connectionist 
analysis of human and nonhuman behaviour is revealing interesting new avenues for 
future research all the time. I believe that such analysis will be critical if we ever 
hope to have a unified theory and model of human and nonhuman animal 
categorisation. Of course, this is still a long way off, but with targeted comparative 
research, it may just happen.
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Figure 28. The frequency with which participants produced classifications based on a 
specific number o f clusters in Experiment 1.
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Figure 29. The frequency with which participants produced classifications based on a 
specific number o f clusters in Experiment 2.
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Figure 30. The frequency with which participants produced classifications based on a 
specific number o f clusters in Experiment 3.
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specific number of clusters in Experiment 5.
Appendix 2
Table 8. Mean number o f food well entries during PCS and CS periods across the
three days o f conditioning, split by condition.
Experiment 9
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Condition PCS CS PCS CS PCS CS
Baseline 66.25 70.63 61.75 74.63 57.38 64.75
Surprise 59.38 64.75 53.75 64.63 48.88 59.13
Sys_trans 51.38 62.25 47.50 48.75 40.13 52.88
Scram trans 56.00 67.75 52.63 68.38 43.63 67.63
Experiment 10
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Condition PCS CS PCS CS PCS CS
Baseline 63.63 75.13 55.75 66.25 48.13 59.13
Systrans 56.63 58.00 39.75 50.50 39.50 59.00
Experiment 11
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Condition PCS CS PCS CS PCS CS
Baseline 61.88 71.13 40.50 54.75 42.13 66.00
Systrans 53.88 67.50 48.75 56.75 47.25 70.50
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